NSA
OrganizationRelationship Network
Event Timeline
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
Vanee Vines
|
Spokesperson for |
9
Strong
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Employment former |
8
Strong
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Contractor assignment |
6
|
1 | |
|
organization
CIA
|
Withheld information |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Michael McConnell
|
Former leadership |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Former contractor |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Jordana H. Feldman
|
Administrator |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
U.S. Virgin Islands Economy
|
Economic dependency |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
FBI
|
Inter agency communication |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | An auction of Hovensa's assets was held, with assets awarded to Limetree Bay Holdings. | New York City | View |
| N/A | N/A | The NSA notified the FBI about the initial investigation. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | NSA notified the FBI about the Snowden affair. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | The Hovensa Refinery in St. Croix closed. | St. Croix | View |
| N/A | N/A | Closing of the Hovensa refinery, which impacted the St. Croix housing market. | St. Croix | View |
| N/A | N/A | The NSA did not immediately share information with the CIA. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | The assets of the closed Hovensa refinery were sold at auction. | St. Croix | View |
| 2020-10-05 | N/A | Plaintiff accepted offer of compensation. | Unknown | View |
| 2020-06-26 | N/A | Plaintiff submitted a claim to the Compensation Program. | Unknown | View |
| 2015-06-04 | N/A | Publication of a New York Times article on the NSA's expansion of internet spying at the U.S. bor... | U.S. Border | View |
| 2015-05-05 | N/A | The Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the NSA's collection of bulk data illegal. | N/A | View |
| 2014-03-07 | N/A | Edward Snowden reportedly raised concerns internally at the NSA over 10 times before 'going rogue'. | NSA | View |
| 2014-01-01 | N/A | NSA informed Congress regarding the method of password acquisition. | Washington D.C. (Implied) | View |
| 2012-01-18 | N/A | The Hovensa refinery was announced to be permanently shut down, leading to job losses and an econ... | US Virgin Islands | View |
| 2012-01-18 | N/A | The permanent shutdown of the Hovensa refinery was announced, causing an economic downturn and le... | US Virgin Islands | View |
| 2012-01-01 | N/A | Closure of the Hovensa oil refinery. | St. Croix | View |
| 2012-01-01 | N/A | Closure of the Hovensa oil and gas refinery, which impacted the territory's unemployment rate. | U.S. Virgin Islands | View |
| 2012-01-01 | N/A | Closure of the Hovensa oil refinery in St. Croix, cited as a likely cause for a downturn in GDP. | St. Croix | View |
| 2011-01-01 | N/A | Stellar Wind program terminated for budgetary reasons. | USA | View |
| 2010-12-01 | N/A | Report of counterspies hunting for a Russian mole inside the National Security Agency. | U.S. | View |
| 1990-01-01 | N/A | Period mentioned where CIA, FBI, and NSA discovered they were vulnerable to penetration/insider t... | USA (implied) | View |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020284.jpg
This document discusses the likelihood of Edward Snowden's cooperation with Russian security services (FSB) following his arrival in Russia. It cites experts like Andrei Soldatov and General Oleg Kalugin, who argue that the FSB would inevitably control and exploit Snowden, and details how lawyer Anatoly Kucherena facilitated Snowden's stay in Moscow under Kremlin-dictated terms.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020282.jpg
This document, page 130 of a larger report (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020282), analyzes the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's flight to Hong Kong and subsequent move to Russia. It details the strategic calculations made by Vladimir Putin and Russian intelligence to accept Snowden, not out of sentiment, but to capitalize on the disruption to US interests. The text also draws parallels between Snowden's situation and the harsh treatment of Bradley Manning, suggesting Snowden knew he could not return to the US without facing similar imprisonment.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020281.jpg
This document appears to be page 129 of a House Oversight report (marked HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020281) discussing Edward Snowden, not Jeffrey Epstein. It details a theory that Russian intelligence may have been aware of Snowden's activities prior to his arrival in Hong Kong in 2013 by monitoring the anti-surveillance activists he communicated with, such as Runa Sandvik and Laura Poitras. The text includes insights from a 2015 interview with a former NSA counterintelligence officer regarding Russian capabilities to bypass encryption and potentially steer Snowden's movements.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020280.jpg
This document is page 128 of a report or book (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020280) discussing the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's actions. It analyzes theories regarding when Snowden might have come under Russian influence, arguing against early recruitment due to his risky contact with journalists Greenwald and Poitras, while supporting the 'Hong Kong Scenario' where Russian officials engaged him after his arrival there. The document mentions Putin's direct authorization of Snowden's travel to Moscow. Note: While requested as an 'Epstein-related' document, the text exclusively concerns the Snowden leaks and contains no mentions of Jeffrey Epstein.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020279.jpg
