CIA
OrganizationRelationship Network
Event Timeline
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
The Board (NLRB)
|
Regulatory commenter |
7
|
1 | |
|
person
Richard Kahn
|
Professional association |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Kenneth Bruce
|
Analyst coverage |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Richard Kahn
|
Professional |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Richard Kahn
|
Business associate |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Alexander Poteyev
|
Espionage |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Ebrahim Noroozi
|
Employment |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Mel Evans
|
Employee |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
National Labor Relations Board
|
Adversarial in context of rulemaking |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Alexander Poteyev
|
Asset handler |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Anatoli Golitsyn
|
Source agency |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
Goldman
|
Licensing agreement |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Author
|
Employment |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Michelle Gevirtz
|
Employee |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Joe Mandaro
|
Event chair |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Kathy Wilson
|
Event chair |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
John Cacioppo
|
Academic professional |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
U.S. Department of Justice
|
Governmental correspondence |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
TIG Insurance Company
|
Family |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Various Insurance Companies (Boston Old Colony, Continental, etc.)
|
Family |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Bob Woodward
|
Author subject organization |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
NSA
|
Withheld information |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
J.P. Morgan
|
Unknown |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
Starrett City
|
Financial |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
|
Aligned |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | The first British test of social impact bonds began at Her Majesty's Prison Peterborough. | Her Majesty's Prison Peterb... | View |
| N/A | N/A | Edward Snowden attempted to qualify to become a Special Forces soldier but did not complete the t... | Unspecified | View |
| N/A | N/A | The NSA did not immediately share information with the CIA. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | Disciplinary committee brought charges against Conrad resulting in suspension. | Unknown | View |
| 2025-11-20 | N/A | A planned Judiciary Committee hearing regarding Judge Kavanaugh's nomination. | U.S. Senate | View |
| 2025-11-20 | N/A | A Judiciary Committee hearing is scheduled where Christine Blasey Ford is to testify against Judg... | U.S. Senate | View |
| 2025-11-20 | N/A | A planned Judiciary Committee hearing regarding the Kavanaugh nomination. | N/A | View |
| 2020-07-13 | N/A | Rape Hotline Notification/Lead generation | Unknown | View |
| 2019-04-03 | N/A | House Judiciary Committee voted to issue subpoenas for the full Mueller Report. | Washington D.C. | View |
| 2018-11-01 | N/A | A planned public hearing where Sundar Pichai was expected to appear before the House Judiciary Co... | Washington | View |
| 2018-03-01 | N/A | Registration statistics noted for Chinese scholars and students in the UK. | United Kingdom | View |
| 2017-02-01 | N/A | Korea's Financial Services Commission introduced the country's first Stewardship Code. | Korea | View |
| 2017-01-01 | N/A | Anticipated IPO of Ant Financial | Hong Kong | View |
| 2016-07-06 | N/A | Document Update | Unknown | View |
| 2015-01-01 | N/A | Enforcement actions by the Federal Reserve against China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of ... | United States | View |
| 2013-06-23 | N/A | Snowden lands in Moscow from Hong Kong and is taken by Special Services. | Sheremetyevo International ... | View |
| 2013-06-23 | N/A | Snowden arrives from Hong Kong and is removed from the plane by Russian Special Services. | Sheremetyevo International ... | View |
| 2011-12-03 | N/A | Chinese Students & Scholars Association Disaffiliated from University | University (implied Cambrid... | View |
| 2007-11-09 | N/A | The Department of Justice submits its formal views and concerns regarding H.R. 3887 in a letter t... | Washington, D.C. | View |
| 2004-09-14 | N/A | Court heard oral argument on motions to dismiss. | Court | View |
| 2004-01-01 | N/A | Holding in Hemp Industries Association v. DEA enjoining DEA enforcement of 2003 amendment. | Ninth Circuit | View |
| 2003-12-09 | N/A | Transfer of Burnett action to SDNY (MDL 1570) | District of Columbia to New... | View |
| 1990-01-01 | N/A | Period mentioned where CIA, FBI, and NSA discovered they were vulnerable to penetration/insider t... | USA (implied) | View |
| 1981-01-01 | N/A | Period of 'The Secret Wars of the CIA', as documented by Bob Woodward. | N/A | View |
| 1969-01-01 | N/A | Philip Agee leaves the CIA. | USA | View |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020307.jpg
