China
LocationRelationship Network
Event Timeline
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
location
United States
|
Geopolitical economic conflict |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
United States
|
Economic strategic |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Tom
|
Alleged allegiance |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
Pakistan
|
Business associate |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
U.S.
|
Diplomatic tension |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
UK Government
|
Diplomatic economic |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Russia
|
Geopolitical alliance |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Western Powers
|
Geopolitical rivals |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
USA
|
Adversarial strategic |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Russia
|
Potential allies |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
United States
|
Geopolitical policy relationship |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
North America
|
Geopolitical rivals |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
North America
|
Business associate |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
American Bar Ass'n (Am. Bar Ass'n)
|
Geopolitical rivals |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
Japan
|
Diplomatic relations |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
United States
|
Economic adversaries |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Sub-national governments (US)
|
Geopolitical economic |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Arab states
|
Diplomatic political |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
Iran
|
Diplomatic political |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
United States
|
Espionage target |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Russia
|
Intelligence allies |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
Russia
|
Intelligence alliance |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Russia
|
Technology sharing |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Russia
|
Espionage sharing |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
United States
|
Business associate |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | UN Vetoes (implied context) | UN (implied) | View |
| N/A | N/A | China arranges for a $46 billion investment in pipelines in Pakistan | Pakistan | View |
| N/A | N/A | The document discusses general and ongoing 'coercive and covert activities by China' and 'efforts... | United States | View |
| N/A | N/A | Syrian Crisis | Syria | View |
| N/A | N/A | China's unexpected RMB devaluation. | China | View |
| N/A | N/A | Discussion of the Syrian situation, including the legitimacy of Mr. Assad, international response... | Global political context, U... | View |
| N/A | N/A | Scheduled trade talks | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | China projecting friendliness toward Malaysia. | Malaysia | View |
| N/A | N/A | Intensification of the trade war between the United States and China. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Implementation of U.S. Tariffs on China on various goods (food, electronics, materials) | Global/International Trade | View |
| N/A | N/A | Peacekeeping dispatches and naval port visits | The Gulf / Region | View |
| 2025-12-23 | N/A | China hit U.S. with $60 bn worth of tariffs | Global/Trade | View |
| 2025-11-21 | N/A | U.S. and China agree to pause trade war | Unknown | View |
| 2025-11-19 | N/A | Opium Wars | China | View |
| 2025-11-17 | N/A | Russian and Chinese veto of a Franco-British resolution on Syria at the UN Security Council. | UN Security Council | View |
| 2025-11-17 | N/A | U.S. slapped $200 bn worth of tariffs on China | Global/Economic | View |
| 2025-11-01 | N/A | Establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ by China | East China Sea | View |
| 2018-09-24 | N/A | US imposes 10% tariffs on $200bn, China retaliates | US/China | View |
| 2018-07-06 | N/A | US implements $34bn sanctions on China, which retaliates | US/China | View |
| 2018-06-18 | N/A | Tariffs on additional $200bn of Chinese goods announced | US | View |
| 2018-03-23 | N/A | US implements metal tariffs on China, which retaliates | US/China | View |
| 2018-03-22 | N/A | Tariffs on $50bn of Chinese goods announced | US | View |
| 2017-06-27 | N/A | US Dept of State releases annual Trafficking in Persons Report putting China at Tier 3. | United States | View |
| 2017-01-01 | N/A | Release of the seized APCs. | China | View |
| 2016-12-19 | N/A | Potential trilateral summit (Tentative) | Not specified | View |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020536.jpg
This document appears to be page 77 of a larger report (likely from the House Oversight Committee given the footer) outlining policy recommendations for US think tanks interacting with China. It focuses on three pillars: Transparency (disclosing funding sources from China/Hong Kong), Integrity (establishing a Code of Conduct), and Reciprocity (demanding equal access for scholars and cancelling trips if visas are denied). It specifically names the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Shanghai Institute of International Studies as the only institutions currently offering residential stays for foreign scholars.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020535.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a report on American think tanks and their relationship with China. It details issues regarding funding from Chinese sources, censorship, and pressure campaigns by the Chinese embassy to influence the narrative or discourage meetings with dissidents like the Dalai Lama. It concludes with recommendations for think tanks to use their institutional leverage to resist these incursions.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020534.jpg
