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Case 22-1426, Document 77, 06/29/2023, 3536038, Page211 of 258
SA-209
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 209 of 348

the defendant faced decades in prison for sexual crimes against minors with such an insignificant
term of incarceration, and made numerous other concessions to the defense. As OPR has set forth
in substantial detail in this Report, OPR did not find evidence to support allegations that the
prosecutors sought to benefit Epstein at the expense of the victims. Instead, the result can more
appropriately be tied to Acosta’s misplaced concerns about interfering with a traditionally state
crime and intruding on state authority. Acosta was also unwilling to abandon the path that he had
set, even when Villafaña and Lourie advocated to end the negotiations and even though Acosta
himself had learned that the state authorities may not have been a reliable partner.

Many of the problems that developed might have been avoided had Acosta engaged in
greater consultation with his staff before making key decisions. The contemporaneous records
revealed problems with communication and coordination among the five key participants. Acosta
was involved to a greater extent and made more decisions than he did in a typical case. Lourie
told OPR that it was “unusual to have a U.S. Attorney get involved with this level of detail.”
Menchel told OPR, “I know we would have spoken about this case a lot, okay? And I’m sure with
Jeff as well, and there were conversations -- a meeting that I had with Marie and Andy as well.”
Lourie similarly told OPR:

Well, . . . he would have been talking to Jeff and Matt, talking to me
to the extent that he did, he would have been looking at the Pros
Memo and . . . the guidance from CEOS, he would have been
reading the defense attorney’s letters, maybe talking to the State
Attorney, I don’t know, just . . . all these different sources of
information he was -- I’m comfortable that he knew the case, you
know, that he was, he was reading everything. Apparently, he, you
know, read the Pros Memo, he read all the stuff . . . .

At the same time, Acosta was significantly removed, both in physical distance and in levels
in the supervisory chain, from the individuals with the most knowledge of the facts of the case—
Villafaña and, to a lesser extent, Lourie. Lourie normally would have signed off on the prosecution
memorandum on his own, but as he told OPR, he recognized that the case was going to go through
the front office “[b]ecause there was front office involvement from the get go.” Yet, although
Acosta became involved at certain points in order to make decisions, he did not view himself as
overseeing the investigation or the details of implementing his decisions. OPR observed that as a
consequence, management of the case suffered from both an absence of ownership of the
investigation and failures in communication that affected critical decisions.

On occasion, Villafaña included Acosta directly in emails, but often, information upon
which Acosta relied for his decisions and information about the decisions Acosta had made
traveled through multiple layers between Acosta and Villafaña. Villafaña did draft a detailed,
analytical prosecution memorandum, but it is not clear that Acosta read it and instead may have
relied on conversations primarily with Menchel and later with Sloman after Menchel’s departure.
Despite these discussions, though, it is not clear that Acosta was aware of certain information, such
as Oosterbaan’s strong opinion from the outset in favor of the prosecution or of Villafaña’s
concerns and objections to a state-based resolution or the final NPA. Acosta interpreted the state
indictment on only one charge as a sign that the case was weak evidentially, but it is not clear that
when making his decision to resolve the matter though a state-based plea, he knew the extent to

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