FBI
OrganizationRelationship Network
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
USANYS Staff
|
Professional law enforcement |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
USAO SDNY
|
Legal representative |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
GHISLAINE MAXWELL
|
Subject of investigation |
1
|
1 | |
|
organization
USAO
|
Interagency cooperation |
1
|
1 | |
|
location
USANYS
|
Professional tension |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
GHISLAINE MAXWELL
|
No direct contact as per maxwell |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
Wild
|
Victim investigator communication |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
BRAD EDWARDS
|
Informant |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
Rothstein
|
Subject of investigation prosecution |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
Пенг
|
Possible victim of federal crime recipient of victim assistance information |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
OPR
|
Provided notification to |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
Epstein
|
Investigated |
1
|
1 | |
|
organization
USAO
|
Collaborate on victim notification |
1
|
1 | |
|
organization
USAO
|
Did not obtain vns information from |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
[REDACTED] victim
|
Victim investigator |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
sender
|
Professional cooperation |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
OCME
|
Investigative cooperation |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
USANYS Staff
|
Professional investigative |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
SDNY Assistant U.S. Attorney
|
Professional conflict |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
SDNY Prosecutors
|
Professional tension |
1
|
1 | |
|
organization
NYPD
|
Interagency collaboration |
1
|
1 | |
|
location
USANYS
|
Interagency collaboration |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
DOJ
|
Inter agency cooperation |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
Davis
|
Investigative interest |
1
|
1 | |
|
person
Reiter
|
Source informant |
1
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | OPR working with FBI Palm Beach Office, including case agents and Victim Witness Specialist, to o... | Palm Beach | View |
| N/A | N/A | FBI search of Automated Case Support system and documentation of victim notification system. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | FBI Meeting | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | Notification received by OPR from FBI and USAO regarding federal investigation and Epstein's plea. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | FBI investigation into Epstein's international sex trafficking organization was quashed. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Federal investigation began, contemporaneous with news reports of Epstein's arrest. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Victims provided OPR with information regarding their contacts with the FBI and USAO. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Rothstein's firm was raided. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | FBI produced a criminal complaint related to Alfredo Rodriguez. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Potential arrest of Ghislaine Maxwell ('green lighting ab arrest'). | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | Launch of counterintelligence investigation into Trump campaign | USA | View |
| N/A | N/A | Defense counsel review of nude images | FBI | View |
| N/A | N/A | FBI interview of a victim pursuant to a federal investigation regarding the sexual exploitation o... | Unknown | View |
| N/A | Investigation | Epstein investigation | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Transfer of evidence | New York Office (NYO) | View |
| N/A | N/A | Criminal Investigation / Agency Interviews | MCC New York | View |
| N/A | N/A | Search of Epstein's island | Little St. James | View |
| N/A | N/A | Seizure of images from Jeffrey Epstein's residences pursuant to search warrants. | New York and Virgin Islands | View |
| N/A | N/A | Planned Arrest upon return to US | Unspecified Airport | View |
| N/A | N/A | Closure of federal investigations by FBI and U.S. Attorney | Federal jurisdiction | View |
| N/A | N/A | FBI Raid / Evidence Collection | Epstein Residence | View |
| N/A | N/A | Identification of new victims | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | Government interviews with accusers | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | Opening of the case/Investigation | New York | View |
| N/A | N/A | Referral of case to FBI | Palm Beach | View |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030246.jpg
This document appears to be a drafted statement or email by Jeffrey Epstein (sent from jeevacation@gmail.com) in which he aggressively defends himself against federal charges and media narratives. He details his grievances with the FBI's plea deal tactics, claims he was forced to pay women he never met, and specifically attempts to discredit a redacted accuser (likely Virginia Giuffre) by denying her claims regarding Bill Clinton, Al Gore, and Prince Andrew. The text is notable for its numerous spelling errors and the author's insistence that the women involved were not underage or were strip club workers lying about their age.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020376.jpg
This document page (labeled House Oversight) is a narrative analysis focusing on the impact of Edward Snowden's intelligence leaks. It details how Snowden communicated with journalists Laura Poitras and Jacob Appelbaum in 2013 and cites officials like Michael Morell and Admiral Rogers confirming that the leaks caused terrorist targets (specifically ISIS and those on the PRISM watch list) to go dark or change communication methods. The text references the November 2015 Paris attacks but concludes that while specific events can't be solely blamed on Snowden, his actions purposefully compromised intelligence operations.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020375.jpg
