NSA
OrganizationRelationship Network
Event Timeline
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
Vanee Vines
|
Spokesperson for |
9
Strong
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Employment former |
8
Strong
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Contractor assignment |
6
|
1 | |
|
organization
CIA
|
Withheld information |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Michael McConnell
|
Former leadership |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Former contractor |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Jordana H. Feldman
|
Administrator |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
U.S. Virgin Islands Economy
|
Economic dependency |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
FBI
|
Inter agency communication |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | An auction of Hovensa's assets was held, with assets awarded to Limetree Bay Holdings. | New York City | View |
| N/A | N/A | The NSA notified the FBI about the initial investigation. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | NSA notified the FBI about the Snowden affair. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | The Hovensa Refinery in St. Croix closed. | St. Croix | View |
| N/A | N/A | Closing of the Hovensa refinery, which impacted the St. Croix housing market. | St. Croix | View |
| N/A | N/A | The NSA did not immediately share information with the CIA. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | The assets of the closed Hovensa refinery were sold at auction. | St. Croix | View |
| 2020-10-05 | N/A | Plaintiff accepted offer of compensation. | Unknown | View |
| 2020-06-26 | N/A | Plaintiff submitted a claim to the Compensation Program. | Unknown | View |
| 2015-06-04 | N/A | Publication of a New York Times article on the NSA's expansion of internet spying at the U.S. bor... | U.S. Border | View |
| 2015-05-05 | N/A | The Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the NSA's collection of bulk data illegal. | N/A | View |
| 2014-03-07 | N/A | Edward Snowden reportedly raised concerns internally at the NSA over 10 times before 'going rogue'. | NSA | View |
| 2014-01-01 | N/A | NSA informed Congress regarding the method of password acquisition. | Washington D.C. (Implied) | View |
| 2012-01-18 | N/A | The Hovensa refinery was announced to be permanently shut down, leading to job losses and an econ... | US Virgin Islands | View |
| 2012-01-18 | N/A | The permanent shutdown of the Hovensa refinery was announced, causing an economic downturn and le... | US Virgin Islands | View |
| 2012-01-01 | N/A | Closure of the Hovensa oil refinery. | St. Croix | View |
| 2012-01-01 | N/A | Closure of the Hovensa oil and gas refinery, which impacted the territory's unemployment rate. | U.S. Virgin Islands | View |
| 2012-01-01 | N/A | Closure of the Hovensa oil refinery in St. Croix, cited as a likely cause for a downturn in GDP. | St. Croix | View |
| 2011-01-01 | N/A | Stellar Wind program terminated for budgetary reasons. | USA | View |
| 2010-12-01 | N/A | Report of counterspies hunting for a Russian mole inside the National Security Agency. | U.S. | View |
| 1990-01-01 | N/A | Period mentioned where CIA, FBI, and NSA discovered they were vulnerable to penetration/insider t... | USA (implied) | View |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020339.jpg
This document appears to be page 187 of a narrative report or book submitted to the House Oversight Committee (Bates stamp 020339). The text details the 2013 flight of Edward Snowden from Hong Kong to Russia, the inability of US intelligence to capture him, and the strategic fallout of the NSA leaks. It discusses intelligence tradecraft (referencing James Angleton) regarding how foreign adversaries (Russia/China) would likely obscure their involvement or the intelligence gained from the leak. Note: This specific page contains no references to Jeffrey Epstein, despite the user's prompt context.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020338.jpg
This document appears to be page 186 of a House Oversight report detailing the timeline of Edward Snowden's NSA leaks in June 2013. It describes his coordination with journalists Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras in Hong Kong, the release of the leaks by The Guardian and Washington Post, and the immediate geopolitical fallout involving US-China relations during a summit between Obama and Xi Jinping. Despite the prompt's context, there is no mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates in this specific document.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020337.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a House Oversight report or narrative detailing the timeline of Edward Snowden's leak of NSA documents in May-June 2013. It describes his movements in Hong Kong, his communications with Washington Post journalist Barton Gellman (issuing an ultimatum to publish), and the intelligence risks posed by Chinese and Russian services monitoring him. The text highlights the pressure Snowden was under to publish before his medical leave expired on June 3rd, at which point the NSA would realize he was missing.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020336.jpg
This document appears to be page 184 from a book (likely by Edward Jay Epstein regarding Edward Snowden) included in a House Oversight Committee production. It details Edward Snowden's arrival in Hong Kong in May 2013, his possession of critical NSA documents, and the geopolitical risks involved, specifically regarding China and Russia. The text analyzes Snowden as a 'single point of failure' for US intelligence and discusses the potential for hostile foreign intelligence services to access the stolen data.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020335.jpg
