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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 675 Filed 06/25/22 Page 10 of 21

contains “emphatic language” which “preclude[s] categorical proscriptions on any factor concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant, with the exception of invidious factors.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

Additionally, there is nothing in section 3661 limiting sentencing information to individuals who meet the CVRA’s definition of being directly and proximately harmed by the offense. See Degenhardt, 405 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1343 (D. Utah 2005). Federal judges have broad discretion to allow “affected individuals to present information to the court at sentencing.” United States v. Gamma Tech Industries, Inc., 265 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2001). See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949).

At least one federal court of appeals has considered the situation where a person provided information to the sentencing court even though the defendant objected that the individual did not meet the CVRA’s definition of victim. In United States v. Leach, 206 Fed. Appx. 432, 2006 WL 3203746 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished), the court, while sentencing the defendant to felon-in-possession of a firearm, allowed the defendant’s estranged wife to be heard. She told the court that the defendant was a dangerous man who had threatened to kill her. The Sixth Circuit held that the sentencing court possessed discretion to hear from the wife under section 3661. The Court explained that the CVRA “did not alter (or, more importantly, limit) a district court’s traditional broad discretion to consider a wide variety of factors at sentencing.” Id. at 434.

These authorities clearly support the principle that this Court has broad unlimited discretion in sentencing Maxwell to hear from anyone it believes will have relevant information. Sarah and

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