This document is page 127 of a House Oversight report analyzing intelligence failures and defectors. It contrasts the rejected asylum request of Chinese official Wang Lijun with the case of Edward Snowden, detailing concerns that Snowden may have been recruited by Russian intelligence as early as 2009 or during his financial troubles in Geneva. The text outlines three possible scenarios for when Snowden came under Russian control and cites assessments by CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell and NSA Director General Keith Alexander.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020278.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a narrative book or report (marked as a House Oversight exhibit) detailing Cold War espionage tradecraft. It specifically discusses the case of Robert Hanssen, a 'walk-in' spy who provided the KGB with massive amounts of US intelligence while refusing direct control or face-to-face meetings, and contrasts this with the defection of KGB Major Anatoli Golitsyn in 1962. The text analyzes the intelligence value of 'defectors-in-place' versus those who physically defect to the United States.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020277.jpg
This document appears to be page 125 of a larger report or book (Chapter Sixteen: 'The Question of When?'), marked with a House Oversight footer. The text discusses the history and mechanics of espionage, contrasting recruited moles (referencing John Le Carré novels and Heinz Felfe) with 'walk-ins' or self-generated spies (referencing Alexander Poteyev and Robert Hanssen). It analyzes how intelligence agencies manage these assets and notes a 1990 PFIEB finding that most Cold War spies were volunteers rather than recruits.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020276.jpg
This document page, marked with a House Oversight footer, discusses theories surrounding Edward Snowden's removal of documents from the NSA. It speculates on the possibility of a hypothetical accomplice within the NSA and suggests that even if Snowden acted as an idealist, he may have been entangled by Russian intelligence services. Note: The text contains a likely typo in the second paragraph ('it does exclude' likely meant 'it does not exclude').
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020275.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (marked with House Oversight numbering) discussing the theory that Edward Snowden may have been guided or assisted by a hidden Russian mole within the NSA. The text draws parallels to historical espionage cases involving KGB moles Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, who eluded detection for decades. It includes details of an interview the author conducted in 2015 with Victor Cherkashin, the KGB handler for Hanssen and Ames.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020274.jpg
This document appears to be page 122 of a House Oversight report or narrative analysis concerning the Edward Snowden NSA leaks. It explores the 'witting-accomplice scenario,' theorizing that Snowden may have had help from a system administrator or a 'deep-cover spy' to access secure files, although an FBI investigation over six months failed to find any knowing accomplices among his co-workers. The text discusses the culture of the 'geek squad' contractors and the possibility that foreign intelligence utilized Snowden as a distraction.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020273.jpg
This document appears to be a page from an investigative report or book regarding the Edward Snowden NSA leaks, bearing a House Oversight Committee stamp. It details the technical security measures at the NSA (EMP shielding, sealed USB ports) and argues that Snowden would have required assistance—potentially a 'witting accomplice'—to bypass these measures and steal data, as he lacked the necessary system administrator privileges and equipment. Note: While the prompt requested an analysis of an 'Epstein-related' document, this specific page refers exclusively to Edward Snowden and NSA security protocols.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020272.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (possibly by Edward Jay Epstein regarding Edward Snowden) submitted as evidence to the House Oversight Committee. It analyzes how Edward Snowden obtained passwords to secure NSA vaults, ruling out his time at Dell or his system admin privileges at Booz Allen. The text explores the 'Unwitting Accomplice Possibility,' featuring an interview with a former Booz Allen executive who deems it highly unlikely that co-workers would voluntarily share passwords with Snowden, leading to a discussion of potential technical methods like 'key loggers.'
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020271.jpg
This document, page 119 of a House Oversight production, analyzes the distinction between whistle-blowers and spies through the historical examples of Philip Agee and Edward Snowden. It details Agee's 1969 departure from the CIA and subsequent provision of secrets to the KGB and Cuban intelligence. It parallels this with Snowden's 2013 theft of NSA data, arguing that Snowden's behavior—specifically taking a job to access secrets—aligns more with 'penetration agents' than whistle-blowers, and discusses the counterintelligence investigation into how he breached secure systems.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020270.jpg
This document appears to be Page 118 (Chapter Fifteen) of a book or report titled 'Did Snowden Act Alone?', stamped with a House Oversight footer. The text discusses the blurred lines between whistleblowers and spies, citing historical examples such as Donald Maclean, Bradley Birkenfeld, and Daniel Ellsberg. It argues that neither financial compensation nor acting alone are definitive distinctions between the two categories, noting that whistleblowers often have accomplices or receive bounties.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020265.jpg
This document appears to be page 113 of a House Oversight Committee report or narrative regarding Edward Snowden. It details his transition from a technician to a media figure in Moscow, his support network (including Julian Assange and Sarah Harrison), and his media appearances. The text critically analyzes his escape to Russia, suggesting it was not accidental but likely involved cooperation with Russian intelligence (FSB/KGB) and President Putin in exchange for NSA secrets. The text contains several typographical errors (e.g., 'denting' instead of 'denying', 'far trial' instead of 'fair trial').