This document appears to be page 183 of a narrative report or book included in a House Oversight production (Bates stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020335). It details Edward Snowden's May 2013 trip to Hong Kong, discussing the heavy surveillance capabilities of Chinese intelligence services operating out of the Prince of Wales skyscraper. The text analyzes the geopolitical implications, noting that while Snowden viewed himself as a whistleblower, Chinese intelligence likely viewed him as a pawn, and the US State Department had to issue strict security protocols for devices in the region due to cyber espionage threats.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020334.jpg
This document page, stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020334, details the intelligence and cyber warfare capabilities of China and its cooperation with Russia. It discusses the hacking of Anthem to gain leverage over US government employees, quotes General Hayden on the legitimacy of such intelligence targets, and outlines a 1992 intelligence-sharing treaty between Russia and China. The text also highlights the geopolitical alignment of Putin and Xi Jinping in 2014 against US global dominance.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020333.jpg
This document appears to be page 181 of a larger report or book, stamped with a House Oversight footer, detailing the history and tactics of Chinese cyber-espionage against the United States. It discusses the organizational structure of Chinese intelligence, specific hacking campaigns against US contractors like Booz Allen and tech companies like Google and Adobe, and the massive data breach at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that exposed millions of federal employee records. The text mentions Paul Strassmann and Edward Snowden but does not contain any specific references to Jeffrey Epstein or his associates.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020332.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book (Chapter 22) produced as evidence in a House Oversight investigation. It details Chinese military advancements, specifically a 2014 submarine missile test in the Atlantic monitored by the NSA, and alleges that China's nuclear and stealth capabilities were largely achieved through espionage against the US and technology licensing from Russia. It references a 1998 Congressional Committee established to investigate these security concerns.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020331.jpg
This document page, stamped as part of a House Oversight production, appears to be an excerpt from a narrative report or book. It discusses NSA surveillance capabilities regarding TOR users, specifically referencing the tracking of Silk Road founder Ross Ulbricht's server in Iceland. It also discusses NSA security vulnerabilities highlighted by the Edward Snowden leaks and comments by former CIA Deputy Director Morell regarding the SVR (Russian intelligence) and cyber security.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020330.jpg
This document appears to be page 178 of a House Oversight Committee report focused on the Edward Snowden leaks. It details operational security failures by Snowden and his journalist contacts (Poitras, Greenwald) in 2013, noting that Poitras shared information with multiple people and Greenwald shared details with his partner, David Miranda. The text also analyzes Russian cyber espionage capabilities, noting their focus on breaking TOR networks and their advanced tools capable of bypassing US government security.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020329.jpg
This document appears to be page 177 of a report or book (potentially by Edward Jay Epstein regarding Edward Snowden) submitted to House Oversight. It details the vulnerabilities of the NSA to 'insider threats' and Russian intelligence (SVR/KGB) recruitment tactics, specifically targeting system administrators. It discusses the 2011 OPM hack as a method for identifying potential recruits via Standard Form 86 data and links Edward Snowden to various anti-surveillance groups like Wikileaks and the TOR project in 2012-2013.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020328.jpg
This document, page 176 of a House Oversight report, analyzes Russian intelligence (SVR) strategies for penetrating the NSA, contrasting the difficulty of recruiting NSA officers versus CIA officers. It details the shift in the 1990s toward targeting civilian technologists and hacktivists, specifically mentioning Edward Snowden as a donor to Ron Paul's campaign, and discusses the use of 'false flag' operations to recruit dissidents.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020325.jpg
This document page details Cold War era espionage cases involving the KGB and SVR, specifically mentioning spies Ronald Pelton and David Sheldon Boone. It primarily focuses on the recruitment of CIA officer Harold Nicholson by the Russian SVR in the 1990s, explaining how he was manipulated from a "dangle" operation into a mole due to psychological vulnerabilities.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020324.jpg
This document details the history of KGB infiltration within the NSA during the Cold War, specifically focusing on defectors like Victor Norris Hamilton and moles like Sgt. Jack Dunlap. It describes the fates of these individuals, ranging from defection to Moscow and institutionalization to mysterious deaths, and outlines the methods used by the KGB to recruit and exploit them for secret intelligence.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020323.jpg
This document discusses the asymmetrical intelligence capabilities between the NSA and Russian intelligence services (SVR/KGB) circa 2013 and historically. It details Russia's efforts to counter NSA dominance through espionage and defection, highlighting the historical case of NSA defectors William Martin and Bernon Mitchell in 1960.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020322.jpg