This document appears to be page 223 of a House Oversight report (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020375) detailing the impact of Edward Snowden's leaks on NSA surveillance capabilities. It describes three specific programs compromised by Snowden: the '215' phone record program, PRISM (Section 702) which intercepted internet data, and XKeyscore which tracked digital fingerprints. The text also details Snowden's warnings regarding British GCHQ surveillance and the interception of data passing through the UK.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020353.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (likely by journalist Edward Jay Epstein, given the reference to his book on Angleton) discussing KGB espionage tactics. It details the handling of NSA spy Ronald Pelton, including payments totaling $35,000 and debriefings in Vienna regarding 'Project A' (undersea cable tapping). The author uses the Pelton case to analyze Russian intelligence's probable interest in and handling of Edward Snowden, suggesting they would aggressively exploit his knowledge just as they did Pelton's.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020352.jpg
This document appears to be a page (200) from a book or interview transcript included in a House Oversight file (stamped 020352). It details a conversation with a former KGB officer named Cherkashin regarding Cold War espionage. The text focuses on the definitions of 'mole' versus 'espionage source' and details the specific recruitment cases of Robert Hanssen and Ronald Pelton, including the tradecraft used to smuggle Pelton out of the Soviet embassy in 1980. There is no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein on this specific page.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020351.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or narrative report included in House Oversight Committee records. It details an interview with KGB officer Victor Cherkashin regarding the motivations and handling of famous American spies Aldrich Ames (CIA) and Robert Hanssen (FBI). The text contrasts Ames, who was managed by the KGB and motivated by resentment and debt, with Hanssen, who was a self-recruited 'mercenary' that controlled the terms of his own espionage.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020350.jpg
This document is page 198 of a manuscript (labeled HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020350) titled 'Through the Looking Glass'. It details an interview in Moscow between the narrator and former KGB spy handler Victor Ivanovich Cherkashin. The text focuses on Cherkashin's recruitment of high-profile US intelligence officers (Ames, Hanssen, Pelton) and his philosophy that resentment, rather than greed or lust, is the primary vulnerability in recruiting spies.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020336.jpg
This document appears to be page 184 from a book (likely by Edward Jay Epstein regarding Edward Snowden) included in a House Oversight Committee production. It details Edward Snowden's arrival in Hong Kong in May 2013, his possession of critical NSA documents, and the geopolitical risks involved, specifically regarding China and Russia. The text analyzes Snowden as a 'single point of failure' for US intelligence and discusses the potential for hostile foreign intelligence services to access the stolen data.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020328.jpg
This document, page 176 of a House Oversight report, analyzes Russian intelligence (SVR) strategies for penetrating the NSA, contrasting the difficulty of recruiting NSA officers versus CIA officers. It details the shift in the 1990s toward targeting civilian technologists and hacktivists, specifically mentioning Edward Snowden as a donor to Ron Paul's campaign, and discusses the use of 'false flag' operations to recruit dissidents.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020325.jpg
This document page details Cold War era espionage cases involving the KGB and SVR, specifically mentioning spies Ronald Pelton and David Sheldon Boone. It primarily focuses on the recruitment of CIA officer Harold Nicholson by the Russian SVR in the 1990s, explaining how he was manipulated from a "dangle" operation into a mole due to psychological vulnerabilities.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020322.jpg
This document details the failure of NSA surveillance to detect the Russian invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014, attributed to Russia's ability to hide electronic traces. It discusses Vladimir Putin's geopolitical motivations to restore Russian power and counter U.S. hegemony, while contrasting the legal constraints on the NSA regarding domestic surveillance with the broad powers of Russian intelligence services under the SORM system.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020318.jpg
This document appears to be page 166 of a report (likely Congressional, given the footer 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT') detailing the privatization of US government security clearance background checks. It specifically critiques the hiring of Edward Snowden by Booz Allen Hamilton and the failure of USIS (United States Investigative Services) to properly vet him due to profit-seeking incentives and lack of inter-agency access (CIA files). The text outlines how USIS, owned by Providence Equity Partners, was sued in 2014 for fraudulently closing hundreds of thousands of background checks to maximize revenue.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020316.jpg
This document appears to be a page (164) from a narrative report or book included in House Oversight records. It details the history of cybersecurity vulnerabilities within US intelligence, specifically the NSA's reliance on civilian contractors and system administrators. It draws parallels between the KGB's recruitment of hackers in the 1980s and the NSA's hiring of 'hacktivist' culture technicians post-9/11 to compete with tech giants. It specifically mentions that by 2013, sensitive NSA work was outsourced to firms like Booz Allen Hamilton and Microsoft.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020314.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book (Chapter Twenty) included in a House Oversight file. It discusses intelligence failures, specifically comparing the 1994 discovery of CIA mole Aldrich Ames to the later security breach by Edward Snowden. It highlights a prescient 1996 NSA report that warned networking computers would make the agency vulnerable to a 'system administrator' acting as a mole.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020310.jpg
