This document appears to be a page from Ehud Barak's memoir or a manuscript discussing the political fallout of the 2000 Camp David Summit. It details the collapse of Barak's coalition in the Knesset, harsh criticism from Benjamin Netanyahu regarding negotiations over Jerusalem, and emotional pushback from Leah Rabin concerning potential concessions on the Old City and Temple Mount. The page bears a House Oversight Bates stamp.
This document appears to be an excerpt (page 77/363) from a memoir or report by Ehud Barak regarding the 2000 Camp David Summit. It details intense late-night negotiations with President Bill Clinton regarding Jerusalem, the political risks in the Knesset, and Clinton's impending departure for the G8 summit in Japan. The text describes a tense 1:00 AM meeting involving top US and Israeli officials including Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and Shlomo Ben-Ami.
This document is a page from a manuscript (likely a memoir by Ehud Barak) detailing the political atmosphere in Israel immediately prior to the Camp David 2000 Summit. It describes Barak surviving a no-confidence vote in the Knesset, his Foreign Minister David Levy refusing to join the summit, and Barak's departure from Ben-Gurion airport carrying a note of support from Rabbi Ovadia Yossef. The text reflects Barak's uncertainty about Yasir Arafat's commitment to peace.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or book manuscript by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), contained within a House Oversight file. The text details a private conversation between Barak and President Bill Clinton in Lisbon during the spring (likely 2000), discussing the deteriorating security situation with the Palestinians and Yasser Arafat's intentions. Barak presses Clinton for a new summit despite Clinton's skepticism and the previous diplomatic failure with Syrian President Assad in Geneva.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir (likely by Ehud Barak, based on the header and context) included in House Oversight evidence files. The text details the political tension in Israel regarding the Oslo Accords, violence from Arafat's security forces, a specific Knesset vote won by a margin of eight, and the strategic decision to withdraw Israeli soldiers from Lebanon. It mentions interactions with President Clinton and Yasser Arafat.
This document appears to be an excerpt from a memoir or statement by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (labeled 'BARAK / 50'), contained within a House Oversight Committee file. The text details the political complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the spring of 2000, specifically focusing on negotiations regarding villages near East Jerusalem (Abu Dis), internal Israeli coalition fragility involving Shas and the National Religious Party, and security concerns surrounding Al-Naqba Day on May 15, 2000. It mentions coordination with President Clinton to prevent violence during planned protests.
This document appears to be page 46 of a memoir or manuscript by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), bearing a House Oversight Bates stamp. It details the logistical and political challenges of setting up peace negotiations between Israel and Syria (under Hafez al-Assad). The text covers domestic opposition in the Knesset, discussions with US diplomat Dennis Ross regarding the venue (eventually settling on Shepherdstown, WV), and the narrator's concern over media leaks compromising the talks.
This document appears to be page 42 of a manuscript or memoir by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, found within House Oversight documents. The text details political turmoil during his premiership (circa 1999), specifically the loss of the United Torah Judaism party from his coalition due to a dispute over transporting heavy machinery on the Sabbath, and internal friction with minister Natan Sharansky. It mentions negotiations with Clinton and the pursuit of peace deals with Syria (Assad) and the Palestinians (Arafat).
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or book draft by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (indicated by header / BARAK / 41). It details geopolitical strategy and negotiations involving the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and interactions with President Bill Clinton, Yasser Arafat, and Hafez al-Assad. The text discusses specific land-swap formulas (70-10-20, 80-20) and the fragility of Barak's coalition government in the Knesset.
This document is page 321 from a book, likely Ehud Barak's memoir (indicated by the header 'BARAK'), produced with the Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011792. The text details the political maneuvering following Barak's 1999 election victory, specifically his decision to form a coalition government with the Shas party rather than Likud (led by Ariel Sharon) to preserve the possibility of peace negotiations with Palestinians and Syria. While the text itself is a historical political narrative, its inclusion in House Oversight documents suggests it was collected as part of an investigation involving Barak, likely regarding his ties to Jeffrey Epstein.
This document is page 320 (Chapter Twenty) of a memoir, likely by Ehud Barak, marked as a House Oversight exhibit. It details his internal reflections upon becoming Prime Minister of Israel in July 1999, highlighting the domestic social rifts and the urgent need to revive the peace process with the help of President Clinton before a new intifada could break out. The text also discusses the complexities of the Israeli electoral system at the time.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript (likely by Ehud Barak) included in House Oversight files. It details the political landscape of the 1999 Israeli elections, discussing the fragmentation of the right-wing government, the firing of Yitzhik Mordechai by Netanyahu ('Bibi'), the formation of the Center Party, and the launch of the 'One Israel' campaign alliance. It provides a snapshot of the candidates and the socio-political divisions within Israel at that time.
This document is page 311 (marked HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011782) from a memoir, likely by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header '/ BARAK / 25'). It details Israeli political maneuvering in late 1998 and early 1999, specifically Barak's efforts to recruit David Levy and the Gesher party into the 'One Israel' alliance to challenge Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ('Bibi'). It also recounts a historical anecdote from the 1982 Lebanon War highlighting David Levy's wisdom in the security cabinet.
