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| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | CEOS providing OPR with Outlook data and conducting a check of its shared hard drive for document... | N/A | View |
| N/A | Investigation | OPR investigated a gap in Acosta's emails related to the Epstein investigation, questioning Acost... | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Review of the investigation requested by U.S. Attorney Acosta. | USAO | View |
| N/A | N/A | John Roth handled Starr's letter and reviewed materials related to the Epstein matter, limiting h... | N/A | View |
| 2019-04-01 | N/A | Program reviews conducted for the 3rd quarter of FY 2019. | N/A | View |
| 2008-06-01 | N/A | The Department's Review of federal jurisdiction issues raised by Epstein's defense. | Washington D.C. (implied) | View |
| 2008-05-19 | N/A | CEOS Review | Unknown | View |
| 2008-05-15 | N/A | Review by CEOS and the Criminal Division | DOJ | View |
| 2008-05-01 | N/A | Review of the investigation by CEOS. | Department of Justice | View |
| 2008-03-01 | N/A | Meeting in Washington between the defense team and representatives of the criminal division and C... | Washington | View |
| 2008-01-01 | Investigation | CEOS assigned a Trial Attorney to the Epstein matter. The FBI also interviewed victims during thi... | N/A | View |
| 2008-01-01 | N/A | CEOS assigned a Trial Attorney to the matter. | Unknown | View |
| 2008-01-01 | N/A | Conclusion of CEOS review. | Washington D.C. | View |
| 2007-11-01 | N/A | Communication and review process involving USAO, defense, CEOS, Department's Criminal Division, a... | N/A | View |
This document is a page from a DOJ report (likely OGR) detailing the period between January and June 2008 regarding the Jeffrey Epstein case. It describes the legal tug-of-war between Epstein's defense (Lefkowitz) and the USAO (Acosta) regarding victim notification under the CVRA, with the defense arguing federal notification was inappropriate. It also details internal DOJ reviews of the case evidence by senior officials (Senior, Oosterbaan, Mandelker, Fisher) which delayed the plea deal, while prosecutor Villafaña and the FBI continued to investigate potential federal charges in anticipation of an NPA breach.
This legal document details the aftermath of the signing of a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) with Epstein, focusing on the U.S. Attorney's Office's (USAO) failure to notify victims. OPR's Oosterbaan disagreed with the USAO's decision on policy grounds, while USAO's Sloman believed notification was planned for a later date. Ultimately, despite initial plans by case agents to inform victims, Acosta decided to delay notification about the NPA and its monetary provisions until after Epstein's state guilty plea in June 2008, following objections from Epstein's defense counsel and internal concerns.
This document is a page from a legal filing, likely an investigative report by the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), detailing interviews about the failure to notify victims before a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) was signed. It presents conflicting accounts from key figures like Sloman, Villafaña, and Acosta regarding the USAO's policy on victim consultation under the CVRA for pre-charge resolutions. The text highlights internal disagreement and confusion over the legal obligations to victims, with CEOS Chief Oosterbaan disagreeing with the USAO's stance but not finding it to be an abuse of discretion.
This legal document details a factual dispute investigated by the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) concerning the Epstein case. Prosecutor Villafaña claimed her supervisors—Acosta, Sloman, and Menchel—instructed her not to consult with victims about plea negotiations, an instruction they all deny recalling. The document outlines the conflicting testimonies and notes that while OPR could not definitively resolve the disagreement, it found no documentary evidence to support Villafaña's claim of a specific meeting or instruction on this matter.
This page from an OPR report discusses the handling of the Epstein case, concluding that prosecutors did not intend to benefit Epstein but that the outcome resulted from Acosta's concerns about state authority. It highlights communication failures within the team, noting that while Acosta was unusually involved in decision-making, he was removed from the supervisory chain and may not have been fully aware of critical details known by staff members like Villafaña.
This page from a DOJ OPR report concludes that the frequency of meetings between USAO officials (Acosta, Menchel, Lourie, Sloman, Villafaña) and Epstein's defense team (Starr, Lefkowitz) was not evidence of improper favoritism, given the high-profile nature of the case and the resources of the defendant. It details specific meetings in late 2007 and early 2008, noting that despite defense efforts to involve higher-level DOJ officials (Fisher, Filip), the USAO maintained its position on the federal investigation and the NPA. The report ultimately finds no evidence that these meetings resulted in substantial improper benefits to the defense.