This document appears to be a historical overview of United States signals intelligence, tracing its origins from the 'Black Chamber' and Western Union cooperation in the 1920s through World War II codebreaking (Enigma and Purple ciphers) to the formation of the NSA in 1952. It details the NSA's mandate to protect US communications and intercept foreign signals, noting its expansion during the Cold War with a 'black budget' and advanced technology. While part of a larger House Oversight production (likely related to intelligence abuses or history), this specific page contains no direct references to Jeffrey Epstein.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020303.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or detailed report (possibly provided to the House Oversight Committee) discussing US intelligence failures related to the Edward Snowden leaks. It details the NSA's offensive cyber strategy, the vulnerability exposed by Snowden at the National Threat Operations Center in Hawaii, and General Michael Hayden's assessment that the leaks significantly aided Chinese and Russian intelligence capabilities.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020302.jpg
This document appears to be page 150 of a report (likely House Oversight Committee based on the footer) discussing historical intelligence failures and Russian espionage capabilities. It details how the SVR/KGB successfully penetrated US intelligence (NSA/CIA) over decades, including a specific incident where CIA officers knowingly passed Russian disinformation to Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. The text concludes by referencing the Edward Snowden breach as a modern example of these vulnerabilities.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020301.jpg
This document, page 149 of a House Oversight production, details the 2010 FBI arrest of Russian sleeper agents (the 'Illegals Program') and the subsequent compromise of the CIA's mole, Poteyev. It describes concerns within the NSA regarding potential SVR penetration at Fort Meade and the logistical impossibility of vetting all employees against insider threats. The text explains how an FBI sting operation against agent Anna Chapman inadvertently revealed Poteyev's identity, necessitating his urgent exfiltration from Russia to the U.S. via Belarus.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020300.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a narrative report or book regarding Russian intelligence operations, specifically the SVR's 'Illegals Program.' It details how a source named Poteyev informed the CIA about sleeper agents, including Anna Chapman, and discusses the high costs of FBI surveillance required to monitor these individuals ($10,000/day). The text concludes with a 2010 warning from Poteyev that Russian military intelligence was seeking to activate these agents for a sensitive assignment.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020299.jpg
This document is a page from a book or report (Chapter 18: The Unheeded Warning) marked as House Oversight evidence. It details the history of Alexander Poteyev, a high-level SVR colonel recruited by the CIA in the 1990s who provided warnings in 2010 about Russian espionage. The text explains the SVR's strategy of using 'illegal' sleeper agents in the US to bypass FBI surveillance of diplomatic staff and service moles within US intelligence agencies.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020298.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a report or narrative regarding the aftermath of the Edward Snowden intelligence leaks. It discusses the skepticism of U.S. intelligence officials regarding Snowden's claims of protecting secrets, the assumption that Russia and China accessed the data ('keys to the kingdom'), and the role of Admiral Michael Rogers in rebuilding the NSA after replacing General Alexander. Note: Despite the prompt labeling this as 'Epstein-related,' the text on this specific page deals exclusively with National Security and the Snowden affair.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020294.jpg
This document page, bearing a House Oversight footer, details intelligence community concerns regarding Edward Snowden's stay in Hong Kong in 2013. It discusses the high probability that Chinese and Russian intelligence services accessed the stolen NSA files on Snowden's laptops through technical or human means while he was at the Mira Hotel and other residences. The text also covers subsequent leaks published after Snowden arrived in Moscow, specifically the revelation via Der Spiegel that the NSA had monitored German Chancellor Angela Merkel's cell phone.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020291.jpg
This document discusses the implications of Edward Snowden's arrival in Moscow, suggesting he likely shared NSA documents with Russian intelligence, which outweighed the diplomatic cost of a cancelled summit between Obama and Putin. It details the geopolitical tension involving Sergei Lavrov and Hillary Clinton's State Department, and notes a later narrative shift where Snowden claimed he brought no secret files to Russia during an interview with James Risen.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020290.jpg