This document appears to be a page from Ehud Barak's memoir (stamped with House Oversight identifiers), detailing his political strategy to defeat Benjamin Netanyahu in the late 1990s. The text describes the formation of his campaign team in Tel Aviv, including Chagai Shalom and Danny Yatom, and his strategy to form the 'One Israel' (Yisrael Ahat) alliance to attract voters outside the traditional Labor party base, specifically targeting Sephardic voters and Russian immigrants by recruiting figures like David Levy.
A digitized page from Ehud Barak's memoir (marked with House Oversight identifiers) detailing his political campaign strategy against Benjamin Netanyahu. The text describes Barak seeking advice from high-profile political consultants including Stanley Greenberg, Bob Shrum, and James Carville. It details a specific meeting in a New York hotel room (text erroneously dates this 'Feburary 1988', context dictates 1998) where Carville critiques Barak's passive approach and lack of a stump speech.
This document is page 305 (Chapter 19) of a book, likely a memoir by Ehud Barak, included in House Oversight Committee records. The text describes Barak's time as Labor leader in the Israeli Knesset, detailing a strategic conversation with Haim Ramon about toppling the government to defeat Benjamin Netanyahu. It also elaborates on Barak's political philosophy, his attempts to bridge gaps with religious parties like the NRP after Rabin's assassination, and his security-focused approach to peace negotiations.
This document page, stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011775, appears to be an excerpt from a manuscript (likely by Ehud Barak, based on the header) detailing Israeli political events leading up to the May 17, 1999 election. It describes the collapse of a government following the failure to uphold the Wye agreement and a subsequent vote of no-confidence in the Knesset passed by a margin of 81 to 30.
This document details political events in Israel, focusing on Prime Minister Bibi's struggles with a peace agreement and his declining political support from early November to late December. The author, an unnamed political figure, recounts committing the Labor party to support Bibi, but later becoming critical of his stalling tactics and approach to the peace process, eventually aligning with Haim Ramon to consider a no-confidence motion. The narrative highlights the political instability, including a cabinet vote, the Wye River agreement, and the eventual loss of support for Bibi, leading to discussions about early elections and a potential new explosion of Palestinian violence.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), stamped with a House Oversight Committee bates number. It details secret political negotiations in 1998 between Barak and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ('Bibi'), facilitated by Yaakov Ne’eman, regarding a potential unity government and peace talks with Syria involving the Golan Heights. The text describes meetings held at the Prime Minister's residence and a Mossad villa, discussing security arrangements and the political landscape of the Oslo accords.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), detailing Israeli political events between 1996 and 1997. It offers a critique of Benjamin Netanyahu's handling of the Oslo Accords, specifically the opening of the Western Wall tunnel which incited violence, and the subsequent Hebron agreement. The text is stamped with 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT,' indicating it was part of a document production for a congressional investigation, likely related to the Epstein probe due to Barak's association.
This document appears to be a page from Ehud Barak's memoir, produced as evidence for the House Oversight Committee (likely related to investigations involving his associations). The text details Barak's victory in the Labor party chairmanship election (winning 57% of the vote) and his subsequent strategy to defeat Benjamin Netanyahu (Bibi) by securing funding through his brother-in-law Doron Cohen and Jean Frydman to hire international political strategists. It also references his military background and political goals regarding peace with Syria and the Palestinians.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or book by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), included in House Oversight Committee records. The text details the immediate aftermath of the 1996 Israeli election where Shimon Peres lost to Benjamin 'Bibi' Netanyahu. It describes a breakfast meeting where senior Labor ministers Avraham Shochat and Fuad Ben-Eliezer urged the narrator (Barak) to replace Peres as the party leader to challenge Netanyahu.
This document appears to be a page from a manuscript or memoir by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header / BARAK / 5), produced as evidence for the House Oversight Committee. It details the 1996 Israeli Prime Minister election campaign, focusing on Barak's support for Shimon Peres against Benjamin Netanyahu ('Bibi'). The text describes Barak recording a campaign message leveraging his past military command over Netanyahu and recounting the preparation for and execution of the televised debate on May 27, 1996.
This document appears to be a page (283) from a memoir, likely by Ehud Barak (based on the description of his former roles), produced as part of a House Oversight investigation. The text details diplomatic maneuvers between Israel and Syria in the mid-1990s, specifically focusing on Shimon Peres's strategy to 'dazzle and befuddle' President Assad with complex proposals to distract from the Golan Heights issue. It recounts interactions with Arab foreign ministers and internal Israeli strategy meetings involving Peres, the narrator, and Itamar Rabinovich.
This document appears to be a page from the memoir of Ehud Barak (identified by the name 'Ehud' and context of Israeli politics), stamped with a House Oversight bates number. The text recounts a phone call with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin while Barak was flying to Seattle in April (likely 1995), during which Rabin asked him to return to Israel immediately to serve as Minister of Interior. The passage references the political instability involving Arye Deri and the Shas party, and foreshadows Rabin's assassination with the comment about his words being 'prophetic.'
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