This legal document details internal discussions and challenges within the prosecution team handling the Jeffrey Epstein case. It reveals concerns among prosecutors like Acosta, Lourie, and Sloman regarding victim testimony, legal weaknesses, and setting unfavorable federal precedent, contrasting with Villafaña's proposed charges. The document highlights the complexity of the case, including victims' reluctance to testify, credibility issues raised by the defense, and the influence of Acosta's past role in the Civil Rights Division on his legal strategy.
This legal document analyzes the non-prosecution agreement (NPA) for Jeffrey Epstein in light of the Department of Justice's 'Ashcroft Memo,' which mandates charging the 'most serious readily provable charge.' It contrasts the federal indictment for sex trafficking prepared by prosecutor Villafaña, which carried a 168-210 month sentence, with the eventual plea deal of an 18-month sentence on state charges. The document also reveals internal disagreement, with prosecutors Acosta, Sloman, Menchel, and Lourie perceiving risks in the federal case, while Villafaña and the CEOS Chief believed the charges were appropriate.
This document is an excerpt from a DOJ OPR report detailing the internal review of the Jeffrey Epstein case in 2008. It describes how Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip and prosecutor John Roth reviewed defense appeals (initiated by Ken Starr) regarding the Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), with Filip ultimately dismissing the defense's arguments as 'ludicrous' and refusing to meet with Epstein. The text also highlights prosecutor Marie Villafaña's sarcastic and angry reaction to learning that State Attorney Barry Krischer had secretly negotiated a light 90-day jail sentence for Epstein.
This legal document details communications from May 2008 regarding the Jeffrey Epstein case, where his defense team, including Starr and Whitley, petitioned the Deputy Attorney General for a review. They argued the federal prosecution was unwarranted, irregular, and politically motivated due to Epstein's "close personal association" with former President Bill Clinton. In response, a Senior Associate Deputy Attorney General instructed the U.S. Attorney's Office to postpone a June 2, 2008 plea deadline pending the completion of this high-level review.
This document page from April 2021 describes a series of communications in May 2008 between Jeffrey Epstein's defense team and the Department of Justice. Epstein's lawyers, including Starr and Lefkowitz, raised complaints and sought meetings, while a DOJ section (CEOS), via a letter from official Oosterbaan, concluded that a federal prosecution of Epstein would not be improper, though its review was limited. The defense team continued to press its case, with Lefkowitz requesting a direct meeting with U.S. Attorney Acosta.
This legal document details a March 12, 2008 meeting where Jeffrey Epstein's defense team, including Ken Starr, presented their case to officials from the DOJ's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS). Following the meeting, the defense team submitted written complaints about the U.S. Attorney's Office's conduct, alleging improper coordination with state authorities and conflicts of interest. Footnotes reveal communications indicating the defense team actively tried to block communication between federal and state prosecutors.
This legal document details communications from February and March 2008 between federal prosecutors (Acosta, Sloman, Oosterbaan) and Jeffrey Epstein's defense team (Lefkowitz, Starr). The central conflict involves the scope of the CEOS section's review of the case, with the defense pushing for broader involvement from senior Department of Justice officials and expressing distrust in prosecutor Drew Oosterbaan. The prosecution team expresses frustration with the defense's tactics and concerns about delays, while internal communications reveal doubts about offering Epstein a plea deal.
This document page outlines the Department of Justice hierarchy in early 2008 and details a specific period of review by the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS). It recounts a February 21, 2008 conversation where CEOS Chief Andrew Oosterbaan told attorney Lefkowitz that CEOS could take a 'fresh and objective look' at the case rather than partnering with the USAO, provided that would help the process move forward.
This page from a DOJ OPR report details the internal Department review between February and June 2008 regarding the Epstein case. It highlights that while Epstein's defense sought a broad review of misconduct and NPA terms, the DOJ only reviewed federal jurisdiction issues. The document also records a 'stand down' order where Oosterbaan instructed a CEOS attorney to cease involvement, and details the formal notification sent by the USAO to the Civil Rights Division classifying the case as 'child prostitution' rather than a matter of 'national interest.'
