| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
Glenn Greenwald
|
Source journalist |
18
Very Strong
|
59 | |
|
person
Laura Poitras
|
Source journalist |
15
Very Strong
|
55 | |
|
person
Anatoly Kucherena
|
Client |
14
Very Strong
|
26 | |
|
person
Sarah Harrison
|
Business associate |
13
Very Strong
|
12 | |
|
person
Ben Wizner
|
Client |
12
Very Strong
|
11 | |
|
organization
Dell
|
Employment |
11
Very Strong
|
23 | |
|
person
Lindsay Mills
|
Romantic |
11
Very Strong
|
8 | |
|
person
Barton Gellman
|
Source journalist |
11
Very Strong
|
10 | |
|
organization
Dell
|
Employee |
11
Very Strong
|
7 | |
|
person
Anatoly Kucherena
|
Legal representative |
11
Very Strong
|
23 | |
|
person
Ron Paul
|
Supporter |
10
Very Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Lindsay Mills
|
Business associate |
10
Very Strong
|
12 | |
|
organization
Booz Allen
|
Employment |
10
Very Strong
|
18 | |
|
person
Gellman
|
Source journalist |
10
Very Strong
|
6 | |
|
person
Putin
|
Political asylum |
10
Very Strong
|
8 | |
|
person
Mills
|
Business associate |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
Jacob Appelbaum
|
Source journalist |
10
Very Strong
|
3 | |
|
person
Lindsay Mills
|
Friend |
10
Very Strong
|
8 | |
|
person
NSA
|
Employee |
10
Very Strong
|
10 | |
|
person
Brian Williams
|
Interviewee interviewer |
10
Very Strong
|
3 | |
|
person
Booz Allen Hamilton
|
Employment |
10
Very Strong
|
7 | |
|
person
Harrison
|
Business associate |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
Robert Tibbo
|
Client |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
Ben Wizner
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
5 | |
|
organization
Booz Allen
|
Employee |
10
Very Strong
|
6 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | Special operation to take Snowden from the plane | Moscow Airport | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden's new security clearance was approved. | USA | View |
| N/A | N/A | Meeting/Press Conference where Snowden requested asylum. | Russia | View |
| N/A | N/A | Potential timeframe for Russian intelligence spotting Snowden | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Planning of face-to-face meeting in Hong Kong between Snowden and Greenwald. | Hong Kong | View |
| N/A | N/A | Edward Snowden took state secrets (communication intercepts) from the NSA. | NSA (implied) | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden provides Gellman with NSA PRISM slides via Poitras. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | A specific discussion regarding the potential exfiltration of Edward Snowden from Hong Kong by Ru... | Hong Kong | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden on video shown in Hong Kong | Hong Kong | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden's first appearance in Russia | Russia | View |
| N/A | N/A | Theft of NSA documents concerning sources and methods in foreign countries. | NSA | View |
| N/A | N/A | First CryptoParty | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | Theft of state secrets. | United States | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden's arrival in Moscow. | Moscow | View |
| N/A | N/A | Theft of documents from the NSA. | NSA (implied) | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden enrolled as a student at UMUC. | UMUC | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden transferred files from Fort Meade to Hawaii, using the activity as cover to steal data. | Fort Meade to Hawaii | View |
| N/A | N/A | Joint Counterintelligence seminar sponsored by DIA where Snowden gave presentations. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | Ewen MacAskill joins the group to verify Snowden's identity. | Snowden's hotel room | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden illicitly hacked into NSA administrative files to steal answers to the NSA entrance exam. | NSA | View |
| N/A | N/A | Release of NSA documents to journalists. | Germany, Brazil | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden attempted to gain entry into the upper ranks of the NSA. | NSA | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden provided documents to journalists. | Hong Kong | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden transferred employment from Dell to Booz Allen. | Unknown | View |
| N/A | N/A | Snowden establishes operational security arrangement with Poitras, involving encrypted files and ... | Unknown | View |
This document, page 130 of a larger report (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020282), analyzes the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's flight to Hong Kong and subsequent move to Russia. It details the strategic calculations made by Vladimir Putin and Russian intelligence to accept Snowden, not out of sentiment, but to capitalize on the disruption to US interests. The text also draws parallels between Snowden's situation and the harsh treatment of Bradley Manning, suggesting Snowden knew he could not return to the US without facing similar imprisonment.
This document appears to be page 129 of a House Oversight report (marked HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020281) discussing Edward Snowden, not Jeffrey Epstein. It details a theory that Russian intelligence may have been aware of Snowden's activities prior to his arrival in Hong Kong in 2013 by monitoring the anti-surveillance activists he communicated with, such as Runa Sandvik and Laura Poitras. The text includes insights from a 2015 interview with a former NSA counterintelligence officer regarding Russian capabilities to bypass encryption and potentially steer Snowden's movements.
