House Oversight Committee
OrganizationRelationship Network
Event Timeline
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
David Schoen
|
Legal representative |
14
Very Strong
|
23 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Submitter recipient |
11
Very Strong
|
9 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Submission |
11
Very Strong
|
7 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Document production |
10
Very Strong
|
11 | |
|
person
Federal Register document
|
Evidentiary exhibit |
7
|
1 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Submission of evidence |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Investigative subject witness |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Bank of America Merrill Lynch
|
Investigative subject provider |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Production submission |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Unknown |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Submission involvement |
6
|
1 | |
|
organization
APO
|
Investigator subject of interest |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Document producer |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Investigation subject provider |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Goldman Sachs
|
Document production |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Evidence submission |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Document producer recipient |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
SinoVision
|
Subject of investigation citation |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Subject of investigation discovery |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Submitter investigative subject |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Document provider |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Bank of America Merrill Lynch
|
Document provider |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Ackrell Capital
|
Investigative subject evidence |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research
|
Investigative subject evidence provider |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
David Schoen
|
Subject of inquiry document provider |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019-07-08 | N/A | Call from House Oversight Committee to DOJ regarding Jeffrey Epstein indictment. | N/A | View |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020296.jpg
This document appears to be page 144 of a book or report (likely by Edward Jay Epstein) analyzing the timeline of NSA document leaks attributed to Edward Snowden. It questions how Snowden could continue releasing documents via Wikileaks and The Intercept (regarding French presidents and Israeli operations) years after supposedly destroying his files in Hong Kong, suggesting potential involvement or approval by Russian intelligence services. The text details specific leaks from June and July 2015 and cites interviews with intelligence officials.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020295.jpg
This document, marked as House Oversight material, analyzes the Snowden leaks specifically regarding the surveillance of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. It argues that the document revealing the spying on Merkel was not part of the original cache Snowden gave to Greenwald and Poitras in Hong Kong, suggesting it was released later from Moscow or via another source. The text details James Bamford's forensic analysis of the drive, which found no mention of Merkel, leading to speculation about how *Der Spiegel* obtained the information.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020294.jpg
This document page, bearing a House Oversight footer, details intelligence community concerns regarding Edward Snowden's stay in Hong Kong in 2013. It discusses the high probability that Chinese and Russian intelligence services accessed the stolen NSA files on Snowden's laptops through technical or human means while he was at the Mira Hotel and other residences. The text also covers subsequent leaks published after Snowden arrived in Moscow, specifically the revelation via Der Spiegel that the NSA had monitored German Chancellor Angela Merkel's cell phone.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020293.jpg
This document is page 141 of a larger report (likely House Oversight Committee based on the footer) analyzing Edward Snowden's activities and claims regarding NSA data. The text scrutinizes Snowden's narrative that he destroyed all NSA documents in Hong Kong before traveling to Russia, highlighting inconsistencies with statements made by his lawyer, Anatoly Kucherena, and questioning the logic of destroying valuable 'bargaining chips.' It details Snowden's media strategy, including interviews arranged by Ben Wizner with various outlets like the Washington Post and NBC News.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020292.jpg
This document page, bearing a House Oversight stamp, details the legal maneuvering surrounding Edward Snowden's NSA leaks. It focuses on the involvement of ACLU lawyer Ben Wizner, who was brought in by journalists Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald to represent Snowden. The text outlines the legal challenges Wizner faced in seeking amnesty for Snowden, particularly distinguishing Snowden's actions from previous whistleblowers and managing the narrative regarding whether classified documents were taken to Russia.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020291.jpg
This document discusses the implications of Edward Snowden's arrival in Moscow, suggesting he likely shared NSA documents with Russian intelligence, which outweighed the diplomatic cost of a cancelled summit between Obama and Putin. It details the geopolitical tension involving Sergei Lavrov and Hillary Clinton's State Department, and notes a later narrative shift where Snowden claimed he brought no secret files to Russia during an interview with James Risen.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020290.jpg
