Booz Allen
OrganizationRelationship Network
Event Timeline
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
NSA
|
Contractor |
10
Very Strong
|
5 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Employment |
10
Very Strong
|
18 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Employee |
10
Very Strong
|
6 | |
|
person
Michael McConnell
|
Employment |
8
Strong
|
3 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Employment contractor |
8
Strong
|
1 | |
|
person
NSA
|
Client |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Unnamed Source
|
Former executive |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Mr. Snowden
|
Employment |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Unnamed Booz Allen source
|
Founder |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Anonymous Hackers
|
Attacker victim |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Michael McConnell
|
Executive |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Michael McConnell
|
Executive leadership |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
Anonymous (hacker group)
|
Adversarial hacked |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Carlyle Group
|
Financial |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
China
|
Adversarial hacking target |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013-03-01 | N/A | Snowden applied to Booz Allen. | Unknown | View |
| 2013-02-01 | N/A | Snowden applied for a job at Booz Allen. | Hawaii (implied) | View |
| 2013-02-01 | N/A | Snowden applies for job at Booz Allen. | USA | View |
| 2013-01-01 | N/A | Edward Snowden theft of documents. | NSA | View |
| 2013-01-01 | N/A | Snowden security breach exposing NSA sources. | NSA | View |
| 2011-07-11 | N/A | A Forbes article reported on a breach of Booz Allen Hamilton by 'Anonymous Hackers'. | Cyberspace | View |
| 2011-01-01 | N/A | The hacker group Anonymous breached Booz Allen Hamilton's systems. | N/A | View |
| 2011-01-01 | N/A | Anonymous hackers breached Booz Allen Hamilton. | N/A | View |
| 2008-01-01 | N/A | Carlyle Group acquires controlling stake in Booz Allen. | USA | View |
| 2004-01-01 | N/A | Booz Allen Hamilton issued a history of its evolution titled "Helping Clients Envision the Future." | N/A | View |
| 0001-06-01 | N/A | Snowden failed to show up for work, setting off alarms at Booz Allen and NSA. | Hawaii (Workplace) | View |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020363.jpg
This document is a page from a House Oversight report detailing Edward Snowden's strategic employment shift from Dell to Booz Allen Hamilton to gain access to specific intelligence documents, including the 'black budget' and foreign intelligence lists (Level 3). It argues that Snowden's motivation went beyond whistleblowing to seeking documents that enhanced his power, referencing his ability to access allied intelligence (Britain, Israel, etc.) via 'Priv Ac' clearance. The text includes quotes from CIA Deputy Director Morell regarding the value of the stolen data to Russian intelligence.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020362.jpg
The document appears to be page 210 (Chapter 28) of a manuscript or report stamped by House Oversight regarding Edward Snowden. It analyzes his motivations for switching employment from Dell to Booz Allen in March 2013, arguing the move was not financially motivated nor necessary for access to documents, as he already possessed significant classified material (including Presidential Policy Directive 20) while at Dell. The text suggests the job switch actually increased his risk of apprehension.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020333.jpg
This document appears to be page 181 of a larger report or book, stamped with a House Oversight footer, detailing the history and tactics of Chinese cyber-espionage against the United States. It discusses the organizational structure of Chinese intelligence, specific hacking campaigns against US contractors like Booz Allen and tech companies like Google and Adobe, and the massive data breach at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that exposed millions of federal employee records. The text mentions Paul Strassmann and Edward Snowden but does not contain any specific references to Jeffrey Epstein or his associates.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020320.jpg
This document analyzes the NSA's outsourcing practices, highlighting the security vulnerabilities that allowed Edward Snowden to steal classified files in 2013. It details the economic and bureaucratic incentives for outsourcing, the ignore warnings regarding security risks, and the lack of penalties for contractors like Booz Allen despite significant security failures.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020319.jpg
This document details severe security failures and misconduct within USIS and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), including employees falsifying background checks and massive data breaches attributed to Chinese and Russian hackers. It highlights specific incidents such as the 2011 hack of Booz Allen Hamilton by "Anonymous" and the compromise of over 19 million employee records via the E-QIP system.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020318.jpg
This document appears to be page 166 of a report (likely Congressional, given the footer 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT') detailing the privatization of US government security clearance background checks. It specifically critiques the hiring of Edward Snowden by Booz Allen Hamilton and the failure of USIS (United States Investigative Services) to properly vet him due to profit-seeking incentives and lack of inter-agency access (CIA files). The text outlines how USIS, owned by Providence Equity Partners, was sued in 2014 for fraudulently closing hundreds of thousands of background checks to maximize revenue.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020317.jpg