This document is page 128 of a report or book (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020280) discussing the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's actions. It analyzes theories regarding when Snowden might have come under Russian influence, arguing against early recruitment due to his risky contact with journalists Greenwald and Poitras, while supporting the 'Hong Kong Scenario' where Russian officials engaged him after his arrival there. The document mentions Putin's direct authorization of Snowden's travel to Moscow. Note: While requested as an 'Epstein-related' document, the text exclusively concerns the Snowden leaks and contains no mentions of Jeffrey Epstein.
This document is page 127 of a House Oversight report analyzing intelligence failures and defectors. It contrasts the rejected asylum request of Chinese official Wang Lijun with the case of Edward Snowden, detailing concerns that Snowden may have been recruited by Russian intelligence as early as 2009 or during his financial troubles in Geneva. The text outlines three possible scenarios for when Snowden came under Russian control and cites assessments by CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell and NSA Director General Keith Alexander.
This document appears to be a page from a narrative book or report (marked as a House Oversight exhibit) detailing Cold War espionage tradecraft. It specifically discusses the case of Robert Hanssen, a 'walk-in' spy who provided the KGB with massive amounts of US intelligence while refusing direct control or face-to-face meetings, and contrasts this with the defection of KGB Major Anatoli Golitsyn in 1962. The text analyzes the intelligence value of 'defectors-in-place' versus those who physically defect to the United States.
This document appears to be page 125 of a larger report or book (Chapter Sixteen: 'The Question of When?'), marked with a House Oversight footer. The text discusses the history and mechanics of espionage, contrasting recruited moles (referencing John Le Carré novels and Heinz Felfe) with 'walk-ins' or self-generated spies (referencing Alexander Poteyev and Robert Hanssen). It analyzes how intelligence agencies manage these assets and notes a 1990 PFIEB finding that most Cold War spies were volunteers rather than recruits.
This document page, marked with a House Oversight footer, discusses theories surrounding Edward Snowden's removal of documents from the NSA. It speculates on the possibility of a hypothetical accomplice within the NSA and suggests that even if Snowden acted as an idealist, he may have been entangled by Russian intelligence services. Note: The text contains a likely typo in the second paragraph ('it does exclude' likely meant 'it does not exclude').
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (marked with House Oversight numbering) discussing the theory that Edward Snowden may have been guided or assisted by a hidden Russian mole within the NSA. The text draws parallels to historical espionage cases involving KGB moles Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, who eluded detection for decades. It includes details of an interview the author conducted in 2015 with Victor Cherkashin, the KGB handler for Hanssen and Ames.
This document appears to be page 122 of a House Oversight report or narrative analysis concerning the Edward Snowden NSA leaks. It explores the 'witting-accomplice scenario,' theorizing that Snowden may have had help from a system administrator or a 'deep-cover spy' to access secure files, although an FBI investigation over six months failed to find any knowing accomplices among his co-workers. The text discusses the culture of the 'geek squad' contractors and the possibility that foreign intelligence utilized Snowden as a distraction.
This document appears to be a page from an investigative report or book regarding the Edward Snowden NSA leaks, bearing a House Oversight Committee stamp. It details the technical security measures at the NSA (EMP shielding, sealed USB ports) and argues that Snowden would have required assistance—potentially a 'witting accomplice'—to bypass these measures and steal data, as he lacked the necessary system administrator privileges and equipment. Note: While the prompt requested an analysis of an 'Epstein-related' document, this specific page refers exclusively to Edward Snowden and NSA security protocols.
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (possibly by Edward Jay Epstein regarding Edward Snowden) submitted as evidence to the House Oversight Committee. It analyzes how Edward Snowden obtained passwords to secure NSA vaults, ruling out his time at Dell or his system admin privileges at Booz Allen. The text explores the 'Unwitting Accomplice Possibility,' featuring an interview with a former Booz Allen executive who deems it highly unlikely that co-workers would voluntarily share passwords with Snowden, leading to a discussion of potential technical methods like 'key loggers.'
This document, page 119 of a House Oversight production, analyzes the distinction between whistle-blowers and spies through the historical examples of Philip Agee and Edward Snowden. It details Agee's 1969 departure from the CIA and subsequent provision of secrets to the KGB and Cuban intelligence. It parallels this with Snowden's 2013 theft of NSA data, arguing that Snowden's behavior—specifically taking a job to access secrets—aligns more with 'penetration agents' than whistle-blowers, and discusses the counterintelligence investigation into how he breached secure systems.
This document appears to be Page 118 (Chapter Fifteen) of a book or report titled 'Did Snowden Act Alone?', stamped with a House Oversight footer. The text discusses the blurred lines between whistleblowers and spies, citing historical examples such as Donald Maclean, Bradley Birkenfeld, and Daniel Ellsberg. It argues that neither financial compensation nor acting alone are definitive distinctions between the two categories, noting that whistleblowers often have accomplices or receive bounties.
