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Case 22-1426, Document 77, 06/29/2023, 3536038, Page187 of 258
SA-185
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 185 of 348

The meeting of USAO representatives and Epstein’s defense attorneys, together with the
State Attorney and the lead state prosecutor on September 12, 2007, was a necessary part of the
NPA negotiation process.

Even after the NPA was signed, the defense continued to request meetings and reviews of
the case, both within the USAO and by the Department’s Criminal Division and the Deputy
Attorney General. Although limited reviews were granted, during this period there was only one
substantive meeting with Acosta, on December 14, 2007.232 This meeting occurred in lieu of the
meeting Starr had requested of Assistant Attorney General Fisher, most likely because the defense
submissions to the Department’s Criminal Division had raised issues not previously raised with
the USAO and the Department determined that Acosta should address those in the first instance.233
Acosta told OPR that he did not ask for the Department review, but he also did not want to appear
as if he “fear[ed]” that review. Acosta’s nuanced position, however, was not clear to the
Department attorneys who responded to Epstein’s appeals and who perceived Acosta to be in favor
of a Department review, rather than merely tolerant of it. Notably, though, none of those meetings
or reviews resulted in the USAO abandoning the NPA, and Epstein gained no substantial
advantage from his continued entreaties.

In sum, in evaluating the subjects’ conduct, OPR considered the number of meetings, their
purpose, the content of the discussions, and decisions made afterwards. OPR cannot say that the
number of meetings, particularly those occurring before the NPA was signed, was so far outside
the norm—for a high profile case with skilled defense attorneys—that the quantity of meetings
alone shows that the subjects were motivated by improper favoritism. In evaluating the subjects’
conduct, OPR considered that the meetings were held with different levels of USAO managers and
that the explanations for the decisions to participate in the meetings reflected reasonable strategic
goals. Although OPR cannot rule out the possibility that because Acosta, Menchel, Lourie, or
Sloman knew or knew of the defense attorneys, they may have been willing to meet with them, it
is also true that prosecutors routinely meet with defense attorneys, including those who are known
to them and those who are not. Furthermore, meetings are more likely to occur in high profile
cases involving defendants with the financial resources to hire skilled defense counsel who request
meetings at the highest levels of the USAO and the Department. Most significantly, OPR did not
find evidence supporting a conclusion that the meetings themselves resulted in any substantial
benefit to the defense. At each meeting, defense counsel strongly pressed the USAO—on factual,
legal, and policy grounds—to forgo its federal investigation and to return the matter to the state to
proceed as it saw fit. The USAO never yielded on that point. Accordingly, OPR did not find
evidence supporting a conclusion that Acosta, Sloman, Menchel, Lourie, or Villafaña met with
defense counsel for the purpose of benefiting Epstein or that the meetings themselves caused
Acosta or the other subjects to provide improper benefits to Epstein.

232 Acosta’s October 12, 2007 breakfast meeting with Lefkowitz is discussed separately in the following section.

233 Starr and other defense attorneys only obtained one meeting at the Department level, with Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Mandelker and CEOS Chief Oosterbaan in March 2008. Although Starr requested a meeting with
Assistant Attorney General Fisher and another with Deputy Attorney General Filip, those requests were not granted.

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