United States
LocationRelationship Network
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
location
Israel
|
Political alliance |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
the defendant
|
Citizenship |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
China
|
Geopolitical economic conflict |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
Israel
|
Alliance |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
China
|
Economic strategic |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
Israel
|
Unknown |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
|
Diplomatic adversarial |
5
|
1 | |
|
location
Saudi Arabia
|
Diplomatic economic |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Gulf States (UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar)
|
Strategic alliance |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
Soviet Union
|
Adversarial |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
Soviets
|
Diplomatic adversarial |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
Iran
|
Adversarial diplomatic |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Mr. Thomas
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Schafrick
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Schmidt
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Seabrook
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Sensi
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Sergentakis
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Serrano
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Shaw
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Sliker
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
SNYDER
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Soares
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Spears
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Sprouts
|
Legal representative |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | Modification of the Non-Prosecution Agreement | United States | View |
| N/A | N/A | Discussion of the Syrian situation, including the legitimacy of Mr. Assad, international response... | Global political context, U... | View |
| N/A | N/A | Clarification of provisions in paragraph 7 of the Non-Prosecution Agreement regarding the selecti... | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Assignment of Independent Third-Party | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Non-prosecution agreement (NPA) intended for broad, complete resolution of matters, including Eps... | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) entered into by the United States Attorney's Office, Southern Dis... | Southern District of Florida | View |
| N/A | N/A | Agreement regarding Epstein's charges, sentencing, and victim representation. Includes terms for ... | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | War with Iran / U.S.-led attack | Iran | View |
| N/A | N/A | Negotiation and execution of a plea agreement | Eleventh Circuit | View |
| N/A | N/A | Cold War | Global | View |
| N/A | N/A | Non-Prosecution Agreement execution | Unspecified | View |
| N/A | N/A | Epstein agrees to plea deal (NPA) for 18 months imprisonment. | Florida | View |
| N/A | N/A | Potential Iranian nuclear targeting of US logistics hubs. | Middle East / Bahrain | View |
| N/A | N/A | Selection of attorney representative for victims | Unspecified | View |
| N/A | N/A | Public protests and Mubarak's time of need | Cairo, Egypt | View |
| N/A | N/A | Suspension of federal Grand Jury investigation. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | US shipment of battery-operated TV sets to Pacific islands. | Pacific Ocean islands | View |
| N/A | N/A | Hypothetical conflict/coalition warfare between US and Iran | Middle East | View |
| N/A | N/A | Potential U.S. attack on Iran | Iran | View |
| N/A | N/A | Suspension of federal Grand Jury investigation | Federal Court | View |
| N/A | N/A | Proposed peace conference to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. | U.S. | View |
| N/A | N/A | Palestinian bid for full U.N. membership. | United Nations | View |
| N/A | N/A | United States' decision to pursue warmer ties with Tehran. | International | View |
| N/A | Legal case | United States v. Rodriguez, Case No. 9:09-mj-08308-LRJ | N/A | View |
| N/A | Non-prosecution agreement | Epstein agreed to a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment on two charges, and in return, the ... | N/A | View |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020824.jpg
This is the cover page for a report titled 'USA Inc.: A Basic Summary of America's Financial Statements,' dated February 2011. It features a graphic of a United States map composed of shredded financial paper strips and bears the Bates stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020824'.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020656.jpg
This document is a biographical list titled 'About the Participants,' likely from a House Oversight Committee record (indicated by the footer HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020656). It details the professional titles and affiliations of twelve individuals, many of whom are prominent scholars, diplomats, or experts in Asian studies, China-US relations, and international security. A significant number of the participants are affiliated with Stanford University or major think tanks like the Hoover Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020654.jpg
This document is the 'Afterword' of a report written by Orville Schell and Larry Diamond regarding US-China relations. The text discusses the shift from economic competition to adversarial rivalry, warns about Chinese influence operations in the US, but explicitly cautions against racial profiling or a 'McCarthy era-like reaction' against Chinese-Americans. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' footer, suggesting it is part of a larger document production for a congressional investigation.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020652.jpg
This document is a formal dissenting opinion written by Susan Shirk, likely attached to a larger report regarding Chinese influence in the United States. Shirk argues that the report conflates legitimate and illegitimate activities, thereby overstating the threat China poses to American institutions. She warns that such exaggeration could lead to a new 'Red Scare' and suggests that domestic overreaction poses a greater threat to society than the influence seeking itself.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020649.jpg