This document appears to be a page (114) from a narrative report or book included in House Oversight files. The text discusses Edward Snowden, the compromise of secret documents sent to the cloud, and the role of counterintelligence in understanding the event. There is no explicit mention of Jeffrey Epstein on this specific page.
This document appears to be page 113 of a House Oversight Committee report or narrative regarding Edward Snowden. It details his transition from a technician to a media figure in Moscow, his support network (including Julian Assange and Sarah Harrison), and his media appearances. The text critically analyzes his escape to Russia, suggesting it was not accidental but likely involved cooperation with Russian intelligence (FSB/KGB) and President Putin in exchange for NSA secrets. The text contains several typographical errors (e.g., 'denting' instead of 'denying', 'far trial' instead of 'fair trial').
This document details the logistics of Edward Snowden's flight from Hong Kong to Moscow on June 23rd, facilitated by WikiLeaks staff Sarah Harrison and Jonathan Mann. It describes how Snowden was allowed to board an Aeroflot flight without a valid passport or visa and highlights Julian Assange's strategy of creating 'distractions,' including a fake booking to Cuba and spreading misinformation that grounded Bolivian President Evo Morales' plane. The text appears to be part of a House Oversight Committee report regarding the Snowden incident.
This document, Page 111 of a House Oversight report (marked HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020263), details the timeline of Edward Snowden's stay in Hong Kong in mid-2013 and his interactions with Russian officials prior to fleeing to Moscow. It highlights intelligence suggesting Snowden was in contact with Russian 'diplomatic representatives' well before his public exposure on June 9, 2013, and notes his flight on Aeroflot SU213 on June 23, 2013. The text contrasts Snowden's evasive public statements with reports from the Russian newspaper Kommersant about his visits to the Russian consulate, including a birthday celebration.
This document appears to be 'Chapter Fourteen: Fugitive' from a report (likely House Oversight Committee based on the footer) detailing Edward Snowden's flight from U.S. jurisdiction. It describes his interactions with journalists Poitras, Greenwald, and Gellman, specifically noting Gellman's refusal to help Snowden evade authorities via an encrypted key. The text analyzes Snowden's potential asylum destinations, including Iceland and Ecuador, detailing the logistical and diplomatic attempts made by Assange to secure travel documents, and questions Snowden's intended destination given his lack of visas.
This document appears to be a page from a House Oversight report detailing the events of June 2013 regarding Edward Snowden's flight from the US. It describes a meeting on June 19th between Snowden and his legal team (Tibbo, Mann, and Ho) in a Hong Kong apartment where they discussed a strategy to fight extradition. The text highlights the conflict between the legal advice to stay and fight in court versus Snowden's secret intention to use Hong Kong only as a stopover for his escape to Moscow.
This document, page 107 of a House Oversight record, details the logistics of Edward Snowden's escape from Hong Kong in June 2013. It describes how Wikileaks associate Sarah Harrison, under Julian Assange's direction, used tradecraft such as burner phones and decoy flight bookings (to Beijing and New Delhi) to evade US intelligence before securing a flight to Moscow. The text also analyzes the financial state of Wikileaks at the time and the diplomatic tension regarding extradition between the US, Hong Kong, and China.
This document, likely part of a House Oversight report, details the coordination between Julian Assange and Edward Snowden regarding Snowden's flight from US authorities. It describes Assange's advice for Snowden to seek asylum in Russia rather than Ecuador to manage PR consequences, and his deployment of WikiLeaks staffer Sarah Harrison from Australia to Hong Kong to assist Snowden. The text also covers Harrison's family connections in Hong Kong and Snowden's stated motivations involving the treatment of Bradley Manning.
This document, page 105 of a House Oversight report, outlines the history of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, detailing his hacking background, legal troubles in Sweden and the UK, and his eventual asylum in the Ecuador embassy. It introduces Sarah Harrison as his deputy and close associate. The text concludes with Edward Snowden contacting Assange in June 2013 to request assistance in escaping Hong Kong.
This page, marked with a House Oversight Bates stamp, details the events of mid-June (likely 2013) regarding Edward Snowden's leak of NSA files. It describes Laura Poitras realizing she was being surveilled in Hong Kong and subsequently fleeing to Berlin on June 15th. Simultaneously, the document notes Snowden was finalizing his assessment of stolen files and contacting Julian Assange to arrange his own exit from Hong Kong.
This document (page 103, file HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020255) details an interview between journalist Lana Lam (South China Morning Post) and Edward Snowden, facilitated by Laura Poitras in Hong Kong. The text describes the security measures taken for the interview (TOR laptop, phone confiscation) and Snowden's revelation that he specifically took a job at Booz Allen Hamilton in March 2013 to access lists of machines hacked by the NSA globally. It also notes Snowden's claim that the US government committed crimes against Hong Kong and China, and mentions his subsequent flight to Russia around June 24, 2013.