This document appears to be page 75 of a report submitted to the House Oversight Committee (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020534). It details the 'Conclusion and Recommendations' regarding US-China academic relations, specifically focusing on the challenges American think-tank scholars face, such as visa issues and restricted access. It discusses the influence of 'sharp power,' concerns over technology transfer in scientific labs, and mentions C.H. Tung and the China-US Exchange Foundation as a primary source of funding for American think tanks. While part of a larger document dump that may relate to Epstein (often associated with academic funding investigations), this specific page does not mention Jeffrey Epstein.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020533.jpg
This document page outlines concerns from think-tank analysts regarding Chinese influence in the United States, including efforts to manage perceptions, the potential for financial leverage over institutions, and surveillance. It also highlights fears that U.S. government overreaction could lead to binary thinking and unfair attacks on Chinese Americans or those with interests in China.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020532.jpg
This document discusses the internal dynamics of US think tanks regarding China, specifically addressing pressure from boards of trustees and the presence of Chinese nationals as staff or visiting fellows. It highlights varying perspectives on the risks of espionage versus the benefits of cultural insight and language skills, noting specific instances of attempted board interference and security protocols for sensitive meetings.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020531.jpg
This document appears to be page 72 of a House Oversight Committee report concerning Think Tanks. It details interviews with various scholars and analysts who admit to varying degrees of self-censorship regarding China (PRC), Xi Jinping, Taiwan, and human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The analysts cite the fear of losing visa access to China and the need to protect their institutions' financial interests or access as primary motivators for modulating their public criticism.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020530.jpg
This document page, stamped 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT', details the challenges faced by US think-tank scholars regarding publishing in China, including censorship, intellectual property theft, and 'neibu' (internal) circulation restrictions. It cites specific examples of content being pirated by Sohu and Baidu, books being heavily redacted by the State Press and Publishing Administration, and scholars being blocked from publication due to 'unfriendly remarks' made in the media. The text notes that while some scholars resist these pressures by publishing in Taiwan or Hong Kong, others allow mistranslated or altered versions of their work to be published in mainland China.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020529.jpg
This document appears to be page 70 of a House Oversight report detailing Chinese foreign influence operations, specifically focusing on the relationship between US think tanks and Chinese state media. It describes how outlets like CCTV, Xinhua, and CGTN interact with American scholars, including instances of censorship, the fabrication of a positive op-ed by Xinhua to misrepresent an analyst's views, and the payment of $150 fees by CGTN to incentivize favorable coverage. The text highlights the varying strategies US analysts use to mitigate these risks, ranging from refusing interviews to insisting on live broadcasts to prevent editing.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020527.jpg
This page from a House Oversight report details the challenges US think-tank scholars face regarding visa access to China. It highlights issues such as Chinese monitoring of social media (Twitter), political scrutiny of applicants, the politicization of nomenclature (Hong Kong/Taiwan), and specific incidents where scholars were interrogated in Beijing or placed on blacklists. While part of a document dump often associated with Epstein/Foreign Influence investigations, this specific page focuses entirely on US-China think tank relations and does not mention Jeffrey Epstein directly.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020525.jpg
This document page, likely from a House Oversight Committee report, analyzes foreign influence on US think tanks, specifically focusing on Chinese funding sources. It details how various think tanks manage funding from entities like Huawei, the China Development Bank, and Alibaba, noting that while some accept direct funding for travel or specific projects, others differentiate between domestic and foreign funding sources to manage conflicts of interest. Specific individuals mentioned include entrepreneur Zhou Zhixing and businessman Fu Chen.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020524.jpg
This page from a House Oversight Committee report details Chinese foreign influence operations through think tanks in the United States. It highlights the efforts of officials like 'Fu' and C.H. Tung to cultivate relationships with US scholars to advance Chinese government narratives, specifically mentioning the establishment of the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS) in Washington, DC, in 2015. The document notes that while ICAS claims to be a bridge for perception, it is funded by Chinese government-supported entities and aligns with President Xi Jinping's directive for think tanks to 'go global.'