This document appears to be Appendix 3 of a House Oversight Committee report (marked HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020649). It details the ownership structures, political leanings, and potential Chinese government (PRC) influence over various Chinese-language media outlets operating in the West, including Duowei, Mingjing, The Epoch Times, and others. It highlights a trend of formerly independent media coming under Beijing's control or softening their stance after 2017.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020648.jpg
This document (marked HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020648, Appendix 3) appears to be part of a Congressional report analyzing Chinese-language media influence in the United States. It details how outlets like SinovisionNet and Qiaobao align closely with official PRC narratives, specifically regarding human rights reports in 2017 and South China Sea tensions. It also notes the trend of independent media outlets being acquired by businessmen sympathetic to the PRC. NOTE: While the user prompt identifies this as 'Epstein-related,' this specific page contains no mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates; it focuses entirely on foreign media influence.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020647.jpg
This document, labeled Appendix 3 (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020647), outlines the social media presence and ownership structures of PRC-funded and PRC-controlled media outlets operating in the United States. It provides statistical data on social media followers for major Chinese state media and details the corporate relationships linking US-based outlets like SinoVision and Sky Link TV back to the Chinese state via the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and other entities. There is no mention of Jeffrey Epstein, flight logs, or specific individuals in this document.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020646.jpg
This document, labeled Appendix 3, outlines the extensive reach of official and semi-official Chinese-language media within the United States infrastructure as of 2018. It details the availability of networks like CCTV, Phoenix TV, and Xinhua across U.S. satellite providers, streaming services, and social media platforms.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020644.jpg
This document is an endnotes/bibliography page (Appendix 2, Page 185) from a House Oversight Committee report. It lists citations for articles and reports published between 2016 and 2018, focusing heavily on Chinese foreign influence, particularly in Western academia (Confucius Institutes), telecommunications (Huawei), and politics (David Cameron's appointment). The citations reference major publications such as The Financial Times, The Guardian, Reuters, and Foreign Policy.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020642.jpg
This document is page 183 of a House Oversight report (Appendix 2) discussing Chinese influence on the United Kingdom's critical infrastructure. It details security concerns regarding Huawei and ZTE in the telecom sector and China General Nuclear Power's investment in UK nuclear plants (Hinkley Point C). While the prompt suggests an Epstein connection, this specific page focuses entirely on geopolitics and UK-China relations, containing no mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638.jpg
This document appears to be page 179 (Appendix 2) of a larger report included in House Oversight Committee files (Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638). The text focuses on geopolitical analysis, specifically Chinese influence operations in the United Kingdom, contrasting the UK's lack of debate on the subject with the US, Australia, and New Zealand. It cites various events involving Singapore and China between 2015 and 2017, but contains no direct references to Jeffrey Epstein or his specific associates on this page.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020634.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a geopolitical analysis report (Appendix 2) included in House Oversight Committee files (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020634). It details diplomatic tensions between China and Singapore, specifically focusing on Singapore's relationship with Taiwan and its stance on the South China Sea. The text analyzes Chinese pressure tactics during Singaporean leadership transitions (2004 and 2016) and influence operations targeting Singaporean civil society.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020633.jpg
This document, page 174 of a House Oversight Committee report (Appendix 2), details the history and methodology of Chinese influence operations in Singapore. It contrasts modern tactics (2016-17) involving social media and 'United Front' work with historical examples, specifically the 1971 revelation that a Hong Kong-based communist intelligence service funded the 'Eastern Sun' newspaper to shape public opinion. It also mentions diplomatic pressure exerted on Singapore in 2004 regarding Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's visit to Taiwan.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020632.jpg
This document appears to be a page (173) from a House Oversight Committee report (Appendix 2) focused on geopolitical issues involving China. It contains citations for works by Anne-Marie Brady regarding Chinese political influence and a section titled 'SINGAPORE AND ASEAN' that analyzes the diplomatic tension between Singapore and China during 2016-2017 regarding the South China Sea disputes. There is no mention of Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, or their associates on this specific page.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020628.jpg
This document page discusses Chinese influence operations in New Zealand, highlighting their strategic interests such as Antarctica and the "Five Eyes" partnership. It notes that influence efforts have increased under Xi Jinping and that New Zealand is vulnerable due to its small size and economic dependence on China. The text references specific incidents, such as a Member of Parliament concealing past involvement with Chinese military intelligence.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020624.jpg
