| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
GHISLAINE MAXWELL
|
Legal representative |
32
Very Strong
|
72 | |
|
person
Jeffrey Epstein
|
Legal representative |
13
Very Strong
|
10 | |
|
person
Epstein
|
Legal representative |
13
Very Strong
|
19 | |
|
person
MAXWELL
|
Legal representative |
12
Very Strong
|
9 | |
|
organization
Iran
|
Adversarial |
10
Very Strong
|
7 | |
|
person
Davis
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
5 | |
|
person
Bodmer
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
5 | |
|
person
Dreier
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
English
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
Boustani
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
5 | |
|
person
Torres
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
location
China
|
Unknown |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
Smith
|
Legal representative |
9
Strong
|
5 | |
|
person
Ms. Maxwell
|
Legal representative |
9
Strong
|
4 | |
|
location
China
|
Geopolitical rivals |
9
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Sampson
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
Carrillo-Villa
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Petrov
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
3 | |
|
person
Dominguez
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Hung
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Abdellatif El Mokadem
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Rowe
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
3 | |
|
person
Alindato-Perez
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Crowell
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Deutsch
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019-01-01 | Legal case | Citation for United States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d 79. | 2d Cir. | View |
| 2019-01-01 | Legal proceeding | Decision in the case of United States v. Watkins. | 2d Cir. | View |
| 2019-01-01 | Legal case | The case of United States v. Davis, which stated that a statutory phrase should have a fixed mean... | N/A | View |
| 2019-01-01 | Legal case | Legal case United States v. Duncan, No. 18 CR 289, 2019 WL 2210663 is cited. | S.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2019-01-01 | Legal case | The court case United States v. Gaudet, 933 F.3d 11, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2019) is cited as a preceden... | 1st Cir. | View |
| 2019-01-01 | Legal case | Decision in the case of United States v. Boustani. | 2d Cir. | View |
| 2019-01-01 | Court ruling | Ruling in the case of United States v. Eldred. | 2d Cir. | View |
| 2019-01-01 | Legal ruling | Ruling in the case of United States v. Boustani. | E.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2018-12-05 | Legal case | The date of the cited case, United States v. Raniere. | E.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2018-12-05 | Legal proceeding | A court decision was made in the case of United States v. Raniere. | E.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2018-12-05 | Legal ruling | A ruling in the case of United States v. Raniere, which is cited as precedent. | E.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2018-12-05 | Court decision | In United States v. Raniere, the court noted that since it had already held one detention hearing... | E.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2018-10-02 | Court ruling | In United States v. Hussain, the defendant was granted a $100,000 personal recognizance bond with... | Southern District of New York | View |
| 2018-09-26 | Court ruling | Ruling in the case of United States v. Williams. | E.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2018-08-09 | Legal case | The date of the United States v. Pierre-Louis case cited in the footnote. | S.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2018-08-09 | Court decision | Decision in the case United States v. Pierre-Louis. | U.S. District Court for the... | View |
| 2018-04-10 | Court decision | Decision in the case United States v. Pizarro. | U.S. District Court for the... | View |
| 2018-04-10 | Legal case | Legal case: United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN). | S.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2018-02-04 | Legal case | United States v. Patrick Ho, where the defendant was ordered detained based on risk of flight, st... | S.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2018-02-04 | Legal case | United States v. Patrick Ho, 17 Cr. 779 (KBF), Dkt. 49 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2018) | Southern District of New York | View |
| 2018-01-31 | Legal case | Legal case: United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585 (WHP). | S.D.N.Y. | View |
| 2018-01-01 | N/A | Revision of the US-South Korea trade agreement. | N/A | View |
| 2018-01-01 | N/A | South Korea is excluded from US steel tariffs in exchange for capping its steel exports. | N/A | View |
| 2018-01-01 | Legal case | Citation of United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638 (1st Cir. 2018). | 1st Cir. | View |
| 2018-01-01 | Legal proceeding | The case United States v. Guerrero, 910 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2018) was decided. | 2d Cir. | View |
This is the cover page for a report titled 'USA Inc.: A Basic Summary of America's Financial Statements,' dated February 2011. It features a graphic of a United States map composed of shredded financial paper strips and bears the Bates stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020824'.
This document is a biographical list titled 'About the Participants,' likely from a House Oversight Committee record (indicated by the footer HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020656). It details the professional titles and affiliations of twelve individuals, many of whom are prominent scholars, diplomats, or experts in Asian studies, China-US relations, and international security. A significant number of the participants are affiliated with Stanford University or major think tanks like the Hoover Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations.
