United States
LocationRelationship Network
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
page
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Polos
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Quinones
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Sanchez
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Skys
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Suarez
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Okwumabua
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Noble
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Butler
|
Legal representative |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Olivieri
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Esposito
|
Legal representative |
6
|
2 | |
|
organization
People's Republic of China
|
Unknown |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Dewar
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
SIMMONS
|
Legal representative |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Caparros
|
Legal representative |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Oshatz
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Pascarella
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Walters
|
Legal representative |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Abdullahu
|
Legal representative |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Ulbricht
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
organization
Soviet Union
|
Strategic rivalry |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Sattar
|
Legal representative |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Countentos
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Cromitie
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Paulino
|
Legal representative |
6
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | Modification of the Non-Prosecution Agreement | United States | View |
| N/A | N/A | Discussion of the Syrian situation, including the legitimacy of Mr. Assad, international response... | Global political context, U... | View |
| N/A | N/A | Clarification of provisions in paragraph 7 of the Non-Prosecution Agreement regarding the selecti... | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Assignment of Independent Third-Party | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Non-prosecution agreement (NPA) intended for broad, complete resolution of matters, including Eps... | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) entered into by the United States Attorney's Office, Southern Dis... | Southern District of Florida | View |
| N/A | N/A | Agreement regarding Epstein's charges, sentencing, and victim representation. Includes terms for ... | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | War with Iran / U.S.-led attack | Iran | View |
| N/A | N/A | Negotiation and execution of a plea agreement | Eleventh Circuit | View |
| N/A | N/A | Cold War | Global | View |
| N/A | N/A | Non-Prosecution Agreement execution | Unspecified | View |
| N/A | N/A | Epstein agrees to plea deal (NPA) for 18 months imprisonment. | Florida | View |
| N/A | N/A | Potential Iranian nuclear targeting of US logistics hubs. | Middle East / Bahrain | View |
| N/A | N/A | Selection of attorney representative for victims | Unspecified | View |
| N/A | N/A | Public protests and Mubarak's time of need | Cairo, Egypt | View |
| N/A | N/A | Suspension of federal Grand Jury investigation. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | US shipment of battery-operated TV sets to Pacific islands. | Pacific Ocean islands | View |
| N/A | N/A | Hypothetical conflict/coalition warfare between US and Iran | Middle East | View |
| N/A | N/A | Potential U.S. attack on Iran | Iran | View |
| N/A | N/A | Suspension of federal Grand Jury investigation | Federal Court | View |
| N/A | N/A | Proposed peace conference to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. | U.S. | View |
| N/A | N/A | Palestinian bid for full U.N. membership. | United Nations | View |
| N/A | N/A | United States' decision to pursue warmer ties with Tehran. | International | View |
| N/A | Legal case | United States v. Rodriguez, Case No. 9:09-mj-08308-LRJ | N/A | View |
| N/A | Non-prosecution agreement | Epstein agreed to a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment on two charges, and in return, the ... | N/A | View |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020550.jpg
This document page discusses the influence of WeChat on Chinese immigrants in the US, suggesting it creates an "anti-American hothouse" ripe for exploitation by the Chinese government. It also provides a historical overview of the Chinese Communist Party's long-standing strategy of using overseas media and Western journalists to shape public opinion, contrasting it with the KMT's similar efforts.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020549.jpg
This document page details Beijing's efforts to control overseas Chinese-language media through the China News Service and discusses the shrinking space for independent media, highlighting *Vision Times* and Falun Gong-supported outlets. It also examines WeChat's significant influence as a news source in the diaspora community, noting its censorship practices aligned with the Chinese Communist Party and the prevalence of right-wing misinformation on the platform.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020548.jpg
This page from a House Oversight report details the People's Republic of China's efforts to influence overseas Chinese-language media through investments, conferences, and seminars. It describes how outlets like Mingjing and backchina.com shifted their editorial stances to align with CCP narratives following financial investments or attendance at state-sponsored forums. The document cites specific officials like Guo Zhaojin and He Yafei instructing media to act as mouthpieces for national strategies like the Belt and Road Initiative.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020547.jpg
This page from a House Oversight Committee report details Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence operations within the United States, specifically targeting the Chinese diaspora through the 'United Front Work Department.' It describes the acquisition and co-opting of Chinese-language media outlets in the US (such as Wenxuecheng and Duowei) by pro-Beijing business interests to suppress Taiwan independence movements and promote CCP propaganda. **Note:** While the user prompt identifies this as an Epstein-related document, this specific page contains no mentions of Jeffrey Epstein, his associates, or his network; it is strictly focused on geopolitical media influence.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020546.jpg