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020262.jpg
This document appears to be 'Chapter Fourteen: Fugitive' from a report (likely House Oversight Committee based on the footer) detailing Edward Snowden's flight from U.S. jurisdiction. It describes his interactions with journalists Poitras, Greenwald, and Gellman, specifically noting Gellman's refusal to help Snowden evade authorities via an encrypted key. The text analyzes Snowden's potential asylum destinations, including Iceland and Ecuador, detailing the logistical and diplomatic attempts made by Assange to secure travel documents, and questions Snowden's intended destination given his lack of visas.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020258.jpg
This document, likely part of a House Oversight report, details the coordination between Julian Assange and Edward Snowden regarding Snowden's flight from US authorities. It describes Assange's advice for Snowden to seek asylum in Russia rather than Ecuador to manage PR consequences, and his deployment of WikiLeaks staffer Sarah Harrison from Australia to Hong Kong to assist Snowden. The text also covers Harrison's family connections in Hong Kong and Snowden's stated motivations involving the treatment of Bradley Manning.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020256.jpg
This page, marked with a House Oversight Bates stamp, details the events of mid-June (likely 2013) regarding Edward Snowden's leak of NSA files. It describes Laura Poitras realizing she was being surveilled in Hong Kong and subsequently fleeing to Berlin on June 15th. Simultaneously, the document notes Snowden was finalizing his assessment of stolen files and contacting Julian Assange to arrange his own exit from Hong Kong.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020255.jpg
This document (page 103, file HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020255) details an interview between journalist Lana Lam (South China Morning Post) and Edward Snowden, facilitated by Laura Poitras in Hong Kong. The text describes the security measures taken for the interview (TOR laptop, phone confiscation) and Snowden's revelation that he specifically took a job at Booz Allen Hamilton in March 2013 to access lists of machines hacked by the NSA globally. It also notes Snowden's claim that the US government committed crimes against Hong Kong and China, and mentions his subsequent flight to Russia around June 24, 2013.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020254.jpg
This document is page 102 of a report (likely House Oversight) detailing the immediate aftermath of Edward Snowden's NSA leaks in June 2013. It describes his logistics in Hong Kong, including moving between hotel rooms at The Mira, engaging lawyers Robert Tibbo and Jonathan Mann, and escaping to a safe house while communicating with journalists Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras. The text also notes Greenwald's subsequent departure to Brazil and the founding of The Intercept.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020253.jpg
This document details the events surrounding the publication of Edward Snowden's NSA leaks in June 2013, describing how journalists verified his credibility using code phrases and the subsequent interactions with government officials before publication. It recounts the release of the Verizon and PRISM stories by the Guardian and Washington Post, followed by Snowden's decision to reveal his identity through a video interview to define his own narrative before the government could demonize him.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020252.jpg
This page from a House Oversight report details the initial meetings between Edward Snowden and journalists (Greenwald, Poitras, MacAskill) in a hotel room on June 4th. It describes Snowden's security rituals (the 'magical cloak'), transcriptions of his introduction to Ewen MacAskill, and critically analyzes discrepancies between Snowden's claims about his career/salary ($200k vs $133k) and the official records from the CIA, DIA, and Booz Allen. The report attempts to discredit Snowden's truthfulness regarding his authority to intercept presidential communications.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020251.jpg
This document is a narrative account, likely from a House Oversight report, detailing the initial meeting between Edward Snowden ('Citizen Four'), Glenn Greenwald, and Laura Poitras in Hong Kong on June 3rd at the Mira Hotel. It describes the recognition signal involving a Rubik's cube, the subsequent filming of Snowden in Room 1014, and communications with Snowden's girlfriend, Lindsay Mills, regarding government investigators visiting their home in Hawaii after he failed to report to work at Booz Allen.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020248.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a report or narrative (marked House Oversight) detailing the logistics and communications leading up to the publication of the Edward Snowden NSA leaks in June 2013. It describes the coordination between Snowden, Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras, and The Guardian (represented by 'Gibson' and Ewen MacAskill), including travel to Hong Kong and the setup of a contingency website with a 'dead man's switch.' The text focuses on Snowden's motivations, his specific instructions to journalists, and the editorial decisions made by The Guardian regarding Snowden's manifesto versus the NSA documents.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020247.jpg
This document, page 95 of a House Oversight file, details the interactions between journalists Laura Poitras, Glenn Greenwald, and hacktivist Jacob Appelbaum with Edward Snowden (referred to as Citizen 4) leading up to the 2013 NSA leaks. It describes the vetting process of Snowden's technical claims, Greenwald's travel logistics from Rio to New York to seek approval from Guardian editor Janine Gibson, and Gibson's hesitation regarding Snowden's 'manifesto.' The text outlines the specific legal risks and editorial decisions faced by The Guardian regarding the publication of SCI top-secret documents.
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