This document is the 'Afterword' of a report written by Orville Schell and Larry Diamond regarding US-China relations. The text discusses the shift from economic competition to adversarial rivalry, warns about Chinese influence operations in the US, but explicitly cautions against racial profiling or a 'McCarthy era-like reaction' against Chinese-Americans. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' footer, suggesting it is part of a larger document production for a congressional investigation.
This document is a formal dissenting opinion written by Susan Shirk, likely attached to a larger report regarding Chinese influence in the United States. Shirk argues that the report conflates legitimate and illegitimate activities, thereby overstating the threat China poses to American institutions. She warns that such exaggeration could lead to a new 'Red Scare' and suggests that domestic overreaction poses a greater threat to society than the influence seeking itself.
This document appears to be Appendix 3 of a House Oversight Committee report (marked HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020649). It details the ownership structures, political leanings, and potential Chinese government (PRC) influence over various Chinese-language media outlets operating in the West, including Duowei, Mingjing, The Epoch Times, and others. It highlights a trend of formerly independent media coming under Beijing's control or softening their stance after 2017.
This document (marked HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020648, Appendix 3) appears to be part of a Congressional report analyzing Chinese-language media influence in the United States. It details how outlets like SinovisionNet and Qiaobao align closely with official PRC narratives, specifically regarding human rights reports in 2017 and South China Sea tensions. It also notes the trend of independent media outlets being acquired by businessmen sympathetic to the PRC. NOTE: While the user prompt identifies this as 'Epstein-related,' this specific page contains no mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates; it focuses entirely on foreign media influence.
This document, labeled Appendix 3 (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020647), outlines the social media presence and ownership structures of PRC-funded and PRC-controlled media outlets operating in the United States. It provides statistical data on social media followers for major Chinese state media and details the corporate relationships linking US-based outlets like SinoVision and Sky Link TV back to the Chinese state via the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and other entities. There is no mention of Jeffrey Epstein, flight logs, or specific individuals in this document.
This document, labeled Appendix 3, outlines the extensive reach of official and semi-official Chinese-language media within the United States infrastructure as of 2018. It details the availability of networks like CCTV, Phoenix TV, and Xinhua across U.S. satellite providers, streaming services, and social media platforms.
This document is an endnotes/bibliography page (Appendix 2, Page 185) from a House Oversight Committee report. It lists citations for articles and reports published between 2016 and 2018, focusing heavily on Chinese foreign influence, particularly in Western academia (Confucius Institutes), telecommunications (Huawei), and politics (David Cameron's appointment). The citations reference major publications such as The Financial Times, The Guardian, Reuters, and Foreign Policy.
This document is page 183 of a House Oversight report (Appendix 2) discussing Chinese influence on the United Kingdom's critical infrastructure. It details security concerns regarding Huawei and ZTE in the telecom sector and China General Nuclear Power's investment in UK nuclear plants (Hinkley Point C). While the prompt suggests an Epstein connection, this specific page focuses entirely on geopolitics and UK-China relations, containing no mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates.
This document appears to be page 179 (Appendix 2) of a larger report included in House Oversight Committee files (Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638). The text focuses on geopolitical analysis, specifically Chinese influence operations in the United Kingdom, contrasting the UK's lack of debate on the subject with the US, Australia, and New Zealand. It cites various events involving Singapore and China between 2015 and 2017, but contains no direct references to Jeffrey Epstein or his specific associates on this page.
This document appears to be a page from a geopolitical analysis report (Appendix 2) included in House Oversight Committee files (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020634). It details diplomatic tensions between China and Singapore, specifically focusing on Singapore's relationship with Taiwan and its stance on the South China Sea. The text analyzes Chinese pressure tactics during Singaporean leadership transitions (2004 and 2016) and influence operations targeting Singaporean civil society.
This document, page 174 of a House Oversight Committee report (Appendix 2), details the history and methodology of Chinese influence operations in Singapore. It contrasts modern tactics (2016-17) involving social media and 'United Front' work with historical examples, specifically the 1971 revelation that a Hong Kong-based communist intelligence service funded the 'Eastern Sun' newspaper to shape public opinion. It also mentions diplomatic pressure exerted on Singapore in 2004 regarding Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's visit to Taiwan.
This document appears to be a page (173) from a House Oversight Committee report (Appendix 2) focused on geopolitical issues involving China. It contains citations for works by Anne-Marie Brady regarding Chinese political influence and a section titled 'SINGAPORE AND ASEAN' that analyzes the diplomatic tension between Singapore and China during 2016-2017 regarding the South China Sea disputes. There is no mention of Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, or their associates on this specific page.
