| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
location
United States
|
Unknown |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
organization
Congress
|
Unknown |
9
Strong
|
2 | |
|
location
United States
|
Geopolitical rivals |
9
Strong
|
2 | |
|
location
Russia
|
Technology licensing |
7
|
1 | |
|
person
Chinese-language media outlets
|
Unknown |
7
|
1 | |
|
person
President Trump
|
Political economic adversary |
7
|
1 | |
|
person
American federal and state politics
|
Unknown |
7
|
1 | |
|
person
its companies
|
Unknown |
7
|
1 | |
|
person
American scholars and researchers
|
Unknown |
7
|
1 | |
|
organization
Google
|
Business associate |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Working Group
|
Unknown |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Donald Trump Administration
|
Unknown |
6
|
1 | |
|
location
the west
|
Geopolitical cooperation |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Mr. Trump
|
Adversarial economic |
6
|
1 | |
|
location
United States
|
Adversarial competitive |
6
|
1 | |
|
organization
EDF
|
Unknown |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
North Korea/Pakistan/Iran/Russia
|
Intelligence sharing |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Russia
|
Intelligence ally |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Russia
|
Intelligence alliance |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Russia
|
Strategic emulation |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Russia
|
Political alliance |
6
|
2 | |
|
location
Russia
|
Alliance treaty |
6
|
1 | |
|
location
United States
|
Espionage target |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
Iran
|
Diplomatic political |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
North America
|
Geopolitical rivals |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | UN Vetoes (implied context) | UN (implied) | View |
| N/A | N/A | China arranges for a $46 billion investment in pipelines in Pakistan | Pakistan | View |
| N/A | N/A | The document discusses general and ongoing 'coercive and covert activities by China' and 'efforts... | United States | View |
| N/A | N/A | Syrian Crisis | Syria | View |
| N/A | N/A | China's unexpected RMB devaluation. | China | View |
| N/A | N/A | Discussion of the Syrian situation, including the legitimacy of Mr. Assad, international response... | Global political context, U... | View |
| N/A | N/A | Scheduled trade talks | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | China projecting friendliness toward Malaysia. | Malaysia | View |
| N/A | N/A | Intensification of the trade war between the United States and China. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Implementation of U.S. Tariffs on China on various goods (food, electronics, materials) | Global/International Trade | View |
| N/A | N/A | Peacekeeping dispatches and naval port visits | The Gulf / Region | View |
| 2025-12-23 | N/A | China hit U.S. with $60 bn worth of tariffs | Global/Trade | View |
| 2025-11-21 | N/A | U.S. and China agree to pause trade war | Unknown | View |
| 2025-11-19 | N/A | Opium Wars | China | View |
| 2025-11-17 | N/A | Russian and Chinese veto of a Franco-British resolution on Syria at the UN Security Council. | UN Security Council | View |
| 2025-11-17 | N/A | U.S. slapped $200 bn worth of tariffs on China | Global/Economic | View |
| 2025-11-01 | N/A | Establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ by China | East China Sea | View |
| 2018-09-24 | N/A | US imposes 10% tariffs on $200bn, China retaliates | US/China | View |
| 2018-07-06 | N/A | US implements $34bn sanctions on China, which retaliates | US/China | View |
| 2018-06-18 | N/A | Tariffs on additional $200bn of Chinese goods announced | US | View |
| 2018-03-23 | N/A | US implements metal tariffs on China, which retaliates | US/China | View |
| 2018-03-22 | N/A | Tariffs on $50bn of Chinese goods announced | US | View |
| 2017-06-27 | N/A | US Dept of State releases annual Trafficking in Persons Report putting China at Tier 3. | United States | View |
| 2017-01-01 | N/A | Release of the seized APCs. | China | View |
| 2016-12-19 | N/A | Potential trilateral summit (Tentative) | Not specified | View |
This document (Page 150, Appendix 2) is an excerpt from a report analyzing Australian politics, specifically focusing on legislation and strategies to counter foreign interference from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It details actions taken by the Turnbull and Morrison governments in 2018, including the establishment of task forces and the passing of transparency schemes. While labeled with a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' footer, the text on this specific page does not contain any information regarding Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, or their associates; it is entirely focused on Australian-Chinese geopolitical relations.
This document, page 148 of a House Oversight report (Appendix 2), details instances of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political interference in Australia between 2016 and 2017. It highlights scandals involving Senator Sam Dastyari and Minister Andrew Robb receiving significant funds or positions from CCP-linked entities, and outlines Prime Minister Turnbull's subsequent legislative response to combat foreign interference and espionage. While the user query mentions Epstein, this specific page concerns Australian political corruption and foreign influence, with no mention of Jeffrey Epstein.
