| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
Vanee Vines
|
Spokesperson for |
9
Strong
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Employment former |
8
Strong
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Contractor assignment |
6
|
1 | |
|
organization
CIA
|
Withheld information |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Michael McConnell
|
Former leadership |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Former contractor |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Jordana H. Feldman
|
Administrator |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
U.S. Virgin Islands Economy
|
Economic dependency |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
FBI
|
Inter agency communication |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | An auction of Hovensa's assets was held, with assets awarded to Limetree Bay Holdings. | New York City | View |
| N/A | N/A | The NSA notified the FBI about the initial investigation. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | NSA notified the FBI about the Snowden affair. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | The Hovensa Refinery in St. Croix closed. | St. Croix | View |
| N/A | N/A | Closing of the Hovensa refinery, which impacted the St. Croix housing market. | St. Croix | View |
| N/A | N/A | The NSA did not immediately share information with the CIA. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | The assets of the closed Hovensa refinery were sold at auction. | St. Croix | View |
| 2020-10-05 | N/A | Plaintiff accepted offer of compensation. | Unknown | View |
| 2020-06-26 | N/A | Plaintiff submitted a claim to the Compensation Program. | Unknown | View |
| 2015-06-04 | N/A | Publication of a New York Times article on the NSA's expansion of internet spying at the U.S. bor... | U.S. Border | View |
| 2015-05-05 | N/A | The Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the NSA's collection of bulk data illegal. | N/A | View |
| 2014-03-07 | N/A | Edward Snowden reportedly raised concerns internally at the NSA over 10 times before 'going rogue'. | NSA | View |
| 2014-01-01 | N/A | NSA informed Congress regarding the method of password acquisition. | Washington D.C. (Implied) | View |
| 2012-01-18 | N/A | The Hovensa refinery was announced to be permanently shut down, leading to job losses and an econ... | US Virgin Islands | View |
| 2012-01-18 | N/A | The permanent shutdown of the Hovensa refinery was announced, causing an economic downturn and le... | US Virgin Islands | View |
| 2012-01-01 | N/A | Closure of the Hovensa oil refinery. | St. Croix | View |
| 2012-01-01 | N/A | Closure of the Hovensa oil and gas refinery, which impacted the territory's unemployment rate. | U.S. Virgin Islands | View |
| 2012-01-01 | N/A | Closure of the Hovensa oil refinery in St. Croix, cited as a likely cause for a downturn in GDP. | St. Croix | View |
| 2011-01-01 | N/A | Stellar Wind program terminated for budgetary reasons. | USA | View |
| 2010-12-01 | N/A | Report of counterspies hunting for a Russian mole inside the National Security Agency. | U.S. | View |
| 1990-01-01 | N/A | Period mentioned where CIA, FBI, and NSA discovered they were vulnerable to penetration/insider t... | USA (implied) | View |
This document is a narrative report detailing the operational security and history of the NSA at Fort Meade, specifically focusing on the tenure and breach of Edward Snowden. It describes the NSA's SIGINT capabilities, internal network structures (NSANet), and the specific methodology Snowden used to access and compromise Level 3 intelligence regarding Russia, Iran, and China starting from his hiring in 2009. While the footer suggests it is part of a House Oversight production, this specific page contains no direct references to Jeffrey Epstein.
This document outlines the administrative challenges faced by the NSA regarding compliance reporting and discusses the establishment and mission of the U.S. Cyber Command to defend against cyber threats. It details the difficulties in attributing cyber attacks to state actors versus civilians, citing the Sony attack, and describes strategies like planting sentinel viruses and retaliation capabilities. Additionally, it reaffirms the NSA's primary role in foreign intelligence gathering despite its new cyber defense responsibilities.
This document page (158) details the history of NSA surveillance expansion following the 9/11 attacks, specifically focusing on the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. It discusses the conflict between government intelligence gathering and privacy advocates (hacktivists), the technical measures taken to bypass encryption/TOR, and the subsequent bureaucratic compliance framework established involving the DOJ and DOD. While part of a larger House Oversight cache, this specific page contains no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates.
This document serves as a historical overview of the National Security Agency's (NSA) capabilities and its relationship with allied nations. It details the immense cost of NSA infrastructure, its ability to monitor global communications via cables and satellites, and the reliance of the CIA and foreign allies on NSA data. The text specifically mentions the 9/11 conspiracy's origins in Hamburg and financing in the Middle East to justify surveillance in friendly nations.