This page, likely from a House Oversight Committee report, analyzes the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's presence in Russia. It discusses conflicting narratives regarding whether Snowden retained possession of NSA and CIA documents after arriving in Moscow, highlighting inconsistencies between Snowden's claims and statements made by his lawyer, Anatoly Kucherena (who is noted to have ties to the FSB). The text speculates on the FSB's access to Snowden's encrypted data, possibly through cloud storage retrieval or coercion.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020289.jpg
This document page (137) from a House Oversight file details the aftermath of Edward Snowden's flight to Russia, specifically focusing on whether he retained sensitive NSA documents. Through interviews with his lawyer Anatoly Kucherena (conducted by Sophie Shevardnadze in 2013 and the author in 2015), it is confirmed that Snowden did not give all documents to journalists in Hong Kong but retained a second, more sensitive set of files while in Russia.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020288.jpg
This document is a page from a House Oversight report (Bates stamp 020288) detailing the intelligence leaks attributed to Edward Snowden. It discusses the logistics of how documents were transferred between Snowden, Laura Poitras, and Glenn Greenwald, including the interception of a courier at Heathrow. The text analyzes the potential damage of specific missing documents, particularly 'level 3' lists concerning Russia and China, and questions whether Snowden took these files to Moscow. Note: While the user prompt requested Epstein-related data, this specific page is exclusively focused on the Snowden/NSA leaks.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020287.jpg
This document is a page from a report or narrative (marked House Oversight) detailing the NSA's damage assessment regarding Edward Snowden. It analyzes the volume of data stolen (estimated at 1.7 million touched / 1.3 million copied) during his time at Booz Allen and Dell, while noting disputes from Snowden and journalists Greenwald and Bamford regarding these numbers. The text discusses the potential motivations of the NSA Damage Assessment team under Ledgett and the legal implications of the leaks.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020285.jpg
This document appears to be page 133 of a House Oversight Committee report regarding Edward Snowden. It details his arrival in Russia, the orchestration of his asylum press conference at Sheremetyevo airport, and his life in Moscow, including internet appearances at SXSW and TED. The report alleges that Snowden's lawyer, Kucherena, received $1 million from Open Road Films (distributors of the Oliver Stone movie) as a proxy payment, and argues that Snowden's privileged treatment by Putin implies active cooperation with Russian intelligence.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020284.jpg
This document discusses the likelihood of Edward Snowden's cooperation with Russian security services (FSB) following his arrival in Russia. It cites experts like Andrei Soldatov and General Oleg Kalugin, who argue that the FSB would inevitably control and exploit Snowden, and details how lawyer Anatoly Kucherena facilitated Snowden's stay in Moscow under Kremlin-dictated terms.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020283.jpg
This document, labeled as a House Oversight record (page 131), details the geopolitical maneuvering surrounding Edward Snowden's flight from Hong Kong to Russia in 2013. It discusses the lack of an extradition treaty between Russia and the US, Vladimir Putin's approval of the exfiltration, and the 'Moscow Scenario' where the FSB took control of Snowden upon arrival. The text highlights that Snowden was prevented from traveling to other nations (Cuba, Venezuela, etc.) and was effectively detained in the airport transit zone/FSB safe houses, with Putin adviser Sergei Markov noting Snowden's value in compromising US intelligence officials.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020282.jpg
This document, page 130 of a larger report (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020282), analyzes the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's flight to Hong Kong and subsequent move to Russia. It details the strategic calculations made by Vladimir Putin and Russian intelligence to accept Snowden, not out of sentiment, but to capitalize on the disruption to US interests. The text also draws parallels between Snowden's situation and the harsh treatment of Bradley Manning, suggesting Snowden knew he could not return to the US without facing similar imprisonment.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020281.jpg
This document appears to be page 129 of a House Oversight report (marked HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020281) discussing Edward Snowden, not Jeffrey Epstein. It details a theory that Russian intelligence may have been aware of Snowden's activities prior to his arrival in Hong Kong in 2013 by monitoring the anti-surveillance activists he communicated with, such as Runa Sandvik and Laura Poitras. The text includes insights from a 2015 interview with a former NSA counterintelligence officer regarding Russian capabilities to bypass encryption and potentially steer Snowden's movements.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020280.jpg