This document is page 102 of a report (likely House Oversight) detailing the immediate aftermath of Edward Snowden's NSA leaks in June 2013. It describes his logistics in Hong Kong, including moving between hotel rooms at The Mira, engaging lawyers Robert Tibbo and Jonathan Mann, and escaping to a safe house while communicating with journalists Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras. The text also notes Greenwald's subsequent departure to Brazil and the founding of The Intercept.
| Date | Type | From | To | Amount | Description | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | Received | TED Conference / ... | Edward Snowden | $20,000.00 | Fee for electronic participation | View |
| N/A | Received | Unnamed former Bo... | Edward Snowden | $133,000.00 | Actual salary amount according to Booz Allen | View |
| N/A | Received | Unnamed former Bo... | Edward Snowden | $133,000.00 | Actual salary amount according to Booz Allen | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Market | $0.00 | Huge losses suffered playing the options market... | View |
| N/A | Received | Unnamed former Bo... | Edward Snowden | $200,000.00 | Salary amount claimed by Snowden (false) | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Self | $0.00 | Packed cash to pay for his fugitive life. | View |
| N/A | Received | Unnamed former Bo... | Edward Snowden | $200,000.00 | Salary claimed by Snowden. | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Self | $0.00 | Packed cash in luggage to pay for his fugitive ... | View |
| N/A | Received | Unnamed former Bo... | Edward Snowden | $200,000.00 | Salary amount claimed by Snowden (false) | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Self | $0.00 | Brought enough cash to pay living expenses for ... | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Ron Paul Election... | $0.00 | Donation to Libertarian election campaign menti... | View |
| N/A | Received | Unnamed former Bo... | Edward Snowden | $133,000.00 | Actual salary according to Booz Allen. | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Financial Markets | $0.00 | Snowden incurred large losses speculating in th... | View |
| N/A | Received | Unnamed former Bo... | Edward Snowden | $200,000.00 | Salary claimed by Snowden. | View |
| N/A | Received | Unnamed former Bo... | Edward Snowden | $133,000.00 | Actual salary according to Booz Allen records c... | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Financial Markets | $0.00 | Snowden incurred large losses speculating in fi... | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Financial Markets | $0.00 | Snowden incurred large losses speculating in fi... | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Ron Paul Campaign | $0.00 | Campaign contribution. | View |
| N/A | Received | N/A | Edward Snowden | $0.00 | Mention that Snowden's credit cards had been fr... | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Self | $0.00 | Packed cash in luggage to pay for fugitive life. | View |
| N/A | Received | Unknown | Edward Snowden | $0.00 | Reference to Snowden's credit cards being frozen. | View |
| N/A | Received | Unnamed former Bo... | Edward Snowden | $133,000.00 | Actual salary according to Booz Allen. | View |
| N/A | Received | Unnamed former Bo... | Edward Snowden | $200,000.00 | Salary claimed by Snowden. | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Ron Paul's Libert... | $0.00 | Campaign donation mentioned as a matter of publ... | View |
| N/A | Paid | Edward Snowden | Financial Markets | $0.00 | Large losses incurred speculating in financial ... | View |
Brief note stating he was away on a business trip and their relationship was on hold.
Even the Constitution is subverted when the appetites of power demand it...
Snowden told Mills her photographs were not 'sexy' enough.
"It's no secret that we hack China very aggressively"
Two-hour conversation regarding the 'welcome package' and meeting in Hong Kong.
Twenty classified NSA documents labeled 'Top Secret' and a personal manifesto.
Sent FISA warrant and encrypted file of NSA documents with instructions not to show Greenwald yet.
Statement made three weeks after arriving in Russia.
Falsely identified himself as a senior member of the intelligence community.
They [the NSA] are intent on making every conversation and every form of behavior in the world known to them.
Concerns about illicit surveillance.
Internet rants against U.S. surveillance
Contacted Russian officials in Hong Kong
Self-outing by Snowden, showing he had taken large number of NSA documents.
Showed he followed Manning's ordeal closely.
Reported a flaw where a rogue admin in Japan could steal data undetected.
Contacting notable enemies of the NSA.
Claimed he acted to protect U.S. secrets by shielding them from adversaries.
Referenced in 'Citizenfour'.
Snowden avoided describing how he breached security; claimed he was not an 'angel'.
Claims he managed the theft on his own.
Explained listing Buddhist because 'agnostic is strangely absent' from the form.
Snowden contacted these journalists to publish scoops regarding NSA surveillance.
Snowden claimed his superior ordered him not to 'rock the boat' and that he was brushed off by the technical team.
Snowden pointed out the lack of audit mechanisms at his base.
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