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In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012)

The character of support provided by al-Qaeda's sponsors in the financial industry also took several forms, but in every instance involved the knowing provision of financial services and other forms of material support to al-Qaeda. In certain cases, al-Qaeda officials were directly embedded in the infrastructures of those financial institutions, and al-Qaeda openly maintained accounts and carried out transactions with the knowledge and consent of senior officials of the financial institution in question. For example, during the period that al-Qaeda was headquartered in the Sudan under the protection of the ruling National Islamic Front regime, it openly used Defendants Al Shamal Islamic Bank (“Al Shamal”) and Faisal Islamic Bank-Sudan (“FIBS”) to support its operations and terrorist agenda.⁵⁸ (Together with Defendants DMI Administrative Services S.A. (“DMI”) and Tadamon Islamic Bank (“Tadamon”), Al Shamal *45 and FIBS are referred to herein as the “Sudanese Defendants”). According to the testimony of former al-Qaeda finance chief Jamal al Fadl, previously deemed credible by this Court,⁵⁹ Al Shamal maintained accounts for Osama bin Laden and several other al-Qaeda officials, and carried out large cash and wire transactions in furtherance of al-Qaeda operations.⁶⁰ Al Fadl similarly testified that FIBS, which in turn is the founder of Al Shamal, partnered with al-Qaeda by mamtaining accounts for al-Qaeda and by embedding al-Qaeda officials in the infrastructure of Al Shamal.⁶¹ Tadamon also maintained accounts for al Qaeda members according to al Fadl, including an account for bin Laden's personal bodyguard, who handled money for bin Laden and used the account for bin Laden's activities on behalf of al Qaeda.⁶²

More frequently, al-Qaeda's partners in the financial sector operated covertly within its global infrastructure, by providing financial services to al-Qaeda's charity fronts with full knowledge that those accounts were being used to support al-Qaeda, and by themselves providing funds to al- *46 Qaeda, typically through their own zakat charitable contributions to al-Qaeda's charity fronts. The allegations and record evidence relating to Al Rajhi Bank and National Commercial Bank (“NCB”) are illustrative of this pattern of support.⁶³ Testifying before Congress just three weeks after the September 11th Attacks, former Central Intelligence Agency Chief of Counterterrorism Operations Vincent Cannistraro affirmed that “[t]here is little doubt that a financial conduit to bin Laden was handled through the National Commercial Bank, until the Saudi government finally arrested a number of persons and closed down the channel. It was evident that several wealthy Saudis were funneling contributions to bin Laden through this mechanism.”⁶⁴

The “mechanism” through which “wealthy Saudis” channeled support to bin Laden via NCB involved large transfers to IIRO, Muwafaq Foundation, Saudi Red Crescent, SJRC and other al-Qaeda charity fronts.⁶⁵ Conveniently, NCB maintained accounts for many of these ostensible charities, including in particular IIRO and SJRC, and promoted *47 contributions to those accounts via advertisements, with specific awareness that those entities were supporting al-Qaeda.⁶⁶ At all times, NCB was aware of the terrorist activities of those purported charities, by virtue of the extensive public reporting concerning those activities in the Muslim world prior to 9/11, and by virtue of the longstanding ties between senior executives of NCB (including its Chairman Appellee Khaled bin Mahfouz and Appellee Yassin al Kadi, who was the architect of NCB's Islamic Banking Division), and bin Laden, as described in further detail below.⁶⁷ (Together with NCB and Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz, Khaled bin Mahfouz and Yassin al Kadi are referred to here is ahe “NCB Defendants.”)

Al Rajhi Bank played an analogous and equally important role in al-Qaeda's financial infrastructure, by also providing financial services to al-Qaeda charity fronts including the MWL, IIRO, al Haramain, and Benevolence International Foundation.⁶⁸ In addition, Al Rajhi Bank funneled its own zakat contributions to al-Qaeda, via contributions to al- *48 Qaeda's charity fronts.⁶⁹ Like NCB, Al Rajhi Bank was aware at all relevant times that MWL, IIRO, al Haramain and Benevolence International Foundation were fronts for al-Qaeda, again by virtue of the public reporting concerning the terrorist activities of those organizations, and because senior Al Rajhi Bank officials, including in particular the bank's founder Suleiman al Rajhi,⁷⁰ were themselves important al-Qaeda benefactors with direct ties to bin Laden dating from the Afghan jihad.⁷¹

Appellees DMI Trust and DMI S.A., in turn, sat at the apex of a deliberately decentralized financial network, which included Appellees Al Shamal, FIBS and Tadamon, established for purposes of “pursuing financial jihad.” Functioning as the operational arm of DMI Trust and implementing the Trust's strategies and objectives, including its material sponsorship of al Qaeda, DMI S.A. handled accounts for al Qaeda members and primary financiers, including Wa’el Jelaidan and Yassin al Kadi, *49 siphoned off charitable donations to support al Qaeda, and used its own zakat contributions to support al Qaeda.⁷²

As referenced above, plaintiffs' pleadings and supplemental materials allege that support for al-Qaeda's agenda emanated

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