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2014] CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 101

crimes or crimes against children.”241 In Indiana, the plain language of its statute leaves open the possibility of a conferral right before formal charges to the extent that the statute includes two separate time frames: “after a crime . . . has been charged” or “before any disposition of a criminal case involving the victim.”242

To be sure, not all states have afforded victims a voice throughout the entirety of the criminal justice process.243 In some states, the statutes are ambiguous.244 In a handful of states, there is clear language limiting rights until after the filing of charges. For example, Louisiana constrains the conferral right to criminal matters “in which formal charges have been filed by the district attorney’s office.”245 Yet, unlike the federal CVRA, this statute specifically excludes pre-charging situations. And, in any event, despite Louisiana’s limitation on a particular right within the statute, the legislature in this state still often saw fit to provide the victim with notification rights, even in the absence of the formal filing of charges.246

Very few state courts have ever considered the precise issue of whether conferral rights may attach prior to the formal filing of charges. This is likely caused by the fact that, unlike the federal statute, many state statutes fail to provide the victim with a procedural mechanism for challenging the conduct of prosecutors or law enforcement agencies.247 However, in rare cases, state courts have implicitly recognized that a meaningful interpretation of victims’ rights should include some rights prior to filing.

For example, a Connecticut court concluded that a company injured by the delinquent act of a minor was entitled to information about the case

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241 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5306(1)(f) (2004). As in the case of most of the state statutes, the Idaho statute is not without ambiguity. A different provision within the statute makes the notification right contingent “[u]pon the filing of a criminal complaint or juvenile petition . . . .” Id. § 19-5306(2).
242 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-5-3(b) (West 2012); id. § 35-40-1-1 (failing to define “case”).
243 See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. 47(b) (“In a case originating by indictment or information filed in a circuit court, a victim of crime shall have the right to be informed . . . .”).
244 In Delaware, for example, the statute contains an additional limitation in the conferral provision that is noticeably absent from the duty imposed on law enforcement to provide information about the victim’s rights to that victim. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9405 (2007), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9411 (2007) (imposing additional requirements after the Attorney General commences the prosecution), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9410 (2007). Query whether the limitations imposed in one section should be inferred in the other under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
245 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1844(D)(1) (2010).
246 See id. § 1844.
247 See generally Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 300–23 (discussing problems with remedies in victims’ rights statutes).

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