This document page discusses Chinese influence operations in New Zealand, highlighting their strategic interests such as Antarctica and the "Five Eyes" partnership. It notes that influence efforts have increased under Xi Jinping and that New Zealand is vulnerable due to its small size and economic dependence on China. The text references specific incidents, such as a Member of Parliament concealing past involvement with Chinese military intelligence.
This document, identified as page 165 and Appendix 2 of a House Oversight Committee file, appears to be an excerpt from a report detailing Chinese political influence and foreign relations. It contains bibliographic notes citing articles from 2017 and 2018 regarding EU-China relations, followed by a narrative section analyzing Japan's vulnerability to Chinese influence operations. The text specifically discusses historical war atrocities and the lack of covert influence operations in Japan compared to Western nations; there is no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein on this specific page.
This document appears to be page 161 of a larger report (marked Appendix 2) submitted to the House Oversight Committee. It details Chinese influence operations in Germany, specifically noting espionage attempts via LinkedIn (revealed in 2017) and the cultivation of business elites to bypass Chancellor Angela Merkel's critical stance on human rights. It discusses the geopolitical impact of the '16-1 group' in Central Europe and identifies former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Philipp Roessler as specific targets of Chinese cultivation efforts. While part of a dataset possibly associated with Epstein or Ghislaine Maxwell investigations (given the House Oversight stamp common in such releases), the text itself is strictly a geopolitical analysis of German-Chinese relations.
This document appears to be a page from a report (Appendix 2) analyzing Chinese (PRC) influence operations in Europe, specifically detailing activities in France and Germany. It highlights Huawei's financial sponsorships of French academic institutions, PRC control over Chinese-language media in France, and the promotion of pro-China narratives by specific French intellectuals. The section on Germany notes that while Chinese influence is sophisticated, it is hindered by public skepticism stemming from the Tiananmen Square massacre and targets younger professionals and EU stability.
This document is page 157 (Appendix 2) of a House Oversight report (Bates: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020616) analyzing the historical and diplomatic relationship between France and China. It details shifts in French public opinion from the 1960s Maoist sympathies to tensions following the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown and 2008 Olympics, as well as France's current role in arms sales to Asia and naval operations in the South China Sea. The document also profiles the large Chinese diaspora in France, noting the diverse makeup of the community and the PRC's increasing outreach efforts via its embassy and consulates.
This document appears to be a page from a report (possibly House Oversight Committee based on the footer) discussing Chinese influence in Canada. It focuses on two main areas: the debate over allowing Huawei into Canada's 5G network due to security concerns raised by former intelligence officials, and the cultural/political dynamics of Chinese students in Canadian universities. The text concludes with an analysis of influence versus interference, noting that Canadian multiculturalism helps blunt specific political efforts by the CCP.
This document is a page (152, Appendix 2) from a House Oversight report analyzing Chinese state influence operations in Canada. It details how entities like the CCP International Liaison Department target Canadian politicians, academia, and civil society, while noting that Canada has been more resilient than Australia or New Zealand due to material factors and regulatory mechanisms. The text also discusses the geopolitical stance of the Liberal government elected in 2015 and references a 2010 CSIS warning regarding compromised provincial officials.
This document appears to be a page from a House Oversight Committee report (Appendix 2) focused on foreign influence, specifically Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence in Australia and Canada. The text contains extensive footnotes citing Australian media and government sources from 2017-2018 regarding political donations, espionage, and legislative responses to foreign interference. The body text begins a section on Canada, noting its long history with the PRC, significant student population (160,000), and a 1997 RCMP-SIS report on interference. There is no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein on this specific page.
This document is 'Appendix 2' of a larger report, likely from the House Oversight Committee, detailing Chinese influence activities globally. It outlines the CCP's strategy of using 'soft power' (research centers, media, university ties) and economic leverage to suppress criticism and penetrate democratic institutions in countries including Australia, Canada, and the UK. The text highlights the asymmetry of China closing its own borders to influence while exploiting the openness of democratic systems abroad.
This document, labeled Appendix 1 with a House Oversight footer, details the organizational structure of China's State Council Information Office (SCIO) and the External Propaganda Leading Group (EPLG). It explains the dual nature of the organization ('one organ, two signboards') serving both the State and the Communist Party to coordinate international propaganda. The footnotes cite various reports from 2014 to 2018 regarding Chinese influence operations.
This document, labeled as Appendix 1 from a House Oversight Committee file (Bates 020599), outlines the functions of the ILD (International Liaison Department). It details the department's role in intelligence collection, diplomatic liaison (specifically between the US and North Korea), and influence operations through NGOs, think tanks, and foreign visits. It highlights the ILD as a critical but underappreciated instrument of China's international influence.
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