This page from a House Oversight report details the shifting editorial stances of major Chinese-language newspapers in the U.S., specifically the World Journal and Ming Pao, toward a pro-Beijing perspective. It cites economic interests in mainland China and direct pressure from Chinese consulates regarding sensitive topics like Falun Gong as drivers for this change. The document also outlines a major $600 million media merger in 2007 involving Ming Pao that was welcomed by Beijing officials.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020545.jpg
This page from a government report details the efforts of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to influence and control Chinese-language media outlets in the United States, such as SinoVision, Qiaobao, and Sing Tao Newspaper Group. It discusses alleged financial subsidies, the ideological alignment of these publications with Beijing's official narratives, and the strategic goal of influencing the overseas Chinese community and American politics.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020544.jpg
This document outlines the connections between Chinese-language media outlets in the United States—specifically SinoVision, Qiaobao, and the Sino American Times—and the Chinese government's Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. It details how these organizations were established to promote Beijing's "soft power," with executives often appointed from Chinese state agencies and content sourced directly from official state media.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020543.jpg
This document, page 84 of a House Oversight report, details the expansion of Chinese state-owned media influence in the United States, termed the 'Grand Overseas Propaganda Campaign.' It describes the acquisition of US-based outlets like Sky Link TV by Chinese state entities, the consolidation of media organs into the 'Voice of China' under Xi Jinping's directive, and efforts since the 1990s to establish diaspora media to counter negative narratives. While part of a document dump that may contain Epstein-related materials, this specific page discusses Chinese geopolitical media strategy and contains no mention of Jeffrey Epstein.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020539.jpg
This document appears to be page 80 of a House Oversight Committee report regarding Chinese State Media and propaganda operations. It details the history of the CCP's external propaganda efforts, ranging from the 1950s through the Cultural Revolution and into the reform era under Deng Xiaoping, specifically highlighting the formation of the External Propaganda Group in 1980 and its evolution into the State Council Information Office. Note: While the prompt requested an 'Epstein-related' document, this specific page contains no text regarding Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, or their associates; it focuses entirely on Chinese geopolitical history.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020537.jpg
This document appears to be page 78 of a policy report regarding US-China relations, specifically focusing on 'Think Tanks' (as noted in the footer). It advocates for reciprocity in visa granting for scholars and emphasizes freedom of speech. The footnotes list numerous major American think tanks involved in or relevant to these exchanges. The document bears a House Oversight Committee Bates stamp.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020536.jpg
This document appears to be page 77 of a larger report (likely from the House Oversight Committee given the footer) outlining policy recommendations for US think tanks interacting with China. It focuses on three pillars: Transparency (disclosing funding sources from China/Hong Kong), Integrity (establishing a Code of Conduct), and Reciprocity (demanding equal access for scholars and cancelling trips if visas are denied). It specifically names the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Shanghai Institute of International Studies as the only institutions currently offering residential stays for foreign scholars.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020535.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a report on American think tanks and their relationship with China. It details issues regarding funding from Chinese sources, censorship, and pressure campaigns by the Chinese embassy to influence the narrative or discourage meetings with dissidents like the Dalai Lama. It concludes with recommendations for think tanks to use their institutional leverage to resist these incursions.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020534.jpg
This document appears to be page 75 of a report submitted to the House Oversight Committee (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020534). It details the 'Conclusion and Recommendations' regarding US-China academic relations, specifically focusing on the challenges American think-tank scholars face, such as visa issues and restricted access. It discusses the influence of 'sharp power,' concerns over technology transfer in scientific labs, and mentions C.H. Tung and the China-US Exchange Foundation as a primary source of funding for American think tanks. While part of a larger document dump that may relate to Epstein (often associated with academic funding investigations), this specific page does not mention Jeffrey Epstein.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020533.jpg
This document page outlines concerns from think-tank analysts regarding Chinese influence in the United States, including efforts to manage perceptions, the potential for financial leverage over institutions, and surveillance. It also highlights fears that U.S. government overreaction could lead to binary thinking and unfair attacks on Chinese Americans or those with interests in China.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020531.jpg
This document appears to be page 72 of a House Oversight Committee report concerning Think Tanks. It details interviews with various scholars and analysts who admit to varying degrees of self-censorship regarding China (PRC), Xi Jinping, Taiwan, and human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The analysts cite the fear of losing visa access to China and the need to protect their institutions' financial interests or access as primary motivators for modulating their public criticism.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020530.jpg