This document page (156) outlines the history of NSA surveillance capabilities and international alliances. It details specific operations such as the 1971 cable tapping in the Sea of Okhotsk, the 1980 Executive Order 12333 by Reagan, and the formation of the 'Five Eyes' alliance. It concludes by mentioning the 2013-2014 Snowden leaks which revealed the extent of data sharing between the NSA and foreign allies like the GCHQ. Although labeled within a 'House Oversight' production, this specific page contains no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein.
This document appears to be a historical overview of United States signals intelligence, tracing its origins from the 'Black Chamber' and Western Union cooperation in the 1920s through World War II codebreaking (Enigma and Purple ciphers) to the formation of the NSA in 1952. It details the NSA's mandate to protect US communications and intercept foreign signals, noting its expansion during the Cold War with a 'black budget' and advanced technology. While part of a larger House Oversight production (likely related to intelligence abuses or history), this specific page contains no direct references to Jeffrey Epstein.
This document appears to be page 154 of a manuscript titled 'Chapter Nineteen: The Rise of the NSA.' It discusses the history of US intelligence, specifically focusing on the impact of the Edward Snowden leaks in 2013 and tracing the history of US code-breaking back to World War I and the 'Black Chamber' in New York City under Herbert O. Yardley. The document bears a House Oversight Bates stamp, indicating it was part of a document production for a congressional investigation.
This page, marked as a House Oversight document, details the fallout of the Edward Snowden leaks within the NSA. It describes General Alexander offering his resignation on June 30, 2013, taking responsibility for the security failures, though President Obama asked him to remain in the position for six months before appointing Admiral Michael Rogers as his successor. The text criticizes the NSA's defenses as catastrophically failed, comparing the administrative changes to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.
This document appears to be a page from a book or detailed report (possibly provided to the House Oversight Committee) discussing US intelligence failures related to the Edward Snowden leaks. It details the NSA's offensive cyber strategy, the vulnerability exposed by Snowden at the National Threat Operations Center in Hawaii, and General Michael Hayden's assessment that the leaks significantly aided Chinese and Russian intelligence capabilities.
This document appears to be page 150 of a report (likely House Oversight Committee based on the footer) discussing historical intelligence failures and Russian espionage capabilities. It details how the SVR/KGB successfully penetrated US intelligence (NSA/CIA) over decades, including a specific incident where CIA officers knowingly passed Russian disinformation to Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. The text concludes by referencing the Edward Snowden breach as a modern example of these vulnerabilities.
This document, page 149 of a House Oversight production, details the 2010 FBI arrest of Russian sleeper agents (the 'Illegals Program') and the subsequent compromise of the CIA's mole, Poteyev. It describes concerns within the NSA regarding potential SVR penetration at Fort Meade and the logistical impossibility of vetting all employees against insider threats. The text explains how an FBI sting operation against agent Anna Chapman inadvertently revealed Poteyev's identity, necessitating his urgent exfiltration from Russia to the U.S. via Belarus.
This document is a page from a book or report (Chapter 18: The Unheeded Warning) marked as House Oversight evidence. It details the history of Alexander Poteyev, a high-level SVR colonel recruited by the CIA in the 1990s who provided warnings in 2010 about Russian espionage. The text explains the SVR's strategy of using 'illegal' sleeper agents in the US to bypass FBI surveillance of diplomatic staff and service moles within US intelligence agencies.
This document appears to be a page from a report or narrative regarding the aftermath of the Edward Snowden intelligence leaks. It discusses the skepticism of U.S. intelligence officials regarding Snowden's claims of protecting secrets, the assumption that Russia and China accessed the data ('keys to the kingdom'), and the role of Admiral Michael Rogers in rebuilding the NSA after replacing General Alexander. Note: Despite the prompt labeling this as 'Epstein-related,' the text on this specific page deals exclusively with National Security and the Snowden affair.
This document appears to be page 145 of a House Oversight Committee report discussing the intelligence fallout from Edward Snowden's leaks. It details the impact on US foreign relations (specifically with Germany regarding Chancellor Merkel's phone), the potential sharing of 'Level 3' NSA documents with Russia and China, and the resulting loss of US and British intelligence capabilities in monitoring adversaries. Note: While the user requested an 'Epstein-related' analysis, this specific page contains no references to Jeffrey Epstein or his network; it is entirely focused on national security and the Snowden affair.
This document appears to be page 144 of a book or report (likely by Edward Jay Epstein) analyzing the timeline of NSA document leaks attributed to Edward Snowden. It questions how Snowden could continue releasing documents via Wikileaks and The Intercept (regarding French presidents and Israeli operations) years after supposedly destroying his files in Hong Kong, suggesting potential involvement or approval by Russian intelligence services. The text details specific leaks from June and July 2015 and cites interviews with intelligence officials.