This document page (158) details the history of NSA surveillance expansion following the 9/11 attacks, specifically focusing on the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. It discusses the conflict between government intelligence gathering and privacy advocates (hacktivists), the technical measures taken to bypass encryption/TOR, and the subsequent bureaucratic compliance framework established involving the DOJ and DOD. While part of a larger House Oversight cache, this specific page contains no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020307.jpg
This document appears to be a historical overview of United States signals intelligence, tracing its origins from the 'Black Chamber' and Western Union cooperation in the 1920s through World War II codebreaking (Enigma and Purple ciphers) to the formation of the NSA in 1952. It details the NSA's mandate to protect US communications and intercept foreign signals, noting its expansion during the Cold War with a 'black budget' and advanced technology. While part of a larger House Oversight production (likely related to intelligence abuses or history), this specific page contains no direct references to Jeffrey Epstein.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020301.jpg
This document, page 149 of a House Oversight production, details the 2010 FBI arrest of Russian sleeper agents (the 'Illegals Program') and the subsequent compromise of the CIA's mole, Poteyev. It describes concerns within the NSA regarding potential SVR penetration at Fort Meade and the logistical impossibility of vetting all employees against insider threats. The text explains how an FBI sting operation against agent Anna Chapman inadvertently revealed Poteyev's identity, necessitating his urgent exfiltration from Russia to the U.S. via Belarus.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020300.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a narrative report or book regarding Russian intelligence operations, specifically the SVR's 'Illegals Program.' It details how a source named Poteyev informed the CIA about sleeper agents, including Anna Chapman, and discusses the high costs of FBI surveillance required to monitor these individuals ($10,000/day). The text concludes with a 2010 warning from Poteyev that Russian military intelligence was seeking to activate these agents for a sensitive assignment.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020299.jpg
This document is a page from a book or report (Chapter 18: The Unheeded Warning) marked as House Oversight evidence. It details the history of Alexander Poteyev, a high-level SVR colonel recruited by the CIA in the 1990s who provided warnings in 2010 about Russian espionage. The text explains the SVR's strategy of using 'illegal' sleeper agents in the US to bypass FBI surveillance of diplomatic staff and service moles within US intelligence agencies.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020288.jpg
This document is a page from a House Oversight report (Bates stamp 020288) detailing the intelligence leaks attributed to Edward Snowden. It discusses the logistics of how documents were transferred between Snowden, Laura Poitras, and Glenn Greenwald, including the interception of a courier at Heathrow. The text analyzes the potential damage of specific missing documents, particularly 'level 3' lists concerning Russia and China, and questions whether Snowden took these files to Moscow. Note: While the user prompt requested Epstein-related data, this specific page is exclusively focused on the Snowden/NSA leaks.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020278.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a narrative book or report (marked as a House Oversight exhibit) detailing Cold War espionage tradecraft. It specifically discusses the case of Robert Hanssen, a 'walk-in' spy who provided the KGB with massive amounts of US intelligence while refusing direct control or face-to-face meetings, and contrasts this with the defection of KGB Major Anatoli Golitsyn in 1962. The text analyzes the intelligence value of 'defectors-in-place' versus those who physically defect to the United States.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020277.jpg
This document appears to be page 125 of a larger report or book (Chapter Sixteen: 'The Question of When?'), marked with a House Oversight footer. The text discusses the history and mechanics of espionage, contrasting recruited moles (referencing John Le Carré novels and Heinz Felfe) with 'walk-ins' or self-generated spies (referencing Alexander Poteyev and Robert Hanssen). It analyzes how intelligence agencies manage these assets and notes a 1990 PFIEB finding that most Cold War spies were volunteers rather than recruits.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020275.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (marked with House Oversight numbering) discussing the theory that Edward Snowden may have been guided or assisted by a hidden Russian mole within the NSA. The text draws parallels to historical espionage cases involving KGB moles Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, who eluded detection for decades. It includes details of an interview the author conducted in 2015 with Victor Cherkashin, the KGB handler for Hanssen and Ames.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020274.jpg
This document appears to be page 122 of a House Oversight report or narrative analysis concerning the Edward Snowden NSA leaks. It explores the 'witting-accomplice scenario,' theorizing that Snowden may have had help from a system administrator or a 'deep-cover spy' to access secure files, although an FBI investigation over six months failed to find any knowing accomplices among his co-workers. The text discusses the culture of the 'geek squad' contractors and the possibility that foreign intelligence utilized Snowden as a distraction.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020271.jpg
This document, page 119 of a House Oversight production, analyzes the distinction between whistle-blowers and spies through the historical examples of Philip Agee and Edward Snowden. It details Agee's 1969 departure from the CIA and subsequent provision of secrets to the KGB and Cuban intelligence. It parallels this with Snowden's 2013 theft of NSA data, arguing that Snowden's behavior—specifically taking a job to access secrets—aligns more with 'penetration agents' than whistle-blowers, and discusses the counterintelligence investigation into how he breached secure systems.
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