This page, likely from a House Oversight Committee report, analyzes the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's presence in Russia. It discusses conflicting narratives regarding whether Snowden retained possession of NSA and CIA documents after arriving in Moscow, highlighting inconsistencies between Snowden's claims and statements made by his lawyer, Anatoly Kucherena (who is noted to have ties to the FSB). The text speculates on the FSB's access to Snowden's encrypted data, possibly through cloud storage retrieval or coercion.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020289.jpg
This document page (137) from a House Oversight file details the aftermath of Edward Snowden's flight to Russia, specifically focusing on whether he retained sensitive NSA documents. Through interviews with his lawyer Anatoly Kucherena (conducted by Sophie Shevardnadze in 2013 and the author in 2015), it is confirmed that Snowden did not give all documents to journalists in Hong Kong but retained a second, more sensitive set of files while in Russia.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020288.jpg
This document is a page from a House Oversight report (Bates stamp 020288) detailing the intelligence leaks attributed to Edward Snowden. It discusses the logistics of how documents were transferred between Snowden, Laura Poitras, and Glenn Greenwald, including the interception of a courier at Heathrow. The text analyzes the potential damage of specific missing documents, particularly 'level 3' lists concerning Russia and China, and questions whether Snowden took these files to Moscow. Note: While the user prompt requested Epstein-related data, this specific page is exclusively focused on the Snowden/NSA leaks.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020287.jpg
This document is a page from a report or narrative (marked House Oversight) detailing the NSA's damage assessment regarding Edward Snowden. It analyzes the volume of data stolen (estimated at 1.7 million touched / 1.3 million copied) during his time at Booz Allen and Dell, while noting disputes from Snowden and journalists Greenwald and Bamford regarding these numbers. The text discusses the potential motivations of the NSA Damage Assessment team under Ledgett and the legal implications of the leaks.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020286.jpg
This document is page 134, 'Chapter Seventeen,' likely from a book or report regarding Edward Snowden (possibly 'How America Lost Its Secrets' by Edward Jay Epstein). It discusses the 'Snowden enigma,' specifically the disparity between the number of NSA documents compromised versus those handed to journalists. It references comments by Glenn Greenwald and NSA official Ledgett regarding the 'keys to the kingdom'—documents that reveal the core mechanisms of U.S. surveillance. The page bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' footer.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020284.jpg
This document discusses the likelihood of Edward Snowden's cooperation with Russian security services (FSB) following his arrival in Russia. It cites experts like Andrei Soldatov and General Oleg Kalugin, who argue that the FSB would inevitably control and exploit Snowden, and details how lawyer Anatoly Kucherena facilitated Snowden's stay in Moscow under Kremlin-dictated terms.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020282.jpg
This document, page 130 of a larger report (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020282), analyzes the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's flight to Hong Kong and subsequent move to Russia. It details the strategic calculations made by Vladimir Putin and Russian intelligence to accept Snowden, not out of sentiment, but to capitalize on the disruption to US interests. The text also draws parallels between Snowden's situation and the harsh treatment of Bradley Manning, suggesting Snowden knew he could not return to the US without facing similar imprisonment.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020280.jpg
This document is page 128 of a report or book (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020280) discussing the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's actions. It analyzes theories regarding when Snowden might have come under Russian influence, arguing against early recruitment due to his risky contact with journalists Greenwald and Poitras, while supporting the 'Hong Kong Scenario' where Russian officials engaged him after his arrival there. The document mentions Putin's direct authorization of Snowden's travel to Moscow. Note: While requested as an 'Epstein-related' document, the text exclusively concerns the Snowden leaks and contains no mentions of Jeffrey Epstein.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020279.jpg