This document discusses the challenges and risks associated with the NSA's reliance on private contractors like Booz Allen Hamilton, highlighting the conflict between profit motives and security quality. It contrasts standard business metrics with the opaque nature of intelligence failures, citing the 2013 Snowden breach as a catastrophic public failure comparable only to the 1968 capture of the USS Pueblo. The text critiques the privatization of secret intelligence, noting how financial incentives led contractors to prioritize low-wage staffing over quality control.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020316.jpg
This document appears to be a page (164) from a narrative report or book included in House Oversight records. It details the history of cybersecurity vulnerabilities within US intelligence, specifically the NSA's reliance on civilian contractors and system administrators. It draws parallels between the KGB's recruitment of hackers in the 1980s and the NSA's hiring of 'hacktivist' culture technicians post-9/11 to compete with tech giants. It specifically mentions that by 2013, sensitive NSA work was outsourced to firms like Booz Allen Hamilton and Microsoft.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020315.jpg
This document, page 163 of a House Oversight production, appears to be an excerpt from a book or detailed report regarding NSA security vulnerabilities. It discusses the privatization of system administration (specifically mentioning Booz Allen Hamilton), the risks of granting civilians special access privileges, and the concept of 'false flag' espionage operations. It specifically details the 1973 recruitment of US Navy officer Jerry Alfred Whitworth by the KGB, who deceived him into believing he was spying for Israel. While the user prompt identifies this as 'Epstein-related,' this specific page contains no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates, though it may be part of a larger file regarding intelligence or blackmail operations.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020313.jpg
This document, stamped 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT', appears to be a narrative report discussing the aftermath of the Edward Snowden data breach on the NSA. It details the efforts of new Director Admiral Michael Rogers to address low morale and rebuild intelligence capabilities in June 2014. The text mentions comments from former directors Michael Hayden and Michael McConnell regarding the severity of the damage and the reliance on outside contractors.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020288.jpg
This document is a page from a House Oversight report (Bates stamp 020288) detailing the intelligence leaks attributed to Edward Snowden. It discusses the logistics of how documents were transferred between Snowden, Laura Poitras, and Glenn Greenwald, including the interception of a courier at Heathrow. The text analyzes the potential damage of specific missing documents, particularly 'level 3' lists concerning Russia and China, and questions whether Snowden took these files to Moscow. Note: While the user prompt requested Epstein-related data, this specific page is exclusively focused on the Snowden/NSA leaks.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020287.jpg
This document is a page from a report or narrative (marked House Oversight) detailing the NSA's damage assessment regarding Edward Snowden. It analyzes the volume of data stolen (estimated at 1.7 million touched / 1.3 million copied) during his time at Booz Allen and Dell, while noting disputes from Snowden and journalists Greenwald and Bamford regarding these numbers. The text discusses the potential motivations of the NSA Damage Assessment team under Ledgett and the legal implications of the leaks.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020279.jpg
This document is page 127 of a House Oversight report analyzing intelligence failures and defectors. It contrasts the rejected asylum request of Chinese official Wang Lijun with the case of Edward Snowden, detailing concerns that Snowden may have been recruited by Russian intelligence as early as 2009 or during his financial troubles in Geneva. The text outlines three possible scenarios for when Snowden came under Russian control and cites assessments by CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell and NSA Director General Keith Alexander.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020275.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (marked with House Oversight numbering) discussing the theory that Edward Snowden may have been guided or assisted by a hidden Russian mole within the NSA. The text draws parallels to historical espionage cases involving KGB moles Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, who eluded detection for decades. It includes details of an interview the author conducted in 2015 with Victor Cherkashin, the KGB handler for Hanssen and Ames.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020273.jpg
This document appears to be a page from an investigative report or book regarding the Edward Snowden NSA leaks, bearing a House Oversight Committee stamp. It details the technical security measures at the NSA (EMP shielding, sealed USB ports) and argues that Snowden would have required assistance—potentially a 'witting accomplice'—to bypass these measures and steal data, as he lacked the necessary system administrator privileges and equipment. Note: While the prompt requested an analysis of an 'Epstein-related' document, this specific page refers exclusively to Edward Snowden and NSA security protocols.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020272.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (possibly by Edward Jay Epstein regarding Edward Snowden) submitted as evidence to the House Oversight Committee. It analyzes how Edward Snowden obtained passwords to secure NSA vaults, ruling out his time at Dell or his system admin privileges at Booz Allen. The text explores the 'Unwitting Accomplice Possibility,' featuring an interview with a former Booz Allen executive who deems it highly unlikely that co-workers would voluntarily share passwords with Snowden, leading to a discussion of potential technical methods like 'key loggers.'