This document is page 128 of a report or book (stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020280) discussing the intelligence implications of Edward Snowden's actions. It analyzes theories regarding when Snowden might have come under Russian influence, arguing against early recruitment due to his risky contact with journalists Greenwald and Poitras, while supporting the 'Hong Kong Scenario' where Russian officials engaged him after his arrival there. The document mentions Putin's direct authorization of Snowden's travel to Moscow. Note: While requested as an 'Epstein-related' document, the text exclusively concerns the Snowden leaks and contains no mentions of Jeffrey Epstein.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020278.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a narrative book or report (marked as a House Oversight exhibit) detailing Cold War espionage tradecraft. It specifically discusses the case of Robert Hanssen, a 'walk-in' spy who provided the KGB with massive amounts of US intelligence while refusing direct control or face-to-face meetings, and contrasts this with the defection of KGB Major Anatoli Golitsyn in 1962. The text analyzes the intelligence value of 'defectors-in-place' versus those who physically defect to the United States.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020277.jpg
This document appears to be page 125 of a larger report or book (Chapter Sixteen: 'The Question of When?'), marked with a House Oversight footer. The text discusses the history and mechanics of espionage, contrasting recruited moles (referencing John Le Carré novels and Heinz Felfe) with 'walk-ins' or self-generated spies (referencing Alexander Poteyev and Robert Hanssen). It analyzes how intelligence agencies manage these assets and notes a 1990 PFIEB finding that most Cold War spies were volunteers rather than recruits.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020276.jpg
This document page, marked with a House Oversight footer, discusses theories surrounding Edward Snowden's removal of documents from the NSA. It speculates on the possibility of a hypothetical accomplice within the NSA and suggests that even if Snowden acted as an idealist, he may have been entangled by Russian intelligence services. Note: The text contains a likely typo in the second paragraph ('it does exclude' likely meant 'it does not exclude').
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020275.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (marked with House Oversight numbering) discussing the theory that Edward Snowden may have been guided or assisted by a hidden Russian mole within the NSA. The text draws parallels to historical espionage cases involving KGB moles Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, who eluded detection for decades. It includes details of an interview the author conducted in 2015 with Victor Cherkashin, the KGB handler for Hanssen and Ames.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020274.jpg
This document appears to be page 122 of a House Oversight report or narrative analysis concerning the Edward Snowden NSA leaks. It explores the 'witting-accomplice scenario,' theorizing that Snowden may have had help from a system administrator or a 'deep-cover spy' to access secure files, although an FBI investigation over six months failed to find any knowing accomplices among his co-workers. The text discusses the culture of the 'geek squad' contractors and the possibility that foreign intelligence utilized Snowden as a distraction.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020273.jpg
This document appears to be a page from an investigative report or book regarding the Edward Snowden NSA leaks, bearing a House Oversight Committee stamp. It details the technical security measures at the NSA (EMP shielding, sealed USB ports) and argues that Snowden would have required assistance—potentially a 'witting accomplice'—to bypass these measures and steal data, as he lacked the necessary system administrator privileges and equipment. Note: While the prompt requested an analysis of an 'Epstein-related' document, this specific page refers exclusively to Edward Snowden and NSA security protocols.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020272.jpg
This document appears to be a page from a book or investigative report (possibly by Edward Jay Epstein regarding Edward Snowden) submitted as evidence to the House Oversight Committee. It analyzes how Edward Snowden obtained passwords to secure NSA vaults, ruling out his time at Dell or his system admin privileges at Booz Allen. The text explores the 'Unwitting Accomplice Possibility,' featuring an interview with a former Booz Allen executive who deems it highly unlikely that co-workers would voluntarily share passwords with Snowden, leading to a discussion of potential technical methods like 'key loggers.'
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020271.jpg
This document, page 119 of a House Oversight production, analyzes the distinction between whistle-blowers and spies through the historical examples of Philip Agee and Edward Snowden. It details Agee's 1969 departure from the CIA and subsequent provision of secrets to the KGB and Cuban intelligence. It parallels this with Snowden's 2013 theft of NSA data, arguing that Snowden's behavior—specifically taking a job to access secrets—aligns more with 'penetration agents' than whistle-blowers, and discusses the counterintelligence investigation into how he breached secure systems.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020270.jpg
This document appears to be Page 118 (Chapter Fifteen) of a book or report titled 'Did Snowden Act Alone?', stamped with a House Oversight footer. The text discusses the blurred lines between whistleblowers and spies, citing historical examples such as Donald Maclean, Bradley Birkenfeld, and Daniel Ellsberg. It argues that neither financial compensation nor acting alone are definitive distinctions between the two categories, noting that whistleblowers often have accomplices or receive bounties.
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