This document is page 127 of a House Oversight report analyzing intelligence failures and defectors. It contrasts the rejected asylum request of Chinese official Wang Lijun with the case of Edward Snowden, detailing concerns that Snowden may have been recruited by Russian intelligence as early as 2009 or during his financial troubles in Geneva. The text outlines three possible scenarios for when Snowden came under Russian control and cites assessments by CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell and NSA Director General Keith Alexander.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020278.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a narrative book or report (marked as a House Oversight exhibit) detailing Cold War espionage tradecraft. It specifically discusses the case of Robert Hanssen, a 'walk-in' spy who provided the KGB with massive amounts of US intelligence while refusing direct control or face-to-face meetings, and contrasts this with the defection of KGB Major Anatoli Golitsyn in 1962. The text analyzes the intelligence value of 'defectors-in-place' versus those who physically defect to the United States.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020277.jpg
This document appears to be page 125 of a larger report or book (Chapter Sixteen: 'The Question of When?'), marked with a House Oversight footer. The text discusses the history and mechanics of espionage, contrasting recruited moles (referencing John Le Carré novels and Heinz Felfe) with 'walk-ins' or self-generated spies (referencing Alexander Poteyev and Robert Hanssen). It analyzes how intelligence agencies manage these assets and notes a 1990 PFIEB finding that most Cold War spies were volunteers rather than recruits.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020275.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (marked with House Oversight numbering) discussing the theory that Edward Snowden may have been guided or assisted by a hidden Russian mole within the NSA. The text draws parallels to historical espionage cases involving KGB moles Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, who eluded detection for decades. It includes details of an interview the author conducted in 2015 with Victor Cherkashin, the KGB handler for Hanssen and Ames.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020271.jpg
This document, page 119 of a House Oversight production, analyzes the distinction between whistle-blowers and spies through the historical examples of Philip Agee and Edward Snowden. It details Agee's 1969 departure from the CIA and subsequent provision of secrets to the KGB and Cuban intelligence. It parallels this with Snowden's 2013 theft of NSA data, arguing that Snowden's behavior—specifically taking a job to access secrets—aligns more with 'penetration agents' than whistle-blowers, and discusses the counterintelligence investigation into how he breached secure systems.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020270.jpg
This document appears to be Page 118 (Chapter Fifteen) of a book or report titled 'Did Snowden Act Alone?', stamped with a House Oversight footer. The text discusses the blurred lines between whistleblowers and spies, citing historical examples such as Donald Maclean, Bradley Birkenfeld, and Daniel Ellsberg. It argues that neither financial compensation nor acting alone are definitive distinctions between the two categories, noting that whistleblowers often have accomplices or receive bounties.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020253.jpg
This document details the events surrounding the publication of Edward Snowden's NSA leaks in June 2013, describing how journalists verified his credibility using code phrases and the subsequent interactions with government officials before publication. It recounts the release of the Verizon and PRISM stories by the Guardian and Washington Post, followed by Snowden's decision to reveal his identity through a video interview to define his own narrative before the government could demonize him.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020252.jpg
This page from a House Oversight report details the initial meetings between Edward Snowden and journalists (Greenwald, Poitras, MacAskill) in a hotel room on June 4th. It describes Snowden's security rituals (the 'magical cloak'), transcriptions of his introduction to Ewen MacAskill, and critically analyzes discrepancies between Snowden's claims about his career/salary ($200k vs $133k) and the official records from the CIA, DIA, and Booz Allen. The report attempts to discredit Snowden's truthfulness regarding his authority to intercept presidential communications.
| Date | Type | From | To | Amount | Description | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | Received | CIA | CIA | $41,522,399.00 | Final Fair Market Value (FMV) of the beneficiar... | View |
| N/A | Received | GRATs | CIA | $41,522,399.00 | Final Fair Market Value (FMV) of the beneficiar... | View |
| N/A | Paid | CIA | Kate | $0.00 | Employment income (implied by 'employed'). | View |
| 2025-11-07 | Paid | CIA | Palm Beach Utilities | $956.68 | Average Monthly Bill | View |
| 2020-06-30 | Paid | CIA | IRA | $59,039.62 | Account Balance | View |
| 2020-06-30 | Paid | CIA | US | $4,841,818.09 | Account Balance | View |
| 2018-01-01 | Paid | CIA | DONALD J. TRUMP | $0.00 | Income: rent ($1,000,001 - $5,000,000) | View |
| 2018-01-01 | Paid | CIA | DONALD J. TRUMP | $0.00 | Rent income: Over $5,000,000 | View |
| 2018-01-01 | Paid | CIA | DONALD J. TRUMP | $142,830.00 | Management fees | View |
| 2012-01-01 | Received | LLC | CIA | $50,000,000.00 | Mortgage, 4.200% interest, matures in 2022 | View |
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