This document page, stamped 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT', details the challenges faced by US think-tank scholars regarding publishing in China, including censorship, intellectual property theft, and 'neibu' (internal) circulation restrictions. It cites specific examples of content being pirated by Sohu and Baidu, books being heavily redacted by the State Press and Publishing Administration, and scholars being blocked from publication due to 'unfriendly remarks' made in the media. The text notes that while some scholars resist these pressures by publishing in Taiwan or Hong Kong, others allow mistranslated or altered versions of their work to be published in mainland China.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020525.jpg
This document page, likely from a House Oversight Committee report, analyzes foreign influence on US think tanks, specifically focusing on Chinese funding sources. It details how various think tanks manage funding from entities like Huawei, the China Development Bank, and Alibaba, noting that while some accept direct funding for travel or specific projects, others differentiate between domestic and foreign funding sources to manage conflicts of interest. Specific individuals mentioned include entrepreneur Zhou Zhixing and businessman Fu Chen.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020524.jpg
This page from a House Oversight Committee report details Chinese foreign influence operations through think tanks in the United States. It highlights the efforts of officials like 'Fu' and C.H. Tung to cultivate relationships with US scholars to advance Chinese government narratives, specifically mentioning the establishment of the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS) in Washington, DC, in 2015. The document notes that while ICAS claims to be a bridge for perception, it is funded by Chinese government-supported entities and aligns with President Xi Jinping's directive for think tanks to 'go global.'
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020523.jpg
This document appears to be page 64 of a House Oversight Committee report concerning Chinese influence operations, specifically focusing on think tanks. It details the connections between various Chinese academic institutions and the Chinese government (including the Ministry of State Security and the United Front Work Department), and highlights specific incidents involving individuals like Wang Huiyao and Senator Marco Rubio regarding the disclosure of these affiliations in the US. It also describes financial incentives given to Chinese directors for bringing Western delegations to China and mentions key figures like Fu Ying facilitating US-China interactions.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020522.jpg
This page details instances of Chinese officials attempting to influence US think tanks by requesting the exclusion of specific scholars or cancelling events, particularly those related to Taiwan or deemed "anti-China." It highlights that while some requests are made, US think tanks often refuse them without negative repercussions, and notes that Chinese entities engage in intelligence collection through think-tank interactions.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020521.jpg
This document appears to be page 62 of a House Oversight report detailing Chinese influence operations targeting American think tanks. It describes how Chinese embassy and consular officials use a mix of praise, access, and threats to influence scholars' views on sensitive topics like Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong. Specific incidents from 2018 are cited, including warnings regarding the Dalai Lama and US-Taiwan relations.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020520.jpg
This document, page 61 of a House Oversight report, details the deteriorating environment for American researchers and think tanks in China since 2010, specifically citing the 2017 Law on the Management of Foreign NGOs. It contrasts the severe restrictions faced by US researchers in China (limited access to archives, libraries, and officials) with the open access enjoyed by Chinese researchers in the US. It also discusses two US think tank centers located at Tsinghua University in Beijing, noting that they face political pressure, self-censorship issues, and difficulties in securing equivalent participation from Chinese officials for conferences.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020519.jpg
This document page, stamped 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT', discusses the deterioration of US-China 'Track 2' diplomatic and academic exchanges during the Xi Jinping era. It details how US think tanks are withdrawing from programs in China due to a repressive political atmosphere, a lack of candor from Chinese counterparts who stick to 'talking points,' and the perception that exchanges have become intelligence-gathering missions for the Chinese government. The text highlights that Chinese interlocutors often arrive with specific 'shopping lists' of questions directed by Beijing, rather than engaging in genuine collaboration.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020518.jpg
This document appears to be page 59 of a House Oversight Committee report (Section 5) analyzing the relationship between US and Chinese think tanks as of 2018. It details the demographics of US China experts, the necessity of cross-border interaction for research, and notes a significant decline in the openness and productivity of these dialogues due to stricter Chinese government regulations, such as travel limits and topic vetting. While part of a document dump often associated with investigations (potentially overlapping with foreign influence inquiries), this specific page does not mention Jeffrey Epstein or flight logs.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020517.jpg
This page, identified as page 58 of a House Oversight document, outlines the operational roles of US think tanks, including influencing policy, providing government research contracts, and serving as a 'revolving door' for government personnel. It discusses the ethical necessity of maintaining analytical independence from funders despite potential outside pressure. The text transitions into a specific section regarding 'The Role of China in American Think Tanks,' introducing findings based on interviews with seventeen analysts from Washington and New York.
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