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020255.jpg
This document (page 103, file HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020255) details an interview between journalist Lana Lam (South China Morning Post) and Edward Snowden, facilitated by Laura Poitras in Hong Kong. The text describes the security measures taken for the interview (TOR laptop, phone confiscation) and Snowden's revelation that he specifically took a job at Booz Allen Hamilton in March 2013 to access lists of machines hacked by the NSA globally. It also notes Snowden's claim that the US government committed crimes against Hong Kong and China, and mentions his subsequent flight to Russia around June 24, 2013.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020252.jpg
This page from a House Oversight report details the initial meetings between Edward Snowden and journalists (Greenwald, Poitras, MacAskill) in a hotel room on June 4th. It describes Snowden's security rituals (the 'magical cloak'), transcriptions of his introduction to Ewen MacAskill, and critically analyzes discrepancies between Snowden's claims about his career/salary ($200k vs $133k) and the official records from the CIA, DIA, and Booz Allen. The report attempts to discredit Snowden's truthfulness regarding his authority to intercept presidential communications.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020251.jpg
This document is a narrative account, likely from a House Oversight report, detailing the initial meeting between Edward Snowden ('Citizen Four'), Glenn Greenwald, and Laura Poitras in Hong Kong on June 3rd at the Mira Hotel. It describes the recognition signal involving a Rubik's cube, the subsequent filming of Snowden in Room 1014, and communications with Snowden's girlfriend, Lindsay Mills, regarding government investigators visiting their home in Hawaii after he failed to report to work at Booz Allen.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020243.jpg
This document appears to be page 91 of a report (likely House Oversight Committee) detailing Edward Snowden's theft of classified documents from the NSA facility in Hawaii. It describes the timeline of events in April and May 2013, specifically noting his final day at the facility on May 17, 2013, his method of transferring data to thumb drives, and his personal preparations to flee, including misleading his partner Lindsay Mills. The text highlights security failures, such as the lack of random checks by guards and the delay in discovering the theft.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020242.jpg
This document page, likely from a House Oversight report, details the timeline and methods Edward Snowden used to steal classified NSA data in 2013. It covers his preparations in Hawaii, including deceiving Booz Allen about medical leave, obtaining colleagues' passwords through deception, and using automated 'spider' software to index over one million documents, many classified as Level 3 Sensitive Compartmented Information. The text highlights security failures, such as the lack of real-time auditing at the Hawaii base and the 'open culture' that facilitated password sharing.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020241.jpg
This document, page 89 of a House Oversight report, details Edward Snowden's hiring by Booz Allen Hamilton despite a false claim about a degree from Liverpool University. It chronicles his transfer from Hawaii to Fort Meade, Maryland, for orientation in April 2013, where he signed a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) NDA. The text also describes his correspondence with the NSA General Counsel regarding the legal precedence of Congressional acts versus NSA directives, which the report characterizes as an attempt to build a whistleblower defense.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020240.jpg
This document appears to be page 88 of a House Oversight report detailing Edward Snowden's employment history and intelligence theft. It describes his transition from Dell to Booz Allen Hamilton in March 2013, alleging he took a pay cut to access 'Level 3' documents described as 'the Keys to the Kingdom.' The text outlines the specific access privileges he gained and lost during this transition.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020430.jpg
This document is page 278 from a book, specifically the endnotes for 'Chapter Twenty-Eight: Snowden's Choices'. It contains a list of citations for information about Edward Snowden, referencing interviews, news articles from 2013-2015, and other texts. Critically, this document is about Edward Snowden and is not an 'Epstein-related document'; it contains no information about Jeffrey Epstein.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020420.jpg
This document is page 268 of a report, identified by the footer 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020420', likely from a U.S. House committee. It contains citations referencing articles from 2014 and 2015 about the NSA, the E-QIP background check system, and the hiring of Edward Snowden. Despite the prompt's framing, this specific page contains no information related to Jeffrey Epstein.
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