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020523.jpg
This document appears to be page 64 of a House Oversight Committee report concerning Chinese influence operations, specifically focusing on think tanks. It details the connections between various Chinese academic institutions and the Chinese government (including the Ministry of State Security and the United Front Work Department), and highlights specific incidents involving individuals like Wang Huiyao and Senator Marco Rubio regarding the disclosure of these affiliations in the US. It also describes financial incentives given to Chinese directors for bringing Western delegations to China and mentions key figures like Fu Ying facilitating US-China interactions.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020522.jpg
This page details instances of Chinese officials attempting to influence US think tanks by requesting the exclusion of specific scholars or cancelling events, particularly those related to Taiwan or deemed "anti-China." It highlights that while some requests are made, US think tanks often refuse them without negative repercussions, and notes that Chinese entities engage in intelligence collection through think-tank interactions.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020520.jpg
This document, page 61 of a House Oversight report, details the deteriorating environment for American researchers and think tanks in China since 2010, specifically citing the 2017 Law on the Management of Foreign NGOs. It contrasts the severe restrictions faced by US researchers in China (limited access to archives, libraries, and officials) with the open access enjoyed by Chinese researchers in the US. It also discusses two US think tank centers located at Tsinghua University in Beijing, noting that they face political pressure, self-censorship issues, and difficulties in securing equivalent participation from Chinese officials for conferences.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020519.jpg
This document page, stamped 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT', discusses the deterioration of US-China 'Track 2' diplomatic and academic exchanges during the Xi Jinping era. It details how US think tanks are withdrawing from programs in China due to a repressive political atmosphere, a lack of candor from Chinese counterparts who stick to 'talking points,' and the perception that exchanges have become intelligence-gathering missions for the Chinese government. The text highlights that Chinese interlocutors often arrive with specific 'shopping lists' of questions directed by Beijing, rather than engaging in genuine collaboration.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020518.jpg
This document appears to be page 59 of a House Oversight Committee report (Section 5) analyzing the relationship between US and Chinese think tanks as of 2018. It details the demographics of US China experts, the necessity of cross-border interaction for research, and notes a significant decline in the openness and productivity of these dialogues due to stricter Chinese government regulations, such as travel limits and topic vetting. While part of a document dump often associated with investigations (potentially overlapping with foreign influence inquiries), this specific page does not mention Jeffrey Epstein or flight logs.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020517.jpg
This page, identified as page 58 of a House Oversight document, outlines the operational roles of US think tanks, including influencing policy, providing government research contracts, and serving as a 'revolving door' for government personnel. It discusses the ethical necessity of maintaining analytical independence from funders despite potential outside pressure. The text transitions into a specific section regarding 'The Role of China in American Think Tanks,' introducing findings based on interviews with seventeen analysts from Washington and New York.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020515.jpg
This document is a bibliography page (page 56) from a House Oversight Committee report containing citations numbered 41 through 44. The citations reference articles from 2002 to 2018 regarding China, censorship, and the relationship between Chinese entities/students and United States universities. While part of a discovery batch that may relate to Epstein, this specific page contains no direct mention of him, focusing instead on academic and geopolitical references.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020514.jpg
This document is page 55 of a House Oversight Committee report (Section 4) containing endnotes referencing Chinese influence in Western academia. It explicitly details financial ties between Chinese billionaires (Wang Jianlin, Pan Shiyi, Zhang Xin) and elite US universities like Harvard and Yale, including a $100 million scholarship fund. The references also cite articles regarding Communist Party influence, the CUSEF, and government pressure on academic institutions.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020513.jpg
This document is page 54 of a report (likely from the House Oversight Committee, given the footer 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT') containing endnotes/references numbered 6 through 21. The citations focus heavily on Chinese political influence in American higher education, specifically regarding Confucius Institutes, the 'Hanban,' and interference on U.S. campuses. While the document is part of a larger dataset often associated with investigations, this specific page contains no direct mentions of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020512.jpg
This document outlines recommendations for the US academic community to protect academic freedom and integrity in exchanges with Chinese institutions, suggesting a unified "Code of Conduct" and monitoring of college acquisitions. It also emphasizes the importance of universities in US soft power, urging better integration of Chinese students to combat isolation while balancing security concerns with cooperation.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020511.jpg
This document outlines risks to US universities regarding foreign influence and technology theft, particularly from Chinese sources, while emphasizing the need to maintain academic integrity and freedom. It discusses the history of handling foreign donations and proposes that universities update procedures and collaborate with government agencies to protect proprietary research without overly restricting collaboration.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020510.jpg
This document is page 51 of a report (stamped House Oversight) detailing recommendations for American universities regarding foreign funding and academic freedom, specifically focusing on interactions with China. It warns against strings-attached gifts, mentions the Hanban's funding of Confucius Institutes, and advocates for protecting international students from authoritarian government pressure. While part of a dataset that may include Epstein materials (likely regarding university funding controversies), this specific page does not mention Epstein or Maxwell.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020509.jpg
This page contains the 'Conclusion and Recommendations' section of a report (likely House Oversight) regarding foreign influence in US academia, specifically focusing on China. It outlines strict conditions under which Confucius Institutes should operate, including the removal of clauses subjecting them to Chinese law and ensuring they do not become platforms for PRC propaganda. It also mandates stricter due diligence for universities accepting gifts and contracts from Chinese nationals and corporations to protect academic freedom.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020508.jpg
This document appears to be page 49 of a House Oversight report detailing censorship and surveillance tactics employed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) against American scholars and academic institutions. It outlines specific restrictions including the vetting of conference materials, internet restrictions, physical surveillance by security services, and the censorship of digital archives like CNKI. It notes that American universities pay significant fees for these now-censored databases and that research into regions like Tibet and Xinjiang is effectively blocked. While the prompt references Epstein, this specific page focuses entirely on Sino-US academic relations and censorship.
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