This document, marked as House Oversight material, analyzes the Snowden leaks specifically regarding the surveillance of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. It argues that the document revealing the spying on Merkel was not part of the original cache Snowden gave to Greenwald and Poitras in Hong Kong, suggesting it was released later from Moscow or via another source. The text details James Bamford's forensic analysis of the drive, which found no mention of Merkel, leading to speculation about how *Der Spiegel* obtained the information.
This document page, bearing a House Oversight footer, details intelligence community concerns regarding Edward Snowden's stay in Hong Kong in 2013. It discusses the high probability that Chinese and Russian intelligence services accessed the stolen NSA files on Snowden's laptops through technical or human means while he was at the Mira Hotel and other residences. The text also covers subsequent leaks published after Snowden arrived in Moscow, specifically the revelation via Der Spiegel that the NSA had monitored German Chancellor Angela Merkel's cell phone.
This document is page 141 of a larger report (likely House Oversight Committee based on the footer) analyzing Edward Snowden's activities and claims regarding NSA data. The text scrutinizes Snowden's narrative that he destroyed all NSA documents in Hong Kong before traveling to Russia, highlighting inconsistencies with statements made by his lawyer, Anatoly Kucherena, and questioning the logic of destroying valuable 'bargaining chips.' It details Snowden's media strategy, including interviews arranged by Ben Wizner with various outlets like the Washington Post and NBC News.
This document page, bearing a House Oversight stamp, details the legal maneuvering surrounding Edward Snowden's NSA leaks. It focuses on the involvement of ACLU lawyer Ben Wizner, who was brought in by journalists Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald to represent Snowden. The text outlines the legal challenges Wizner faced in seeking amnesty for Snowden, particularly distinguishing Snowden's actions from previous whistleblowers and managing the narrative regarding whether classified documents were taken to Russia.
This document discusses the implications of Edward Snowden's arrival in Moscow, suggesting he likely shared NSA documents with Russian intelligence, which outweighed the diplomatic cost of a cancelled summit between Obama and Putin. It details the geopolitical tension involving Sergei Lavrov and Hillary Clinton's State Department, and notes a later narrative shift where Snowden claimed he brought no secret files to Russia during an interview with James Risen.
This page, likely from a House Oversight Committee report, analyzes the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's presence in Russia. It discusses conflicting narratives regarding whether Snowden retained possession of NSA and CIA documents after arriving in Moscow, highlighting inconsistencies between Snowden's claims and statements made by his lawyer, Anatoly Kucherena (who is noted to have ties to the FSB). The text speculates on the FSB's access to Snowden's encrypted data, possibly through cloud storage retrieval or coercion.
This document page (137) from a House Oversight file details the aftermath of Edward Snowden's flight to Russia, specifically focusing on whether he retained sensitive NSA documents. Through interviews with his lawyer Anatoly Kucherena (conducted by Sophie Shevardnadze in 2013 and the author in 2015), it is confirmed that Snowden did not give all documents to journalists in Hong Kong but retained a second, more sensitive set of files while in Russia.
This document is a page from a House Oversight report (Bates stamp 020288) detailing the intelligence leaks attributed to Edward Snowden. It discusses the logistics of how documents were transferred between Snowden, Laura Poitras, and Glenn Greenwald, including the interception of a courier at Heathrow. The text analyzes the potential damage of specific missing documents, particularly 'level 3' lists concerning Russia and China, and questions whether Snowden took these files to Moscow. Note: While the user prompt requested Epstein-related data, this specific page is exclusively focused on the Snowden/NSA leaks.
This document is a page from a report or narrative (marked House Oversight) detailing the NSA's damage assessment regarding Edward Snowden. It analyzes the volume of data stolen (estimated at 1.7 million touched / 1.3 million copied) during his time at Booz Allen and Dell, while noting disputes from Snowden and journalists Greenwald and Bamford regarding these numbers. The text discusses the potential motivations of the NSA Damage Assessment team under Ledgett and the legal implications of the leaks.
This document is page 134, 'Chapter Seventeen,' likely from a book or report regarding Edward Snowden (possibly 'How America Lost Its Secrets' by Edward Jay Epstein). It discusses the 'Snowden enigma,' specifically the disparity between the number of NSA documents compromised versus those handed to journalists. It references comments by Glenn Greenwald and NSA official Ledgett regarding the 'keys to the kingdom'—documents that reveal the core mechanisms of U.S. surveillance. The page bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' footer.
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