This document page details concerns regarding foreign interference by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Australian politics and society. It cites statements from Australian intelligence officials about the severity of the threat and outlines specific incidents involving surveillance of the diaspora, astroturfing political support, and diplomatic coercion regarding an extradition treaty.
This document appears to be page 146 (Appendix 2) of a larger report submitted to the House Oversight Committee (Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020605). The text analyzes Chinese 'sharp power' and influence operations globally, with a specific focus on Australia's policy response to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It cites reports from 2013 and 2017 and quotes officials like Randall Schriver and Hillary Clinton regarding the significance of Australia's counter-interference strategies.
This document is 'Appendix 2' of a larger report, likely from the House Oversight Committee, detailing Chinese influence activities globally. It outlines the CCP's strategy of using 'soft power' (research centers, media, university ties) and economic leverage to suppress criticism and penetrate democratic institutions in countries including Australia, Canada, and the UK. The text highlights the asymmetry of China closing its own borders to influence while exploiting the openness of democratic systems abroad.
This document, labeled Appendix 1 with a House Oversight footer, details the organizational structure of China's State Council Information Office (SCIO) and the External Propaganda Leading Group (EPLG). It explains the dual nature of the organization ('one organ, two signboards') serving both the State and the Communist Party to coordinate international propaganda. The footnotes cite various reports from 2014 to 2018 regarding Chinese influence operations.
This document, labeled as Appendix 1 from a House Oversight Committee file (Bates 020599), outlines the functions of the ILD (International Liaison Department). It details the department's role in intelligence collection, diplomatic liaison (specifically between the US and North Korea), and influence operations through NGOs, think tanks, and foreign visits. It highlights the ILD as a critical but underappreciated instrument of China's international influence.
This document, labeled as Appendix 1 in a House Oversight production, details the functions of specific Chinese state agencies regarding foreign influence. It distinguishes the United Front Work Department (UFWD), which targets the diaspora, from the International Liaison Department (CCP/ID), which cultivates relationships with foreign politicians and parties. The text highlights the CCP/ID's role in identifying 'rising star' politicians and hosting them on all-expenses-paid trips to China for influence and intelligence gathering.
This document outlines the roles of two key Chinese bureaucracies in overseas influence activities: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the United Front Work Department (UFWD). It describes the MFA as a general-purpose bureaucracy with limited influence operations except through its Department of Public Diplomacy, while characterizing the UFWD as a specialized organization focused on building support for the CCP among specific groups like the Chinese diaspora and elites in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.
This document page (Appendix 1, page 137) appears to be part of a House Oversight Committee report detailing the structure, hierarchy, and conference schedules of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organizations related to foreign affairs and propaganda. It outlines specific conferences held between 2000 and 2018 and discusses the division of labor within the Chinese political system regarding influence activities abroad. Note: While labeled 'Epstein-related' in the prompt, the content of this specific page deals exclusively with Chinese geopolitical structure and does not mention Jeffrey Epstein.
This document appears to be page 135 (labeled Appendix 1) of a larger report produced to the House Oversight Committee (Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020594). It is a detailed political analysis of the Chinese government structure, specifically focusing on propaganda efforts, the United Front Work Department (UFWD), and the Foreign Affairs Commission. It details the hierarchy and specific roles of high-ranking Chinese officials including Xi Jinping, Wang Qishan, and Huang Kunming.
This document appears to be a page (Appendix 1, page 134) from a House Oversight Committee report detailing the bureaucratic structure of the Chinese government regarding policy formulation and foreign influence. It outlines the roles of the Politburo, Leading Small Groups, and specific departments like the United Front Work Department and the Propaganda Department. It specifically highlights the authority of Xi Jinping and Wang Huning within this hierarchy. Note: While the prompt requested analysis of an 'Epstein-related' document, this specific page contains no text regarding Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, or their associates; it focuses entirely on Chinese state governance.
This document is an appendix (Appendix 1) titled 'Chinese Influence Operations Bureaucracy.' It analyzes the structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regarding global influence operations, noting that no single organization oversees all operations. It details specific bodies such as the United Front Work Department, the Propaganda Department, and the PLA, and discusses the policy-making hierarchy where Party organs hold higher status than government institutions, particularly following the March 2018 reorganization under Xi Jinping. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp.
This document appears to be a bibliography or endnotes page (labeled 130) from a House Oversight Committee report. The citations (numbered 14 through 30) reference academic papers, government reports, and news articles concerning technology transfer to China, reverse engineering, US export controls (deemed exports), and the monitoring of foreign students via SEVIS. The latest date referenced in the citations is September 2018.