This document details the failure of NSA surveillance to detect the Russian invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014, attributed to Russia's ability to hide electronic traces. It discusses Vladimir Putin's geopolitical motivations to restore Russian power and counter U.S. hegemony, while contrasting the legal constraints on the NSA regarding domestic surveillance with the broad powers of Russian intelligence services under the SORM system.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020321.jpg
This document is a single page (169) from a larger report, likely from the House Oversight Committee given the footer. The text discusses the National Security Agency's (NSA) continued reliance on private contractors despite the security breach caused by Edward Snowden, suggesting that outsourcing had become an essential component of the US intelligence system. While labeled as part of an Epstein-related request, this specific page contains no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020320.jpg
This document analyzes the NSA's outsourcing practices, highlighting the security vulnerabilities that allowed Edward Snowden to steal classified files in 2013. It details the economic and bureaucratic incentives for outsourcing, the ignore warnings regarding security risks, and the lack of penalties for contractors like Booz Allen despite significant security failures.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020319.jpg
This document details severe security failures and misconduct within USIS and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), including employees falsifying background checks and massive data breaches attributed to Chinese and Russian hackers. It highlights specific incidents such as the 2011 hack of Booz Allen Hamilton by "Anonymous" and the compromise of over 19 million employee records via the E-QIP system.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020318.jpg
This document appears to be page 166 of a report (likely Congressional, given the footer 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT') detailing the privatization of US government security clearance background checks. It specifically critiques the hiring of Edward Snowden by Booz Allen Hamilton and the failure of USIS (United States Investigative Services) to properly vet him due to profit-seeking incentives and lack of inter-agency access (CIA files). The text outlines how USIS, owned by Providence Equity Partners, was sued in 2014 for fraudulently closing hundreds of thousands of background checks to maximize revenue.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020317.jpg
This document discusses the challenges and risks associated with the NSA's reliance on private contractors like Booz Allen Hamilton, highlighting the conflict between profit motives and security quality. It contrasts standard business metrics with the opaque nature of intelligence failures, citing the 2013 Snowden breach as a catastrophic public failure comparable only to the 1968 capture of the USS Pueblo. The text critiques the privatization of secret intelligence, noting how financial incentives led contractors to prioritize low-wage staffing over quality control.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020316.jpg
This document appears to be a page (164) from a narrative report or book included in House Oversight records. It details the history of cybersecurity vulnerabilities within US intelligence, specifically the NSA's reliance on civilian contractors and system administrators. It draws parallels between the KGB's recruitment of hackers in the 1980s and the NSA's hiring of 'hacktivist' culture technicians post-9/11 to compete with tech giants. It specifically mentions that by 2013, sensitive NSA work was outsourced to firms like Booz Allen Hamilton and Microsoft.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020315.jpg
This document, page 163 of a House Oversight production, appears to be an excerpt from a book or detailed report regarding NSA security vulnerabilities. It discusses the privatization of system administration (specifically mentioning Booz Allen Hamilton), the risks of granting civilians special access privileges, and the concept of 'false flag' espionage operations. It specifically details the 1973 recruitment of US Navy officer Jerry Alfred Whitworth by the KGB, who deceived him into believing he was spying for Israel. While the user prompt identifies this as 'Epstein-related,' this specific page contains no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates, though it may be part of a larger file regarding intelligence or blackmail operations.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020314.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book (Chapter Twenty) included in a House Oversight file. It discusses intelligence failures, specifically comparing the 1994 discovery of CIA mole Aldrich Ames to the later security breach by Edward Snowden. It highlights a prescient 1996 NSA report that warned networking computers would make the agency vulnerable to a 'system administrator' acting as a mole.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020313.jpg
This document, stamped 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT', appears to be a narrative report discussing the aftermath of the Edward Snowden data breach on the NSA. It details the efforts of new Director Admiral Michael Rogers to address low morale and rebuild intelligence capabilities in June 2014. The text mentions comments from former directors Michael Hayden and Michael McConnell regarding the severity of the damage and the reliance on outside contractors.
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