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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 51 of 348

of the state’s victim interviews and partial transcripts provided by defense counsel.36 Villafaña
also pursued other investigative steps, which included working with the FBI to locate an expert
witness to testify about the effect of sexual abuse on victims. She also continued collecting records
relating to Epstein’s business entities, in part to help establish the interstate nexus of Epstein’s
activity. On several occasions, Villafaña sought guidance from CEOS, which had considerable
national expertise in child exploitation cases, about legal issues relating to the case, such as
whether charges she was considering required proof that the defendant knew a minor victim’s age.

USAO procedures generally required that a proposed indictment be accompanied by a
prosecution memorandum from the AUSA handling the case. The prosecution memorandum was
expected to explain the factual and legal bases for the proposed charges and address any significant
procedural, factual, and legal issues of which the AUSA was aware; witness-related issues;
expected defenses; and sentencing issues. Routine prosecutions could be approved by lower-level
supervisors, but in high-profile or complex cases, proposed indictments might require review and
approval by the Criminal Division Chief, the FAUSA, or even the U.S. Attorney.

Accordingly, Villafaña drafted an 82-page prosecution memorandum directed to Acosta,
Sloman, Menchel (who had replaced Sloman as the USAO’s Criminal Division Chief the previous
October, when Sloman became the FAUSA), Lourie, and her immediate supervisor, dated May 1,
2007, supporting a proposed 60-count indictment that charged Epstein with various federal crimes
relating to sexual conduct with and trafficking of minors. The prosecution memorandum set forth
legal issues and potential defenses relating to each proposed charge; explained why certain other
statutes were rejected as proposed charges; described the evidence supporting each count and
potential evidentiary issues; and addressed the viability and credibility of each of the victims who
were expected to testify at trial.

Villafaña’s immediate supervisor told OPR that she read the prosecution memorandum,
had only a few small edits to the indictment, and advised Lourie that she approved of it. The
immediate supervisor told OPR that she viewed the case as prosecutable, but recognized that the
case was complex and that Villafaña would need co-counsel.

In his OPR interview, Lourie recalled thinking that the prosecution memorandum and
proposed indictment “were very thorough and contained a lot of hard work,” but that he wanted to
employ a different strategy for charging the case, focusing initially only on the victims that
presented “the toughest cases” for Epstein—meaning those about whom Epstein had not already
raised credibility issues to use in cross-examination. Lourie told OPR that although he had some
concerns about the case—particularly the government’s ability to prevail on certain legal issues
and the credibility challenges some of the victims would face—he did not see those concerns as
insurmountable and was generally in favor of going forward with the prosecution.

Although indictments coming out of the West Palm Beach office usually did not require
approval in Miami, in this case, Lourie understood that “[b]ecause there was front office
involvement from the get-go,” he would not be the one making the final decision whether to go

36
Lefcourt and Sanchez provided the recordings during a follow-up meeting with Lourie and Villafaña on
February 20, 2007, and thereafter furnished the transcripts.

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