This legal document details how prosecutor Acosta, responding to the defense's desire for a 'fresh face', engaged the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS) to review the evidence in the Epstein case. CEOS attorney Villafaña traveled to Florida, interviewed victims, and reported back to Acosta and Sloman on the victims' severe trauma and their desire for significant jail time for Epstein rather than restitution. The document also notes the CEOS Trial Attorney's assessment to OPR that the victim witnesses presented numerous challenges for a potential prosecution.
This document is an excerpt from a DOJ OPR report detailing the friction between US Attorney Alexander Acosta and Jeffrey Epstein's defense team (specifically Ken Starr and Jay Lefkowitz) regarding the Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA). Acosta expresses frustration with the defense's 'collateral challenges' and lack of finality, setting a strict deadline of December 7, 2007, for them to commit to the agreement or face trial. The text highlights Acosta's internal justification to OPR regarding his handling of the breach of agreement risks and the involvement of DOJ Headquarters.
This document is a page from a DOJ OPR report detailing events in late November 2007 regarding the Epstein Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA). It describes attempts by Epstein's lawyers (Starr and Lefkowitz) to meet with Assistant Attorney General Fisher to complain about the NPA's civil damages provision and victim notification plans. The text highlights internal DOJ dissent, with CEOS Chief Oosterbaan calling the deal 'egregious' and 'advantageous for the defendant,' while Prosecutor Villafaña expressed a desire to indict Epstein due to defense tactics.
This document details the intensification of plea negotiations in the Jeffrey Epstein case during September 2007. It describes the prosecution, led by Acosta and Villafaña, engaging with Epstein's defense counsel, Gerald Lefcourt, over the terms of a plea deal. The focus of the negotiations shifted to the length of imprisonment, with the USAO moving from a two-year minimum to considering an 18-month sentence, while the defense pushed for a sentence involving home confinement.
This legal document details communications among prosecutors Acosta, Villafaña, and Lourie in August 2007 regarding the Epstein investigation. The prosecutors debated strategy concerning defense counsel's efforts to delay litigation and prevent the government from obtaining computer evidence. Ultimately, Acosta decided to meet with the defense, postponing investigative steps and deadlines, believing it was better to keep the matter within the USAO rather than letting it escalate to the main Department of Justice.
This document excerpt details the defense's ongoing efforts in July 2007 to halt a federal investigation into Epstein and prevent the government from obtaining computer equipment, including sending letters to the USAO. Concurrently, CEOS endorsed Villafaña's legal analysis and proposed charges, with CEOS Chief Oosterbaan finding the defense's arguments unpersuasive and offering CEOS's assistance for the prosecution. The document also references a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) and the removal of computer equipment from Epstein's home.
This document details internal discussions within the U.S. Attorney's Office in Miami during May-June 2007 regarding the Jeffrey Epstein case. It describes how prosecutor Villafaña submitted a memorandum seeking to file charges by May 15, but her managers, including Sloman, Menchel, and Lourie, paused the process to conduct a more thorough review, including seeking analysis from the DOJ's CEOS section. The document highlights the tension between the desire to move quickly on the indictment, as pushed by the FBI, and the managers' more cautious approach, which ultimately delayed the charges.
This document is a page from a DOJ OPR report detailing the internal deliberations regarding the federal indictment of Jeffrey Epstein in 2007. It describes AUSA Villafaña's 82-page prosecution memorandum dated May 1, 2007, which recommended a 60-count indictment, and the subsequent strategic disagreement by supervisor Lourie, who preferred a narrower strategy focusing on victims with fewer credibility issues. The text also highlights the unusual involvement of the Miami 'front office' in approval decisions typically handled by the West Palm Beach office.
This document provides a timeline of key events in the federal investigation into Jeffrey Epstein from May 2006 to October 2008. It details the opening of the investigation, meetings between prosecutors and Epstein's counsel, the decision to offer a state-based resolution, and the signing of a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA). The timeline concludes with Epstein's guilty plea in state court, a subsequent legal challenge by a victim (Jane Doe), and the start of Epstein's work release program.
This document details the legal team assembled by Epstein following the opening of a USAO investigation in late 2006. Epstein hired several high-profile attorneys, including former federal prosecutors Guy Lewis and Lilly Ann Sanchez, and later retained Kenneth Starr and Jay Lefkowitz of Kirkland & Ellis, who contacted the USAO on his behalf in August 2007. The defense team was further expanded with the addition of attorneys Martin Weinberg and Joe D. Whitley.
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