| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
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Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
location
ISRAEL
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Conflict diplomatic |
5
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1 | |
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organization
Hezbollah
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Conflict national identity |
1
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1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006-07-01 | N/A | War between Israel and Lebanon triggered by Hezbollah crossing the U.N. border. | Israel-Lebanon Border | View |
| 2005-01-01 | N/A | Lebanese crisis triggered by assassination of Rafik Hariri. | Lebanon | View |
| 2000-05-01 | N/A | UN Secretary-General reported agreement on withdrawal line (Blue Line) and confirmed Israeli with... | UN / Southern Lebanon | View |
| 2000-01-01 | N/A | Withdrawal of Israeli Forces | South Lebanon | View |
| 1949-01-01 | N/A | Various General Armistice Agreements signed. | Middle East | View |
| 1949-01-01 | N/A | Armistice Agreements | Middle East | View |
| 1948-01-01 | N/A | Israel faced simultaneous threats from neighbors. | Israel | View |
This document is page 6 of a political analysis report discussing the stability of the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad during the 2011 Arab Spring. It details Assad's mistaken belief that his anti-Israel stance and ideology would protect him from uprisings similar to those in Egypt, and outlines his failed attempts at public relations and reform through speeches in March and April 2011. The document bears a House Oversight stamp, suggesting it was part of a larger cache of retrieved files.
This document appears to be page 15 of a political article or policy paper authored by Professor Musa and Dr. Sarrif. The text proposes a geopolitical solution for the Middle East involving a new diverse state, the rejection of Zionism, and the formation of an EU-style economic and military union between the new state, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. It concludes with biographical notes on the authors and bears a House Oversight Committee stamp.
This document appears to be page 14 of a political proposal or academic paper found within the House Oversight Committee's files (likely related to the Epstein investigation). The text advocates for a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, arguing that a two-state solution is impossible due to geography and intertwined populations. It calls for the UN to establish an International Criminal Tribunal to prosecute war crimes committed by Israeli and Arab individuals, citing the Goldstone Report and the Gaza flotilla raid as context.
This document appears to be a page from a geopolitical analysis or intelligence report produced for the House Oversight Committee. It analyzes the strategic calculations of Gulf states regarding Iran's potential nuclear capabilities, drawing parallels to Kuwait's hesitation to provoke Saddam Hussein in 1990. The text argues that Gulf states perceive a history of U.S. reluctance to confront Iran militarily, citing historical examples such as the 1980s Lebanon bombings, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, and IED attacks in Iraq.
This document appears to be a page from a policy report or geopolitical analysis (stamped by House Oversight) discussing the strategic threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran to Gulf states. It draws parallels to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and argues that Gulf states perceive a historical reluctance by the U.S. to use military force against Iran, citing lack of retaliation for events in Lebanon, Khobar Towers, and Iraq.
This document is a geopolitical intelligence briefing from early 2013 detailing key political and military events in the Middle East. It covers the resignation of Jordan's Prime Minister, an Israeli airstrike in Syria, the results of Israeli elections, Bahrain's national dialogue, and Iranian President Ahmadinejad's historic visit to Egypt. The document appears to be part of a larger cache of House Oversight materials.
This document discusses geopolitical developments in the Middle East, focusing on Egypt's foreign policy, particularly its relations with Iran and Gulf countries, and its role in the Palestinian issue. It highlights Egypt's efforts to broker a reconciliation agreement between Palestinian factions and its decision to open the Rafah Crossing, which was met with mixed reactions regionally and internationally. The text also touches upon the Gulf Cooperation Council's expansion and the instability faced by several Arab nations.
This document outlines economic developments in Arab countries starting in the 1990s, focusing on the rise of mobile networks, privatizations, and the emergence of Arab multinationals. It details how powerful families and governments controlled investments and revenue, citing examples like the Trabelsi, Materi, Ezz, Sawires, Makhlouf, and Hariri families as local partners, and mentions key figures like Najib Mikati and companies like Orascom and MTN. The text also touches on the impact of the 1986 oil price crash and the influence of the International Monetary Fund and European Commission on these economies, as well as real estate ventures inspired by the 'Dubai miracle'.
This document is a page from a memoir by Ehud Barak (page 121, House Oversight page 407). It details the political and military dynamics of the Gaza operation (Operation Cast Lead) and the subsequent Israeli elections (2009). Barak describes his disagreements with Prime Minister Olmert regarding the depth of the Gaza incursion, the eventual cease-fire on January 17, and the political fallout where Tzipi Livni won a narrow election victory but failed to form a coalition government against Benjamin Netanyahu.
