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226 See supra note 224 (citing state statutes in Florida and Wisconsin that encourage or mandate local prosecutors to adopt policies that improve enforcement).

227 Gershowitz, supra note 219.

228 On domestic violence and rape offenses, see Gruber, supra note 221, at 752-63 (recounting the feminist movement's efforts to reform domestic violence and rape prosecution law and policies); id. at 760 & n.90 (citing statutes that require prosecutors to adopt "pro-prosecution" policies for domestic violence); id. at 763-74 (describing the history of victim rights' movement); Sack, supra note 220, at 1666, 1689-90 (2004) (describing the women's movement as focused on domestic violence since the 1960s and arguing that mandatory prosecution policies are necessary for police and prosecutors to make the "right choices"); Christine O'Connor, Note, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 937, 942-43 (1999) (arguing that prosecutors' view of domestic violence as a private problem contributed to reluctance to prosecute). On drunk-driving law and policy, see Gershowitz, supra note 219 (describing efforts by MADD and other groups to toughen laws and enforcement efforts against drunk driving and summarizing subsequent law reform).

229 See supra note 228.

230 Cf. Long & Wilkinson, supra note 186, at 1 (explaining that specialized prosecution units provide prosecutors with the opportunity to work with "community partners").

231 See, e.g., Jeffrey Ulmer & Christopher Bader, Do Moral Communities Play a Role in Criminal Sentencing? Evidence from Pennsylvania, 49 Soc. Q. 737, 753, 757 (2008) (finding in county-level data that "Christian religious homogeneity" increases the likelihood of incarceration, especially when Christian denominations are civically engaged, partially through the effect of local Republican Party dominance via the election of judges and prosecutors).

232 Gershowitz, supra note 219.

233 See generally Richard Perez-Pena & Timothy Williams, Glare of Video Is Shifting Public's View of Police, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2015, at A1 (describing survey data on public views about police and apparent effects of video evidence on public opinion); Santo, supra note 186 (describing enforcement challenges for crimes against prison inmates).

234 Ian Lovett, Los Angeles Joins Debate on Force After Police Killing of a Homeless Man, N.Y. Times, April 17, 2016, at A12 (describing the "pressure that prosecutors now face to move aggressively against officers who kill civilians" and quoting an activist who says that the Los Angeles prosecutor's failure to indict in one case would be "political suicide").

235 See Carlos Berdejo & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 Rev. Econ. Stat. 741, 754-55 (2013) (finding that elected judges in Washington state assign longer sentences in years closest to elections); Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. Pol. Sci. 107, 133 (2007) (comparing partisan and nonpartisan judicial elections in Kansas and finding strong effects on sentencing when judges in partisan elections expect or face challengers). See generally, Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The People's Courts (2012) (providing a history of elected judges).

236 For a knowledgeable account of the U.S. Justice Department's traditions of professionalism that mostly minimize political influence in charging decisions, see generally Samuel W. Buell, Capital Offenses: Business Crime and Punishment in America's Corporate Age (2016). But see Gordon, supra note 214; cf. Scott Ashworth, Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work, 15 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 183, 183-201 (2012) (surveying theoretical and empirical research into the connection between political accountability and policy decisions).

237 See, e.g., In re Hickson, 2000 PA Super 402, P 41 (finding that private prosecutions "constitute[] a recognition by the legislature that the office of the district attorney should be subject to a system of checks and balances"); In re Piscanio, 344 A.2d 658, 660-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) ("The judge's independent review of the complaint checks and balances the district attorney's decision and further hedges against possibility of error.").

238 Outside the United States, prosecution agencies are commonly under a politically accountable justice minister or attorney general, whose political judgment, in principle, operates only at the level of broad policy and should not interfere with specific case decisions. See, e.g., Prosecution of Offences Act 1974, § 2(5) (Act No. 22/1974) (Ir.) http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1974/act/22/section/2/enacted/en/index.html ("The Director [of Public Prosecutions] should be independent in the performance of his functions."). Australia's Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, whose director is appointed for a seven-year term, is an independent prosecution service within the Commonwealth Attorney-General's portfolio, but functions independently of the Attorney-General and the political process. Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) (Austl.) (as amended 2012); About Us, Commonwealth Dir. Pub. Prosecutions,http://www.cdpp.gov.au/AboutUs (last visited Oct. 30, 2018); see also Mark Findlay et al., Australian Criminal Justice 125-26 (1994) (describing "the development of prosecutorial independence from the executive"). Canada's Public

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