This document is page 129 of a larger report, bearing the Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020588. The text discusses legislative reforms to CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) under President Trump, specifically targeting Chinese exploitation of loopholes and expanding review of real estate and infrastructure deals. The bottom half of the page contains endnotes (1-13) citing various sources on Chinese industrial espionage, the 'Made in China 2025' initiative, the Thousand Talents Program, and intellectual property theft.
This document appears to be page 128 of a House Oversight Committee report titled 'Technology and Research.' It discusses US export control reforms intended to protect national security, specifically regarding the synchronization of the Munitions List and Commerce Control List to prevent technology transfer to China. It also details the role of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in reviewing and rejecting Chinese acquisitions of American companies.
This document is page 126 of a House Oversight report titled 'Technology and Research'. It outlines conclusions and recommendations regarding US competitiveness in science and technology against China's aggressive policies and IP theft. It discusses the 'Thousand Talents Program,' the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). Note: While requested as part of an Epstein-related analysis, this specific page contains no mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates; it focuses entirely on national security, IP theft, and academic research integrity.
This document appears to be a page (125) from a House Oversight Committee report discussing the risks of technology transfer and intellectual property theft by China. It highlights a specific partnership between the University of Tennessee, Oak Ridge National Lab, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences as a potential vehicle for 'technical transfer.' It also discusses cyberespionage, quoting NSA Director Keith Alexander, and various methods of counterfeiting and regulatory exploitation used to acquire trade secrets.
This document appears to be a page from a House Oversight Committee report detailing Chinese state-sponsored efforts to acquire US technology. It describes specific methods such as 'short-term visits' which are characterized as espionage, and the use of cooperation organizations like Triway Enterprise, Inc. and the Silicon Valley Chinese Engineers Association to facilitate technology transfer and recruitment. While the prompt identifies this as Epstein-related, this specific page focuses entirely on Sino-US technology transfer and does not mention Epstein or his associates directly.
This document is 'Section 8: Technology and Research' from a House Oversight Committee report. It analyzes the expropriation of American technology and Intellectual Property (IP) theft by China, referencing the 'Made in China 2025' initiative. It cites a National Bureau of Asian Research conclusion that IP theft costs the US economy hundreds of billions annually and quotes General Keith Alexander describing it as 'the greatest transfer of wealth in human history.' NOTE: This specific page contains no direct mentions of Jeffrey Epstein.
This document appears to be a page of endnotes (citations 47-54) from a House Oversight Committee report, likely concerning foreign influence (specifically China) on U.S. corporations and politics. It details financial dependencies of companies like GM and Boeing on China, Steve Wynn's role in conveying Chinese government requests to President Trump regarding dissident Guo Wengui, and Chinese intelligence monitoring of the President's phone calls. It also references Hollywood's relationship with China, including Disney hiring Henry Kissinger to manage fallout from the movie *Kundun*.
This document is page 119 of a House Oversight Committee report (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020578), specifically Section 7. It consists entirely of endnotes/bibliography citations from 2016-2018 (and one from 1993) focused on US-China relations, corporate bowing to Chinese censorship (Facebook, Apple, Marriott), and technology transfer concerns (Google, Tsinghua University). There is no mention of Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, or their specific network in this document; it appears to be part of a broader legislative inquiry into foreign influence or trade.
This document is page 118 of a House Oversight Committee report detailing the influence of the Chinese government on American technology and travel corporations. It highlights how companies like Google, Facebook, and Marriott have navigated Chinese censorship demands, 'cyber-sovereignty,' and political pressure regarding the status of Taiwan and Tibet to maintain market access. Although this document comes from a batch potentially labeled as 'Epstein-related' by the user, the text itself contains no mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates; it focuses exclusively on US-China corporate and geopolitical relations.
This document is a bibliography page (Section 7, page 117) from a House Oversight Committee report. It lists sources from 2015-2018 focusing on Chinese foreign influence, money laundering scandals involving Chinese banks (AgBank, China Construction Bank, ICBC), and political donations affecting US elections (specifically mentioning the Clinton Foundation and Terry McAuliffe). The text portion analyzes how the Chinese Communist Party leverages foreign corporations and joint ventures to legitimize its rule and enforce political compliance.
This document is page 116 of a House Oversight Committee report (marked HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020575) containing a list of references (endnotes 19-30). The citations primarily focus on Chinese corporate influence in US politics, lobbying activities, and 'dark money' contributions involving entities like ZTE, HNA Group, Wanhua Chemical, and Alibaba. It references reporting from The Intercept, Washington Post, and Daily Beast regarding connections between Chinese entities and US political figures including Donald Trump, Gary Locke, Howard Dean, and Newt Gingrich.
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