This document appears to be a page from Ehud Barak's memoir (Exhibit 405 in a House Oversight investigation). It details the political fallout of the Talansky corruption scandal involving Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, including a $150,000 cash payment, which led to Olmert's eventual resignation and new elections set for February 2009. The text also covers the escalating security situation in Gaza, rocket attacks on Israel, and internal government debates involving Tzipi Livni and Benjamin Netanyahu regarding a potential military operation.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by Ehud Barak (page 117) included in a House Oversight production. It details the strategic disagreements between Barak (then Defense Minister) and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert regarding the timing and tactical execution of a preemptive strike on a Syrian nuclear reactor. Barak argues for a delay to ensure a 'fail-safe plan' that minimizes the risk of all-out war, while noting Olmert's frustration and urgency.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir by Ehud Barak (stamped 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'), detailing his return to political power in Israel in 2007 following the fallout of the Lebanon War. It describes the criticism faced by Olmert, Peretz, and Halutz, Barak's appointment as Defense Minister, and the intelligence briefing he received regarding a secret Syrian nuclear reactor funded by Iran and North Korea. The text highlights the political tensions between Barak and Olmert regarding the handling of this threat.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header) included in a House Oversight Committee production. The text details Barak's advice to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert during the 2006 Lebanon War, warning against mission creep and urging a quick conclusion. It retrospectively critiques the war's management, the lack of clear objectives, and the heavy cost in lives despite the UN cease-fire negotiated by Tzipi Livni.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir by Ehud Barak (page 400, labeled HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028248). It details the onset of the 2006 Lebanon War, describing a phone consultation between Barak and Shimon Peres regarding military strategy against Hizbollah. Barak recounts advising Peres to push Chief-of-Staff Dan Halutz for clear objectives beyond the initial strikes, specifically regarding 'Operation Cinnamon Sticks,' an air force plan developed during Barak's earlier term as Prime Minister.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), contained within House Oversight Committee records. It details the outbreak of the 2006 Lebanon War, starting with the Hizbollah attack on July 12, 2006. The text describes the political landscape of Israel at the time, including Ariel Sharon's coma, Ehud Olmert's rise to Prime Minister, and the formation of a new coalition government, culminating in a phone call from Shimon Peres to the narrator.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir by Ehud Barak (page 112 of the book, page 398 of the file), included in a House Oversight investigation. It details Barak's perspective on Ariel Sharon's unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, the death of Yasser Arafat, and internal Israeli politics involving Shimon Peres and Amir Peretz leading up to the 2006 elections. The text critiques the execution of the withdrawal while acknowledging the necessity of leaving Gaza.
This document appears to be page 107 from a memoir by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, bearing a House Oversight Committee stamp (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028241). In the text, Barak reflects on the end of his premiership, the withdrawal from Lebanon, and the failure of the Camp David peace talks. He specifically critiques a New York Times article by Deborah Sontag from 2001, disputing Yasser Arafat's claim that he had asked Barak to block Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount during a private dinner.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (indicated by the header '/ BARAK /'). The text reflects on the geopolitical situation in Israel during the Second Intifada (2002), specifically discussing the Passover massacre in Netanya, the subsequent military response by Ariel Sharon ('Arik'), and the construction of the security barrier. Barak also offers introspection on his own leadership style and shortcomings as Prime Minister, comparing himself to Yitzhak Rabin.
This document appears to be a page (105) from a memoir or book draft by Ehud Barak, included in House Oversight evidence files. It details the aftermath of the 2001 Israeli election where Barak lost to Ariel Sharon ('Arik'). The text describes Sharon's attempts to recruit Barak as Defense Minister, the internal conflict within the Labor Party regarding joining a unity government, and a subsequent meeting between Barak and Sharon regarding the West Bank security fence and rising casualty numbers from terror attacks.
This document is a page (385) from a memoir, likely by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, produced as evidence in a House Oversight investigation (Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028233). The text details the political situation in Israel in late November (presumably 2000), discussing the collapse of peace talks with Yasser Arafat, the political pressure from Ariel Sharon and the Likud party, and Barak's internal deliberations regarding early elections and his responsibility for the failure of the Camp David summit. While the document is part of an Epstein-related production (Barak was an associate of Epstein), the content of this specific page is strictly political history regarding the Middle East peace process.
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