This document, identified as page 165 and Appendix 2 of a House Oversight Committee file, appears to be an excerpt from a report detailing Chinese political influence and foreign relations. It contains bibliographic notes citing articles from 2017 and 2018 regarding EU-China relations, followed by a narrative section analyzing Japan's vulnerability to Chinese influence operations. The text specifically discusses historical war atrocities and the lack of covert influence operations in Japan compared to Western nations; there is no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein on this specific page.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020620.jpg
This document appears to be page 161 of a larger report (marked Appendix 2) submitted to the House Oversight Committee. It details Chinese influence operations in Germany, specifically noting espionage attempts via LinkedIn (revealed in 2017) and the cultivation of business elites to bypass Chancellor Angela Merkel's critical stance on human rights. It discusses the geopolitical impact of the '16-1 group' in Central Europe and identifies former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Philipp Roessler as specific targets of Chinese cultivation efforts. While part of a dataset possibly associated with Epstein or Ghislaine Maxwell investigations (given the House Oversight stamp common in such releases), the text itself is strictly a geopolitical analysis of German-Chinese relations.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020619.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a report (Appendix 2) analyzing Chinese (PRC) influence operations in Europe, specifically detailing activities in France and Germany. It highlights Huawei's financial sponsorships of French academic institutions, PRC control over Chinese-language media in France, and the promotion of pro-China narratives by specific French intellectuals. The section on Germany notes that while Chinese influence is sophisticated, it is hindered by public skepticism stemming from the Tiananmen Square massacre and targets younger professionals and EU stability.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020616.jpg
This document is page 157 (Appendix 2) of a House Oversight report (Bates: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020616) analyzing the historical and diplomatic relationship between France and China. It details shifts in French public opinion from the 1960s Maoist sympathies to tensions following the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown and 2008 Olympics, as well as France's current role in arms sales to Asia and naval operations in the South China Sea. The document also profiles the large Chinese diaspora in France, noting the diverse makeup of the community and the PRC's increasing outreach efforts via its embassy and consulates.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020613.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a report (possibly House Oversight Committee based on the footer) discussing Chinese influence in Canada. It focuses on two main areas: the debate over allowing Huawei into Canada's 5G network due to security concerns raised by former intelligence officials, and the cultural/political dynamics of Chinese students in Canadian universities. The text concludes with an analysis of influence versus interference, noting that Canadian multiculturalism helps blunt specific political efforts by the CCP.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020611.jpg
This document is a page (152, Appendix 2) from a House Oversight report analyzing Chinese state influence operations in Canada. It details how entities like the CCP International Liaison Department target Canadian politicians, academia, and civil society, while noting that Canada has been more resilient than Australia or New Zealand due to material factors and regulatory mechanisms. The text also discusses the geopolitical stance of the Liberal government elected in 2015 and references a 2010 CSIS warning regarding compromised provincial officials.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020610.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a House Oversight Committee report (Appendix 2) focused on foreign influence, specifically Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence in Australia and Canada. The text contains extensive footnotes citing Australian media and government sources from 2017-2018 regarding political donations, espionage, and legislative responses to foreign interference. The body text begins a section on Canada, noting its long history with the PRC, significant student population (160,000), and a 1997 RCMP-SIS report on interference. There is no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein on this specific page.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020604.jpg
This document is 'Appendix 2' of a larger report, likely from the House Oversight Committee, detailing Chinese influence activities globally. It outlines the CCP's strategy of using 'soft power' (research centers, media, university ties) and economic leverage to suppress criticism and penetrate democratic institutions in countries including Australia, Canada, and the UK. The text highlights the asymmetry of China closing its own borders to influence while exploiting the openness of democratic systems abroad.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020600.jpg
This document, labeled Appendix 1 with a House Oversight footer, details the organizational structure of China's State Council Information Office (SCIO) and the External Propaganda Leading Group (EPLG). It explains the dual nature of the organization ('one organ, two signboards') serving both the State and the Communist Party to coordinate international propaganda. The footnotes cite various reports from 2014 to 2018 regarding Chinese influence operations.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020599.jpg
This document, labeled as Appendix 1 from a House Oversight Committee file (Bates 020599), outlines the functions of the ILD (International Liaison Department). It details the department's role in intelligence collection, diplomatic liaison (specifically between the US and North Korea), and influence operations through NGOs, think tanks, and foreign visits. It highlights the ILD as a critical but underappreciated instrument of China's international influence.
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